tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post894161357566167804..comments2023-07-16T04:38:04.407-05:00Comments on Spinuzzi: Symmetry as a methodological move, part IIIClay Spinuzzihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13356273383001825508noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post-53790321358010942802012-10-09T14:27:18.476-05:002012-10-09T14:27:18.476-05:00Right, you've put your finger on one of the di...Right, you've put your finger on one of the disagreements between Latoureans and Vygotskians: agency. I wrote about this disagreement in my book <i><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Network-Theorizing-Knowledge-Work-Telecommunications/dp/0521895049/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1349809337&sr=8-1&keywords=spinuzzi+network" rel="nofollow">Network</a></i>, and Kaptelinin and Nardi have another (smart, Vygotskian) take in <i><a href="http://spinuzzi.blogspot.com/2007/01/reading-acting-with-technology.html" rel="nofollow">Acting with Technology</a></i>. <br /><br />The Vygotskian take on mediation is that the human being acts, mediated by physical and psychological tools. In the final analysis, though, we're talking about <i>human</i> activity, activity that is directed and controlled by human beings. Although activity theory, which descends from Vygotsky, is often characterized as distributed cognition, at the heart of its understanding of cognition is the human being acting in collective human activity. That is, we're talking about human agency—and activity theory, despite its distribution of cognition, is ultimately an asymmetrical theory. This perspective is very amenable to humanists, which I think is part of why people in my field (professional communication) have been eager to embrace it.<br /><br />The Latourean take on mediation is much more distributed, with agency being an emergent property of the system. That is, it is genuinely symmetrical, with any element of the system (human or nonhuman) potentially being an actor. Furthermore, "system" becomes harder to define, since any actor is also a network. For instance, we could examine a hammer as part of an actor-network, but we could also see the hammer's components as separate and important in different actor-networks—a hammer is suddenly differentiated into components, for instance, if we carry it past a strong magnetic field (which acts on just part of the hammer) or throw it into the fire (in which case part of the hammer will be burned up). That's a long way of saying that Latour's actor-network theory is ontologically focused. <br /><br />Hutchins belongs to neither tradition, though he is conversant with both. But—and I thought this was the most interesting thing—he made the methodological choice to focus on propagation of representational states because that focus and perspective allowed him to get at the question he wanted to ask: how does the ship know what individual sailors don't? <br /><br />And that brings us to the question you asked. Is science a search for truth or heuristics? For Hutchins—and, I think, for Latour—symmetry is a methodological move in that it allows us to set aside long-held assumptions and ask: what if we view it this way instead? And what we find, I think, is that it allows us to look at phenomena from very different angles and investigate very different components of a phenomenon. A scale and a spectrometer give you very different data, but that doesn't mean one is more truthful than the other. Similarly, these theoretical "instruments" let us get at different phenomena that we normally might not consider. Like a scale and a spectograph, these are not exclusive, nor are they irreconcilable.Clay Spinuzzihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13356273383001825508noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post-56262181528863754042012-10-09T00:24:39.918-05:002012-10-09T00:24:39.918-05:00Clay,
>in which the medium and the mediated (u...Clay,<br /><br />>in which the medium and the mediated (us) <br />>mutually affect each other, developing in tandem. <br /><br />There is an interesting tension here between the notions 'mediation' and 'symmetry'. This reminds me of questions that keep me up at night: Is 'science' a search for a preexisting truth or a debate over heuristics? In the context of the symmetry essays, is the 2000 pound weight restriction a truth or a pointer proven over time to cause useful reactions?<br /><br />>understanding agency as also mediated, as an emergent property<br />>of the system-that is, as symmetrical<br /><br />It would probably be helpful for you to elaborate here. As I understand it, you are saying 'agency' is an emergent property or consequence of some sort of balanced mediation. I would be more comfortable if 'agency' was broadened to 'human agency'. This ties into another uncomfortable phrase used above, 'human activity is no longer strictly human'. It isn't clear to me that 'human activity' was ever 'strictly human'. Wouldn't it be just as logical to say 'human activity' and 'human agency' are emergent from mediated 'non-human agency', and never has been, nor will be 'strictly human'? <br /><br />>My aim in this blog series is to break down the <br />>notion of symmetry into small chunks with everyday examples, <br /><br />Ah! more of that tension between the 'always' and the 'emergent'. :-)<br /><br />MarkAnonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03468603936415497403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post-63500355775109173092012-10-08T09:43:35.591-05:002012-10-08T09:43:35.591-05:00For an easy example, imagine having to multiply tw...<br />For an easy example, imagine having to multiply two 8-digit numbers. Doing this in our heads is very difficult; I couldn't do it. Doing it on paper is eminently possible—if we know an algorithm and can perform it on paper. The algorithm that I was taught in school involves placing the numbers in precise columns, then working right to left and knowing how to "carry" excess digits. Alternately, one could use alternate approaches using representational states, such as <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chisanbop" rel="nofollow">chisanbop</a> or blocks or a calculator, each of which might involve a different understanding of the problem. (Not incidentally, <a href="http://spinuzzi.blogspot.com/2011/01/reading-before-writing-volume-i.html" rel="nofollow">one such representation system became the basis of writing</a>.)<br /><br />So mediation changes the task, making it simpler but also affecting it in other ways. Vygotsky argues for a <a href="http://spinuzzi.blogspot.com/2007/01/reading-mind-in-society-supplemental.html" rel="nofollow">dialectical understanding of cognition</a>, in which the medium and the mediated (us) mutually affect each other, developing in tandem. Arguably, adopting a medium also involves adopting some of the sociocultural assumptions that went into its development. That is, as we expand our cognitive capabilities by adopting more and more mediators (tools, algorithms, texts), we ourselves tend to soak up the assumptions and values that go into learning how to use these mediators. (I go down this path myself in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Tracing-Genres-through-Organizations-Sociocultural/dp/0262194910/ref=sr_1_10?ie=UTF8&qid=1349706613&sr=8-10&keywords=spinuzzi" rel="nofollow">my first book</a>.) That is, not just in cognition but in assumptions and values, human activity is no longer strictly human (i.e., residing in individual cognition, volition, etc.) but spread across the range of mediators that the human being uses in her or his activity.<br /><br />And this leads to the question of agency, which is often the sticking point in discussions of Latour. That's because many who are willing to go as far as Vygotsky (understanding activity as mediated) are reluctant to go the next step, as Latour does (understanding agency as also mediated, as an emergent property of the system—that is, as symmetrical). (Again, I apologize for the gross oversimplification). That is, people understand themselves as making choices and initiating actions; they read Latour as claiming that those choices and actions are not theirs, but their tools'.<br /><br />Latour doesn't help these people much because his style of argumentation is florid and metaphorical. My aim in this blog series is to break down the notion of symmetry into small chunks with everyday examples, and to examine it as a methodological stance that allows us to examine interactions from a certain angle rather than as a foundational, overarching explanation of human activity. That is, I want people to get comfortable with <i>trying on symmetry to see how it fits</i>, like trying on a pair of shoes, rather than feeling that they must <i>adopt symmetry as a worldview</i>, like converting to a new religion!<br /><br />I hope this explanation doesn't wander too much—I'm dashing it off before replying to a ton of email. Please do write back if it seems unclear, unsatisfactory, or completely wrong-headed :)Clay Spinuzzihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13356273383001825508noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post-71818332070301002962012-10-08T09:43:30.850-05:002012-10-08T09:43:30.850-05:00Right, I think that perhaps the underlying piece i...Right, I think that perhaps the underlying piece is the notion of <i>mediation</i>, although that notion is understood a bit differently in Latour, Hutchins, and (beneath it all) Vygotsky.<br /><br />Some versions of hardcore cognitive psychology conceive of cognition as occurring strictly within the skull, and understand cognitive interaction with the outside world in terms of modeling parts of the world in working memory (and I apologize for the gross oversimplification here). In the Vygotskian tradition, however, interaction with the world is understood as mediated by physical and semiotic tools; the tools change the problem space, making feats of cognition possible that would not be possible otherwise—in other words, spreading cognition across the problem space. <br /><br />An example of the dialogue between the two views shows up in <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/5/3" rel="nofollow"><i>Mind, Culture, and Activity</i> 5.3</a>, in which Ericsson and Simon are frankly puzzled by Smagorinsky's explanation of mediation. Why can't we just understand mediation as represented in working memory? they ask.<br /><br />The answer according to <a href="http://spinuzzi.blogspot.com/2007/01/reading-in-society.html" rel="nofollow">Vygotsky</a> is that mediation actually <i>changes the task</i> (a point made separately by Hutchins and—if memory serves—Norman). <br />...<br />Clay Spinuzzihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13356273383001825508noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post-56800618184133423682012-10-08T00:29:16.432-05:002012-10-08T00:29:16.432-05:00Hello, Clay.
>instead of speculating about
>...Hello, Clay.<br /><br />>instead of speculating about<br />>internal mental states, <br />>he observes evidence of how<br />>information propagates in <br />>the environment.<br /><br />Good enough. Talking about how ' "cognition" is not confined to what happens inside the skull' certainly has advantages.<br /><br />It isn't clear to me where you are going with this, though. I'm fine with the symmetry discussion, and I'm fine with the distributed cognition argument, but I'm puzzled by the combination. Assuming some would say 'cognition is in the head', then using 'head count' symmetry one could conclude 'more heads is always better', which certainly fails. Searle's riddles and Hutchins instrumentalism might suggest an explanation for that failure, but I suspect few would find the argument removes doubt. For example, some would agree that heads are never symmetrical, but there is no need to posit cognition outside the head. They might argue, atoms of 'cognition' are symmetrical, but some heads work at faster speeds (faster cpu cycles). It is an explanation that seems to conveniently rationalize the problem.<br /><br />I'm left wondering if the subject is Hutchins, symmetry or a topic that has escaped me entirely.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03468603936415497403noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post-64583038176244389892012-10-07T18:35:44.967-05:002012-10-07T18:35:44.967-05:00Hi, Mark. Yes. Hutchins uses a materialist, extern...Hi, Mark. Yes. Hutchins uses a materialist, externalist approach to cognition. So, instead of speculating about internal mental states, he observes evidence of how information propagates in the environment. From the study, that evidence includes observable representational states such as written marks, positioning of tools, and speech. <br /><br />For instance, in one chapter, he examines how the ship takes bearings, following a chain of representations from sighting specific landmarks (that is, identifying readings from a tool pointed at each landmark), to speaking those readings through an intercom, to writing those readings on scrap paper, to setting the hoey (a protractor-like tool) with those readings, to placing it on the map, and so forth. Each link in the chain is observable, verifiable, and measurable. <br /><br />For that and many other reasons, it's a remarkable book that I can't recommend highly enough. Clay Spinuzzihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13356273383001825508noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-33273315.post-9241859982455210692012-10-06T16:17:19.667-05:002012-10-06T16:17:19.667-05:00>He brilliantly demonstrates that
>much of w...>He brilliantly demonstrates that<br />>much of what we might have assumed<br />>was expertise or intelligence is <br />>instead attributable to how these <br />>representational states propagate.<br /><br />What is a 'representational state'? <br /><br />Can a scientific instrument measure or alter it?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03468603936415497403noreply@blogger.com