Reading :: The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State

The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State
By Frederick Engels

I've linked to the free Kindle version of this book (and I have to say it's a real blessing to be able to download these works for free). But you can also find a PDF download at Marxists dot Org; for convenience, I'll be copying quotes from that version.

For background: Engels published this book in 1884, shortly after finishing the draft of Dialectics of Nature in 1882.  But whereas Dialectics of Nature is perhaps best known for its account of how labor made man, the present book is about how the family evolved along with private property and the state.

Engels' book is based in sketchy 19th-century anthropology and, in accordance with Marxism, seeks to explain social dimensions through economics. Much of what he claims here has been since discredited by later anthropology (see Fried's The Notion of Tribe and The Evolution of Political Society and Kuper's The Invention of Primitive Society). Let's acknowledge that openly. But we'll keep our eye on the ball, attending to what this account tells us about the Marx-Engels viewpoint rather than taking it as a true account of societal evolution.

First, Engels sees humanity progressing in defined stages—in accordance with both Marxist theory and 18th century anthropology. In this account, tribes (including contemporary tribes such as the Iroquois) were seen as being in previous stages, progressing to later ones. (Compare to Luria's Uzbekistan study.) Engels argues in Chapter 1, "Stages of Prehistoric Culture," that these stages included:

I. Savagery

1. The "infancy of the human race," which may have lasted "thousands of years" and involved living in original habitations
2. The "middle stage," in which man discovered fire and began eating fish—and each other. 
3. The "higher stage," beginning with the invention of the bow and arrow, involving hunting as an occupation

II. Barbarism

1. The "lower stage," dating from invention of pottery; at this point, populations began to diverge because of differing natural resources.
2. The "middle stage," beginning with the domestication of animals, agriculture, and adobe. He locates the Native Americans (specifically the Pueblos) at this stage.
3. The "higher stage," which "Begins with the smelting of iron ore, and passes into civilization with the invention of alphabetic writing and its use for literary records."

Here, we pass to Chapter 2, on the origins of the family. He bases this account on Morgan's kinship study of the Iroquois and secondarily on other kinship studies. One passage helps us to understand his assumptions:

While, therefore, the American system of consanguinity presupposes a more primitive form of the family which has disappeared in America, but still actually exists in Hawaii, the Hawaiian system of consanguinity, on the other hand, points to a still earlier form of the family which, though we can nowhere prove it to be still in existence, nevertheless must have existed; for otherwise the corresponding system of consanguinity could never have arisen.

This reasoning makes sense as long as one buys the notion that all societies go through the same stages of development.

Engels goes on to catalogue different kinds of families,  fitting them into universal developmental stages (rather than seeing them as different lines of development) and especially paying attention to the interaction with economics. For instance:

Here the domestication of animals and the breeding of herds had developed a hitherto unsuspected source of wealth and created entirely new social relations. Up to the lower stage of barbarism, permanent wealth had consisted almost solely of house, clothing, crude ornaments and the tools for obtaining and preparing food – boat, weapons, and domestic utensils of the simplest kind. Food had to be won afresh day by day. Now, with their herds of horses, camels, asses, cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs, the advancing pastoral peoples – the Semites on the Euphrates and the Tigris, and the Aryans in the Indian country of the Five Streams (Punjab), in the Ganges region, and in the steppes then much more abundantly watered of the Oxus and the Jaxartes – had acquired property which only needed supervision and the rudest care to reproduce itself in steadily increasing quantities and to supply the most abundant food in the form of milk and meat. All former means of procuring food now receded into the background; hunting, formerly a necessity, now became a luxury.

The family, he says, transitions from the pairing family to the monogamous family. Quoting Marx, he argues that the monogamous family is the model of servitude: the wife becomes the husband's property. After some discussion, he adds:

This is the origin of monogamy as far as we can trace it back among the most civilized and highly developed people of antiquity. It was not in any way the fruit of individual sex-love, with which it had nothing whatever to do; marriages remained as before marriages of convenience. It was the first form of the family to be based, not on natural, but on economic conditions – on the victory of private property over primitive, natural communal property.

And he adds:

The first class opposition that appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression coincides with that of the female sex by the male. Monogamous marriage was a great historical step forward; nevertheless, together with slavery and private wealth, it opens the period that has lasted until today in which every step forward is also relatively a step backward, in which prosperity and development for some is won through the misery and frustration of others. It is the cellular form of civilized society, in which the nature of the oppositions and contradictions fully active in that society can be already studied. 

He concludes: "We thus have three principal forms of marriage which correspond broadly to the three principal stages of human development." (That is, marriage is part of these linear stages.) The most recent form of marriage, like the most recent form of human development, relies on oppression. So he boldly predicts:

We are now approaching a social revolution in which the economic foundations of monogamy as they have existed hitherto will disappear just as surely as those of its complement-prostitution. Monogamy arose from the concentration of considerable wealth in the hands of a single individuals man-and from the need to bequeath this wealth to the children of that man and of no other. For this purpose, the monogamy of the woman was required, not that of the man, so this monogamy of the woman did not in any way interfere with open or concealed polygamy on the part of the man. But by transforming by far the greater portion, at any rate, of permanent, heritable wealth – the means of production – into social property, the coming social revolution will reduce to a minimum all this anxiety about bequeathing and inheriting. Having arisen from economic causes, will monogamy then disappear when these causes disappear?

That is, he sees monogamous marriage as an effect of the economic cause, and changes in economics will thus lead to changes in marriage:

With the transfer of the means of production into common ownership, the single family ceases to be the economic unit of society. Private housekeeping is transformed into a social industry. The care and education of the children becomes a public affair; society looks after all children alike, whether they are legitimate or not. This removes all the anxiety about the “consequences,” which today is the most essential social –moral as well as economic – factor that prevents a girl from giving herself completely to the man she loves.

(One can see a similar, but much better grounded, argument in Castells' The Power of Identity.)

In the next chapter, Engels draws on the notion of the noble savage, examining the Iroquois (via Morgan) and their division into gens. The society is seen as wonderful in its simplicity, with little division of labor, little administration, a general caring for the needs of the community, and general equality. "And what men and women such a society breeds is proved by the admiration inspired in all white people who have come into contact with unspoiled Indians, by the personal dignity, uprightness, strength of character, and courage of these barbarians." He adds,

That is what men and society were before the division into classes. And when we compare their position with that of the overwhelming majority of civilized men today, an enormous gulf separates the present-day proletarian and small peasant from the free member of the old gentile society.

But, he concedes, this organization was "doomed" because it could not scale beyond the tribe.

In the next chapter, he discusses the Greek gens, which developed beyond the "stage" represented by the Iroquois. Toward the end of this chapter, he argues that the old gentile order began to disintegrate.

Only one thing was wanting: an institution which not only secured the newly acquired riches of individuals against the communistic traditions of the gentile order, which not only sanctified the private property formerly so little valued, and declared this sanctification to be the highest purpose of all human society; but an institution which set the seal of general social recognition on each new method of acquiring property and thus amassing wealth at continually increasing speed; an institution which perpetuated, not only this growing cleavage of society into classes, but also the right of the possessing class to exploit the non-possessing, and the rule of the former over the latter. And this institution came. The state was invented.

The next chapter describes the rise of the Athenian state. The rise of private property (e.g., herds) led to exchanges in which products became commodities. Once these products were exchanged, the producers lost control over them—the products could even be turned against them. The invention of private land followed, and then money. The division of labor became more complicated and specialized. The state grew. He concludes:

The rise of the state among the Athenians is a particularly typical example of the formation of a state; first, the process takes place in a pure form, without any interference through use of violent force, either from without or from within (the usurpation by Pisistratus left no trace of its short duration); second, it shows a very highly developed form of state, the democratic republic, arising directly out of gentile society; and lastly we are sufficiently acquainted with all the essential details. 

 Skipping a bit, we get to the chapter "Barbarism and Civilization." Here, Engels notes the continuous division of labor, leading to his least favorite: merchants.

Now for the first time a class appears which, without in any way participating in production, captures the direction of production as a whole and economically subjugates the producers; which makes itself into an indispensable middleman between any two producers and exploits them both. Under the pretext that they save the producers the trouble and risk of exchange, extend the sale of their products to distant markets and are therefore the most useful class of the population, a class of parasites comes into being, “genuine social ichneumons,” who, as a reward for their actually very insignificant services, skim all the cream off production at home and abroad, rapidly amass enormous wealth and correspondingly social influence, and for that reason receive under civilization ever higher honors and ever greater control of production, until at last they also bring forth a product of their own – the periodical trade crises.

Merchants were the high priests of money, Engels says, sounding more like a preacher than an economist:

The man who had it ruled the world of production–and who had more of it than anybody else? The merchant. The worship of money was safe in his hands. He took good care to make it clear that, in face of money, all commodities, and hence all producers of commodities, must prostrate themselves in adoration in the dust. 

 For the merchants and for the state, Engels has this prediction:

The state, therefore, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies which have managed without it, which had no notion of the state or state power. At a definite stage of economic development, which necessarily involved the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity because of this cleavage. We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes has not only ceased to be a necessity, but becomes a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they once arose. The state inevitably falls with them. The society which organizes production anew on the basis of free and equal association of the producers will put the whole state machinery where it will then belong–into the museum of antiquities, next to the spinning wheel and the bronze ax.

(cf. Lenin's The State and Revolution.)

All in all, an interesting read. As suggested above, I don't find this account terribly convincing as a whole. But reading this book—and rereading my notes for this review—helped me to see how much this line of reasoning affected Lenin and Soviet thought in general. The withering away of the State makes more sense from that perspective. But, of course, such a dream was doomed in the Soviet system. 

Reading :: The Invention of Enterprise

The Invention of Enterprise: Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times
Edited by David S. Landes, Joel Mokyr, and William J. Baumol

I picked this book up from the library to get a historical perspective on entrepreneurship. Enterpreneurship is a slippery term, of course: some authors, such as Schumpeter, reserve it only for creating new combinations; others apply it to any new business, such as a new coffee shop that is essentially similar to the other coffee shops with which it is competing. The authors of this historical collection—of which there are many, since the collection has 18 chapters—are not unanimous on this question, but tend toward the latter usage.

The chapters overview a number of eras and places: Mesopotamia, Rome, the Medieval Middle East and Europe, 17th-20th century Britain, 19th century Germany, 18th-20th century US, India, China, and Japan. The sweep is overwhelming. I won't examine all of these chapters, but I'll pick some highlights from some of them.

In Chapter 1, "Entrepreneurs: From the Near Eastern Takeoff to the Roman Collapse," Michael Hudson frames the piece with the Marx-Weber disagreement. A century ago, he says, economists simply assumed that entrepreneurs played a role in archaic trade: Adam Smith and Karl Marx both suggest that the economic explanation should be at the root. "There was little room for Max Weber's idea that a drive for social status might dominate economic motives" (p.8). So, for instance, when an excavation of a Mycenaean Greek site turned up accounting records, the building was assumed to be a merchant's house—not a public administrative center (p.8). But "Translation of cuneiform records over the past century has changed these attitudes" (p.8). And it has forced a reevaluation of the role of enterprise throughout history.

Specifically, Mesopotamia—where the Sumerians first invented writing—was resource-poor (p.11). That meant encouraging peaceful trade, which required enterprise, which in turn required a central way to raise and administer exports (p.12). City temples and palaces played that role (p.12).

In Chapter 2, "The Scale of Entrepreneurship in Middle Eastern History: Inhibitive Roles of Islamic Institutions," Timur Kuran argues that a society can be predisposed toward or against entrepreneurship (p.64); his position is that the medieval Middle East was predisposed against it, due in great part to the Islamic inheritance system, which made it difficult to preserve successful enterprises beyond a single generation: the system mandated individual shares for "all members of the nuclear family, male and female," which is highly egalitarian but makes it far more probable that an enterprise will be broken up to satisfy the inheritors (p.69). In addition, the corporation was absent (p.69). A third factor was the attitude that the Quran "outlines a way of life that cannot possibly be improved upon," and in some contexts, this attitude impeded innovation: "in an already flawless social order, innovations cannot yield benefits and may well do harm" (p.73).

In Chapter 4, "Tawney's Century, 1540-1640: The Roots of Modern Capitalist Entrepreneurship," John Munro discusses the linkage between Weber's understanding of the Protestant Ethic and that of Richard Tawney, "unquestionably one of the very most important economic historians that England has ever produced" (p.107). Munro notes that during "Tawney's Century" (not the century in which he lived—his lifespan was 1880-1962), Protestant Dissenters accounted for up to half of the scientists and inventors listed in the Royal Society and at least half of the known entrepreneurs during the Industrial Revolution—even though Dissenters represented only 5-10% of the population (p.107).

Weber argued in 1904, and Tawney amplified in 1926, the thesis that Calvinism supplied the spirit of modern capitalism because of the impact of its three essential doctrines: predestination; calling (and one's success in one's calling provided proof of one's predestination); and worldly asceticism (in which one's profits were driven back into one's calling, in this case, one's business) (p.108). This thesis seems to explain the success of the Dissenters

But Munro also notes that the Dissenters were barred from government, church, and school positions (p.109)! Here is a second possible explanation: Dissenters were disproportionately represented in entrepreneurship and the sciences because they were disproportionately barred from other positions.

In Chapter 7, "Entrepreneurship and the Industrial Revolution in England," Joel Mokyr notes another factor in the same time period. Essentially, entrepreneurship required trust, and 18th-century Britain supplied such a mechanism: one's reputation as a gentleman (p.189). "What mattered for the development of the economy was that people who felt constrained by the gentlemanly code of behavior behaved honorably, kept their word, and did not renege on promises. They did not blindly maximize profits" (p.190). And by supplying this substrate of trust, the gentlemanly code allowed entrepreneurs to hold together a network rather than just a market. It enabled the building of social capital, which in turn spurred the development of institutions ("from scientific academies to drinking clubs") that allowed entrepreneurs to create networks that could support market activity (p.191). (Compare to coworking.) Greater trust means a greater chance of becoming an entrepreneur (p.193); "'better cultural values have a large economic payoff'" (p.193, quoting Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales).

What I notice, as I reread my notes on this book with the Marx-Weber debate in mind, is that these different accounts support the Weberian standpoint. According to them, entrepreneurship (and economics in general) isn't just a cause that effects religion and cultural norms. It is also effected by by religion and its strictures (Ch.2, 4) and by cultural norms (Ch.2, 7).

Clearly I haven't done justice to this thick collection by reviewing just a few chapters. If you're interested in the history of entrepreneurship, I recommend you pick it up and read it for yourself.

Reading :: From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology

From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
Edited by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills

I picked this vintage book up at the used book store for, I think, a dollar. The 1958 cover is a thing of beauty:



Anyway. I didn't actually read the entire book—it's excerpts, many from the other Weber works I have read: Economy and Society and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Instead, I read, and will briefly review, the editors' 74-page introduction.

Why the introduction? I was recently looking for an overview of Weber's life and thought, especially as I began contrasting the Protestant ethic with what one might call the Soviet ethic. One reference was to this introduction, and since the book was already on my shelf waiting to be read, I grabbed it.

I'm glad I did. Although the prose is expansive at points, the authors clearly understand Weber quite well. They cover these major points:

• biography
• political concerns
• intellectual orientations (including Weber's lifelong struggle with Marx's ideas)

I'm most interested in the political concerns, so let's jump to there and pull out some quotes.

On p.38, the editors discuss Weber's evolution in political orientation:

Before Weber's critical examination, no single German stratum seemed to be satisfactory for the job at hand [i.e., establishing a working democracy]. Accordingly, he raised a critical voice, first of all against the head of the nation, the Kaiser, whom he scathingly derided as a dilettante cowering behind divine right of kings. The structure of German party life seemed hopeless as a check on the uncontrolled power of a politically docile but technically perfected bureaucratic machine. He pierced the radical phrases of the Social Democrats as the hysterical howling of powerless party journalists drilling the masses for an intellectual goosestep, thus making them more amenable to manipulation by the bureaucracy. At the same time, the utopian comfort contained in revisionist Marxism's automatic drift into paradise appeared to substitute a harmless complacency for righteous indignation. And he thought that the Social Democrats' refusal to make any compromises with bourgeois parties and assume cabinet responsibilities was one of the factors blocking the introduction to constitutional government. Later political analyses made by Weber sprang from this desperate search for a stratum that would measure up to the political tasks of leadership in an era of imperialist rivalry. (p.38)

I note that Weber's assessment of the revisionist Marxists parallels that of Lenin's (!). And the focus on the revisionist Marxism of Weber's time tracks the account Giddens gives us in

Giddens, A. (1970). Marx, Weber, and the Development of Capitalism. Sociology, 4(3), 289–310.

 Weber, the editors say, used Marx's historical method as a "heuristic" because

As a view of world history, Marxism seemed to him an untenable monocausal theory and thus prejudicial to an adequate reconstruction of social and historical connections. He felt that Marx as an economist had made the same mistake that, during Weber's days, anthropology was making: raising a segmental perspective to paramount importance and reducing the multiplicity of causal factors to a single-factor theorem.

Weber does not squarely oppose historical materialism as altogether wrong; he merely takes exception to its claim of establishing a single and universal causal sequence. (pp.46-47)

 The editors see Weber's work as "an attempt to 'round out' Marx's economic materialism by a political and military materialism," applying a generally Marxist approach to these other causal factors (p.47). Weber was eager to keep economic and political power distinct (p.47).

Weber and Marx thus part ways on a number of points. For instance, the editors say, Marx saw capitalism as irrational due to its fundamental contradiction between the rational advances of productive forces and the fetters of the market; Weber, in contrast, saw capitalism as rational, dynamic, and requiring specialists (p.49). Weber agreed that a class struggle was occurring, but he "does not see them as the central dynamic"; he agrees that socialism of means of production may someday occur, but sees that as a distant eventuality (cf. Schumpeter) (p.49). And, he argued, "Socialization of the means of production would merely subject an as yet relatively autonomous economic life to the bureaucratic management of the state" (p.49). That is, whereas Lenin thought that worldwide socialism would lead to the withering away of the state, the disappearance of the division of labor, and the death of bureaucracy, Weber argued that it would strengthen both. (Given the subsequent history of the Soviet Union, I think Weber won that argument handily. Robert Service mentioned in his biography of Lenin that Lenin refused to read contemporaries such as Weber; too bad.)

May I take one more shot at Lenin? Lenin, echoing Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program, saw the intermediate phase between capitalism and worldwide socialism as the dictatorship of the proletariat, in which the workers would take over the state and freeze out the bourgeoise. Weber argued the opposite: "'For the time being,' he wrote, 'the dictatorship of the official and not the worker is on the march'" (p.50).

Weber also interpreted one of Marx's central claims—that the worker was separated from the means of production—as simply part of a larger trend. "The modern soldier is equally 'separated' from the means of violence; the scientist from the means of enquiry, and the civil servant from the means of administration. ... The series as a whole exemplifies the comprehensive underlying trend of bureaucratization" (p.50).

Let's stop there. I found this introductory essay to be tremendously useful for putting Weber and Marx in dialogue, as well as for examining some of the pushback on Marxist assumptions in general. Since I expect to reread Capital pretty soon, I'll be keeping Weber's arguments in mind.

If you can get your hands on this book, and if you're similarly interested in Marxist vs. Weberian views, certainly you should read this introduction.

Reading :: The Communist Manifesto

The Communist Manifesto
By Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

I read this famous manifesto in the Kindle book Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Collection of 26 Works with analysis and historical background, but it's available in many places, including https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto. Obviously I don't expect to be able to do justice to it. But I'll note some passages that connect to later Soviet works, to themes on this blog, and to activity theory.

Marx and Engels indict the bourgeoise for tearing apart bonds, even feudalism's exploitative bonds: "for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation." It, they say, has reduced even venerable occupations to mere "paid wage labourers"; it has "reduced the family relation to a mere money relation." The authors argue that by its composition, the bourgeoise must destroy such relations:

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. 

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.

Readers may recognize this passage as describing the dark side of Schumpeter's "creative destruction." Marx and Engels charge that this state of affairs has spiraled out of control ("Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells") and has compulsively reproduced ("it creates a world after its own image"). It has also introduced deskilling, separating the laborer from his or her labor:

Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labour, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by the increase of the work exacted in a given time or by increased speed of machinery, etc.

 But this historical period has created its own antagonists, the proletariat. Marx and Engels argue that although there are other classes, the great fight will be between the proletariat and bourgeoise. The other classes are not candidates for revolution. The lower middle class?

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance, they are revolutionary, they are only so in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The dangerous class?

The “dangerous class”,  the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

And here's the famous passage that Krushchev referenced when he said "we will bury you!":

The essential conditions for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labour. Wage-labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by the revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. (my emphasis)

In the second part, the authors allege that the Communists have no factions and represent the proletariat as a whole (cf. Stalin). They also allege that the Communists, with their theoretical grounding, are best situated to lead the revolution (again, cf. Stalin):

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The authors argue for the abolition of private property. "Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour." After some argument, they allege a theme that shows up again and again in the communist literature:

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

The authors go on to scorn the bourgeois family:

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parents and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

And the idea of nations:

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another will also be put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

Here's the root of the Bolshevik vision of the worldwide socialist revolution.

The authors conclude with this ringing cry, which entranced so many socialists over the subsequent years:

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. 

Working Men of All Countries, Unite!  

Reading :: Critique of the Gotha Programme

Critique of the Gotha Programme
By Karl Marx

The link above, like some of the other Marx and Engels books I'll be reviewing soon, goes to the Kindle book Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Collection of 26 Works with analysis and historical background. It's cheap ($1.99), but you can read the Critique even more cheaply at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ if you like. As with my other recent reviews, I'll be copying and pasting quotes from that source.

It's a short read. I picked it up because Solzhenitsyn quotes it in his critique of the Marxist view of labor:

Engels discovered that the human being had arisen not through the perception of a moral idea and not through the process of thought, but out of happenstance and meaningless work (an ape picked up a stone—and with this everything began. Marx, concerning himself with a less remote time ('Critique of the Gotha Program'), declared with equal conviction that the one and only means of correcting offenders ... was not solitary contemplation, not moral soul-searching, nor repentance, and not languishing (for all that was superstructure!)—but productive labor. (Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago p.215) 

Solzhenitsyn cites this claim as the rationale for the work camps of the Gulag. Since I'm interested in the Marxist view of labor and the implied work ethic, I had to read the source itself.

The 1875 Critique, according to the (unsigned) background section, critiques "the draft programme of the United Workers' Party in Germany." As a critique, it quotes specific sentences from the draft programme, followed by Marx's extensive commentary. Essentially, it's a fisking of the programme.

Part 1 begins by critiquing how the programme characterizes labor and how this characterization implies rights. He argues that the programme still accepts a bourgeoise definition of rights:

 The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labor.

Since individuals vary in their ability, and since some individuals have greater needs than others (for instance, some are married and support families while others are not and do not), this definition leads to inequality:

To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal. 

But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby. 

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly -- only then then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!

For our purposes, note that the last paragraph implies the eventual dissolution of the division of labor (cf. Lenin, Ilyenkov); the "all-around development of the individual" (cf. Vygotsky's New Soviet Man); and the eventual emergence of a new order in which the socialist ethic can work (cf. again Lenin, Ilyenkov, Stalin). Marx continues this future vision in Part 4. He first critiques the programme for not orienting to the future:

The German Workers' party — at least if it adopts the program — shows that its socialist ideas are not even skin-deep; in that, instead of treating existing society (and this holds good for any future one) as the basis of the existing state (or of the future state in the case of future society), it treats the state rather as an independent entity that possesses its own intellectual, ethical, and libertarian bases.

Then he contrasts the programme, which attempts to work within the current framework, with the future state of affairs to which it should be oriented:

In this sense, it is possible to speak of the "present-day state" in contrast with the future, in which its present root, bourgeois society, will have died off. 

The question then arises: What transformation will the state undergo in communist society? In other words, what social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to present state functions? This question can only be answered scientifically, and one does not get a flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousand-fold combination of the word 'people' with the word 'state'. 

Between capitalist and communist society there lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. 

Now the program does not deal with this nor with the future state of communist society.

Instead, he says, it describes present-day states. That's inadequate:

all those pretty little gewgaws rest on the recognition of the so-called sovereignty of the people and hence are appropriate only in a democratic republic.

He argues that in the programme, "by the word 'state' is meant the government machine, or the state insofar as it forms a special organism separated from society through division of labor": the programme doesn't look forward to the future abolition of the division of labor.

Here we see the seeds that Lenin cultivated in The State and Revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat, leading to the ideal future state in which the division of labor is abolished. Stalin later developed (and prolonged) the dictatorship of the proletariat, arguing strenuously for an epoch in which a division of labor had to exist, one that sounded lot like "the government machine, or the state insofar as it forms a special organism separated from society through division of labor" that Marx critiqued.

In all, a short read, and an illuminating one when put in conversation with later Soviets.

Reading :: The Foundations of Leninism

Foundations of Leninism
By Joseph Stalin

As with the previous review, I have linked above to the Kindle version that I read, but you can also read this book at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/foundations-leninism/index.htm.

And, as with several of my reviews lately, I'm looking at a text that should help me to better understand the milieu in which activity theory developed. Today's book was published in 1924, which was a momentous year for the Soviet Union and for activity theory. Lenin died; Ilyenkov was born; Vygotsky was invited to join Psychological Institute in Moscow as research fellow, where he began working with Luria and Leont'ev.

Although Lenin and Stalin had tensions that year, when Lenin died, Stalin immediately took advantage by appointing himself the leader of the Lenin cult. The Foundations of Leninism can be understood as one way he developed this cult and his role in it.

In the Introduction, Stalin uses a question-and-answer format. I suggested that Stalin's Dialectical and Historical Materialism could have been called Dialectical Materialism for Dummies; based on its format, The Foundations of Leninism could have been called The Leninist FAQ. Except, of course, these were not frequently asked questions per se; they were leading questions that Stalin posed in order to provide his answers.

Here's one example from the introduction, framing the book as a whole:

What, then, in the last analysis, is Leninism? 

Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution. To be more exact, Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. Marx and Engels pursued their activities in the pre-revolutionary period, (we have the proletarian revolution in mind), when developed imperialism did not yet exist, in the period of the proletarians’ preparation for revolution, in the period when the proletarian revolution was not yet an immediate practical inevitability. But Lenin, the disciple of Marx and Engels, pursued his activities in the period of developed imperialism, in the period of the unfolding proletarian revolution, when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, had smashed bourgeois democracy and had ushered in the era of proletarian democracy, the era of the Soviets. 

That is why Leninism is the further development of Marxism.

Stalin deftly retains Marx and Engels as unimpeachable authorities while adding Lenin as a further, more specific authority.

In Chapter 1, Stalin discusses the historical roots of Leninism. "Leninism grew up and took shape under the conditions of imperialism," he tells us, recalling Lenin's Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. As the title suggests, Lenin saw imperialism as the last stage of capitalism, threatened by three contradictions: "the contradiction between labour and capital"; "the contradiction among the various financial groups and imperialist Powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territory"; and "the contradiction between the handful of ruling, "civilised" nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world." These contradictions, Stalin says, have made capitalism moribund. Stalin alleges that this moribund capitalism was behind World War I, the result of the three contradictions.

Although Marx had expected the socialist revolution to take place in the most developed, industrialist countries, it happened in Russia

Because Russia was the focus of all these contradictions of imperialism. 

Because Russia, more than any other country, was pregnant with revolution, and she alone, therefore, was in a position to solve those contradictions in a revolutionary way. 

Stalin discusses the issues, then concludes: "As we know, the course of the revolution in Russia has more than vindicated Lenin's prediction." (He does not discuss Lenin's further prediction that the worldwide socialist revolution was imminent.)

In Chapter 2, Stalin discusses the method of Leninism. This discussion starts with some fulmination about the Second International, the international socialist organization in which Lenin had participated before the Revolution. Socialists had disagreed on what tack to take, with Lenin characteristically taking an aggressive stance. Stalin tells us that the Leninist method was developed here:

What are the requirements of this method? 

Firstly, the testing of the theoretical dogmas of the Second International in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, in the crucible of living practice-that is to say, the restoration of the broken unity between theory and practice, the healing of the rift between them; for only in this way can a truly proletarian party armed with revolutionary theory be created. 

Secondly, the testing of the policy of the parties of the Second International, not by their slogans and resolutions (which cannot be trusted), but by their deeds, by their actions; for only in this way can the confidence of the proletarian masses be won and deserved. 

Thirdly, the reorganisation of all Party work on new revolutionary lines, with a view to training and preparing the masses for the revolutionary struggle; for only in this way can the masses be prepared for the proletarian revolution. 

Fourthly, self-criticism within the proletarian parties, their education and training on the basis of their own mistakes; for only in this way can genuine cadres and genuine leaders of the Party be trained.

After some historical discussion, Stalin concludes the chapter:

What is contained in Lenin's method was in the main already contained in the teachings of Marx, which, according to Marx himself, were "in essence critical and revolutionary." It is precisely this critical and revolutionary spirit that pervades Lenin's method from beginning to end. But it would be wrong to suppose that Lenin's method is merely the restoration of the method of Marx. As a matter of fact, Lenin's method is not only the restoration of, but also the concretisation and further development of the critical and revolutionary method of Marx, of his materialist dialectics.

This transition takes us to Chapter 3, on theory. Stalin argues that

• Theory was central to the proletarian movement. He lauds Lenin for developing theory connected to revolutionary practice, specifically his Materialism and Empiro-Criticism (n.b., I began this work but was unimpressed and didn't finish it). 
• The party needed a vanguard. He notes that theory had to ground the proletarian movement by guiding the vanguard. The alternative, he notes, is the theory of spontaneity: that a movement can effect change without disciplined and theoretically guided leadership. What results, he claims, is opportunistic compromises with capitalism rather than a true revolution. (Compromises are bad, dialectical synthesis is good.)
• The party needed a theory of proletarian revolution. And Lenin's theory had three theses: (a) The "grossly parasitic character of monopolistic capitalism," shown in various guises, would lead the masses to revolution; (b) colonialism had "split the population of the globe into two camps: a handful of 'advanced' capitalist countries which exploit and oppress vast colonies and dependencies, and the huge majority consisting of colonial and dependent countries which are compelled to wage a struggle for liberation from the imperialist yoke"; and (c) imperialism and resulting imperialist wars "leads to the intensification of the struggle on the third front, the inter-capitalist front, which weakens imperialism and facilitates the union of the first two fronts against imperialism: the front of the revolutionary proletariat and the front of colonial emancipation."

The theory of proletarian revolution implied three "conclusions"—by which I think Stalin means tactics:

• "intensification of the revolutionary crisis within the capitalist countries and growth of the elements of an explosion on the internal, proletarian front in the 'metropolises.'"
• "intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the colonial countries and growth of the elements of revolt against imperialism on the external, colonial front."
• "under imperialism wars cannot be averted, and that a coalition between the proletarian revolution in Europe and the colonial revolution in the East in a united world front of revolution against the world front of imperialism is inevitable."

Thus, he argues, we must 

• think of the socialist struggle in global, not national terms;
• accept that no matter the local conditions, the global conditions are ripe for revolution;
• understand that "the separate national fronts of capital have become links in a single chain called the world front of imperialism, which must be opposed by a common front of the revolutionary movement in all countries." It's the capitalists vs the socialists, all over the world.

Stalin finishes the chapter with some mop-up work defending Lenin from charges of inconsistency. 

In Chapter 4, "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Stalin argues for this peculiar institution:

The revolution can defeat the bourgeoisie, can overthrow its power, even without the dictatorship of the proletariat. But the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principle mainstay.

Notice the language of inevitability here: socialism creates a special organ at a certain stage in its development. Stalin here recapitulates and amplifies Lenin's argument in The State and Revolution. But Lenin had implied that the dictatorship of the proletariat would last for just a short while—until the imminent worldwide socialist revolution had occurred—and then the state would wither away. Seven years later, the worldwide revolution hadn't yet happened. Stalin brazenly gives us a new story:

It scarcely needs proof that there is not the slightest possibility of carrying out these tasks in a short period, of accomplishing all this in a few years. Therefore, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to communism, must not be regarded as a fleeting period of "super-revolutionary" acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organisational work and economic construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats. The historical era is needed not only to create the economic and cultural prerequisites for the complete victory of socialism, but also to enable the proletariat, firstly, to educate itself and become steeled as a force capable of governing the country, and, secondly, to re-educate and remould the petty-bourgeois strata along such lines as will assure the organisation of socialist production.

Forget the imminent withering away of the state: the country was stuck with the dictatorship of the proletariat, likely for "an entire historical era." Stalin deftly pivots to a Marx quote and then back to Lenin for another quote that seems to make the case Stalin is trying to make.

He adds:

Briefly: the dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule-unrestricted by law and based on force-of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule enjoying the sympathy and support of the labouring and exploited masses (Lenin, The State and Revolution).

And, he says, two things follow:

• "The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be 'complete' democracy, democracy for all, for the rich as well as for the poor. ... Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, democracy is proletarian democracy, the democracy of the exploited majority, based on the restriction of the rights of the exploiting minority and directed against this minority."
• "The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot arise as the result of the peaceful development of bourgeois society and of bourgeois democracy; it can arise only as the result of the smashing of the bourgeois state machine, the bourgeois army, the bourgeois bureaucratic apparatus, the bourgeois police."

The "democracy" involved in the dictatorship of the proletariat was exercised, he said, through the Soviets: 

Wherein lies the characteristic features of Soviet power?

In that Soviet power is the most all-embracing and most democratic state organisation of all possible state organisations while classes continue to exist; for, being the arena of the bond and collaboration between the workers and the exploited peasants in their struggle against the exploiters, and basing itself in its works on this bond and on this collaboration. Soviet power is thus the power of the majority of the population over the minority, it is the state of the majority, the expression of its dictatorship.

The next chapter addresses "The Peasant Question." You may recall that previous attempts at revolution in Russia attempted to rely on the peasants, but they didn't come through. Lenin decided instead to focus on the proletariat as allies. Stalin provides a hagiography of this period; according to him, when the peasants joined the revolution, they recognized the heroism and leadership of the proletariat and fell in line. Stalin discusses the leaps in agriculture that he expects from collectivization.

The next chapter addresses "The Nationalist Question," essentially focusing on how to support other nations who are ripe for revolt. 

Chapter 7 is "Strategy and Tactics." This sounds exciting, but it's mostly a discussion of intraparty tactics Lenin followed, plus some discussion of reformist tactics and compromises aimed at "flanking movements, of reforms and concessions to the non-proletarian classes-in order to disintegrate these classes, to give the revolution a respite, to recuperate one's forces and prepare the conditions for a new offensive." I'm pretty sure Stalin is trying to justify Lenin's New Economic Policy as well as his own plans to end it.

Chapter 8, "The Party," lists the features of the Leninist party:

• "The Party is the political leader of the working class," having absorbed the proletariat spirit but having armed itself with revolutionary theory. Stalin likens the Party to "an experienced General Staff" that can correctly see conditions and guide the "revolutionary millions."
• "The Party as the organised detachment of the working class": essentially, delegates of the working class sent to do its work.
• "The Party as the highest form of class organisation of the proletariat": The proletariat have other organizations, such as "trade unions, co-operatives, factory organisations, parliamentary groups, non-Party women's associations, the press, cultural and educational organisations, youth leagues, revolutionary fighting organisations..." but the Party furnishes leadership across all these organizations.
• "The Party as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The proletariat itself runs the dictatorship; the Party is merely the instrument that works for them. "The proletariat needs the Party for the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship." Stalin adds: "But from this it follows that when classes disappear and the dictatorship of the proletariat withers away, the Party also will wither away."
• "The Party as the embodiment of unity of will, unity incompatible with the existence of factions." 
• "The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements," which are the source of factionalism. Stalin plays on (embodies?) the Bolsheviks' paranoia here, warning that such factionalists are the agents of the bourgeoise. 

In Chapter 9, "Style in Work," Stalin says that the Leninist style of work combines "Russian revolutionary sweep" and "American efficiency." He warns that "Russian revolutionary sweep has every chance of degenerating in practice into empty "revolutionary" Manilovism if it is not combined with American efficiency in work," while 

American efficiency, on the other hand, is an antidote to "revolutionary" Manilovism and fantastic scheme concocting. American efficiency is that indomitable force which neither knows nor recognises obstacles; which with its business-like perseverance brushes aside all obstacles; which continues at a task once started until it is finished, even if it is a minor task; and without which serious constructive work is inconceivable. 

But American efficiency has every chance of degenerating into narrow and unprincipled practicalism if it is not combined with Russian revolutionary sweep. 

And he concludes the book:

The combination of Russian revolutionary sweep with American efficiency is the essence of Leninism in Party and state work. 

This combination alone produces the finished type of Leninist worker, the style of Leninism in work.

I found this book to be (mostly) fascinating. Stalin is attempting to consolidate leadership in the wake of Lenin's death by setting Lenin up as an infallible visionary and himself as Lenin's interpreter. In places, he has to manage some elaborate retconning in order to make this work. Not admirable, by my lights, but certainly skillful.

I have been approaching these Soviet works as historical documents that speak of a very different time and place. Not to sound naive, but when I search for them on the Internet, I am startled by how many people see these documents as useful in themselves, useful for understanding the upcoming capitalist revolution that Lenin thought was imminent 98 years ago. Where I see skillful maneuvering and retconning, at least some people see wisdom about how to better run a liberatory society. For those people, I do not recommend this book. But for those who are interested in how the Soviet Union developed, yes, pick it up.

Reading :: Dialectical and Historical Materialism

Dialectical and Historical Materialism
By Joseph Stalin

I've dropped in the Kindle link, since that's the version I read, but this slim book is also available in its entirety at Marxists.org; I've copied and pasted quotes from that version.

Published in 1938, this book provides a concise and simple accounting of dialectical materialism as Stalin saw it. It could have easily been named Dialectical Materialism for Dummies or The Little Golden Book of Dialectical Materialism, and it resembles a catechism more than a theoretical work.

It begins:

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic. 

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history.

Stalin hastens to distinguish the dialectical method of "Marx and Engels" from that of Hegel as well as that of the ancient Greeks:

Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature. 

In its essence, dialectics is the direct opposite of metaphysics.

So what is a Marxist dialectics? Effectively using subheadings, Stalin breaks Marxist dialectics into its major tenets:

• "Nature Connected and Determined": Marxist dialectics understands each phenomenon as part of a dynamic system that must be understood as a whole.
• "Nature is a State of Continuous Motion and Change": "The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being."
• "Natural Quantitative Change Leads to Qualitative Change": Citing Engels, Stalin argues that Marxist dialectics understands change in terms of incremental (quantitative) changes that reach a tipping point, resulting in qualitative changes. "The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher."
• "Contradictions Inherent in Nature": "dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature," specifically contradictions between past and future versions of a phenomenon undergoing continual development. "The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a "struggle" of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions." Stalin quotes Lenin here for support. 

Based on these tenets, Stalin argues that "every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the standpoint of 'eternal justice' or some other preconceived idea, as is not infrequently done by historians, but from the standpoint of the conditions which gave rise to that system or that social movement and with which they are connected." Yardsticks must be relative. For instance, he says, slavery and capitalism both represented steps forward when they respectively emerged; but now, he claims, both are clearly undesirable. The world is changing, these systems represent the old world, and 

Hence, the capitalist system can be replaced by the socialist system, just as at one time the feudal system was replaced by the capitalist system. 

Hence, we must not base our orientation on the strata of society which are no longer developing, even though they at present constitute the predominant force, but on those strata which are developing and have a future before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force.

Side note: Stalin likes using the word "hence" to suggest that his arguments are orderly and logical. The more he wants to appear this way, the more he produces one-sentence paragraphs, like the ones that succeed the block quote above:

Further, if the passing of slow quantitative changes into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes is a law of development, then it is clear that revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon. 

Hence, the transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution. 

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must be a revolutionary, not a reformist. 

Further, if development proceeds by way of the disclosure of internal contradictions, by way of collisions between opposite forces on the basis of these contradictions and so as to overcome these contradictions, then it is clear that the class struggle of the proletariat is a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon. 

Hence, we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system, but disclose and unravel them; we must not try to check the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion. 

Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must pursue an uncompromising proletarian class policy, not a reformist policy of harmony of the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, not a compromisers' policy of the "growing" of capitalism into socialism. 

Such is the Marxist dialectical method when applied to social life, to the history of society.

Stalin applies the tenets of dialectical materialism directly and broadly here. It's a little longer than "we will bury you!" but the import is the same: communism was a historical inevitability. 

Next, Stalin discusses Marxist philosophical materialism. It has these characteristics:

• "Materialist": "Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very nature material, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena as established by the dialectical method, are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a 'universal spirit.'"
• "Objective Reality": "the Marxist philosophical materialism holds that matter, nature, being, is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, consciousness, and that consciousness is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that therefore one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error." Stalin cites Engels here.
• "The World and Its Laws Are Knowable": "Contrary to idealism, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws, which does not believe in the authenticity of our knowledge, does not recognize objective truth, and holds that the world is full of "things-in-themselves" that can never be known to science, Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice." 

Appealing to the laws of dialectics again, he applies the lessons to society, declaring that political and social events can no longer be seen as accidents and that "the practical activity of the party [must be based] on the laws of development of society and on the study of these laws." Socialism isn't just a hope, it's a science; socialist humanities can be as scientific as the hard sciences. And he concludes: "The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism is derived from the fact that it relies upon an advanced theory which correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, that it elevates theory to a proper level, and that it deems it its duty to utilize every ounce of the mobilizing, organizing and transforming power of this theory."

In the next chapter, "Historical Materialism," Stalin asks: "What, from the viewpoint of historical materialism, is meant by the 'conditions of material life of society' which in the final analysis determine the physiognomy of society, its ideas, views, political institutions, etc.?" 

"What Is the Chief Determinant Force?" he asks. "This force, historical materialism holds, is the method of procuring the means of life necessary for human existence, the mode of production of material values – food, clothing, footwear, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc. – which are indispensable for the life and development of society." He notes the roles of 

• productive forces in society (constituted by instruments of production, "the people who operate the instruments of production," production experience and labor skill) and
• men's relations of production (since production is always social production.

"The first feature of production is that it never stays at one point for a long time and is always in a state of change and development, and that, furthermore, changes in the mode of production inevitably call forth changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions – they call forth a reconstruction of the whole social and political order." (Recall that Stalin had at this point collectivized the farms and launched industrialization.) He argues that history must be understood in terms of production; "the prime task of historical science is to study and disclose the laws of production, the laws of development of the productive forces and of the relations of production, the laws of economic development of society."

"The second feature of production is that its changes and development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production." Here, Stalin gives us a history lesson reminiscent of Engels' works:

Here is a rough picture of the development of productive forces from ancient times to our day. The transition from crude stone tools to the bow and arrow, and the accompanying transition from the life of hunters to the domestication of animals and primitive pasturage; the transition from stone tools to metal tools (the iron axe, the wooden plow fitted with an iron coulter, etc.), with a corresponding transition to tillage and agriculture; a further improvement in metal tools for the working up of materials, the introduction of the blacksmith's bellows, the introduction of pottery, with a corresponding development of handicrafts, the separation of handicrafts from agriculture, the development of an independent handicraft industry and, subsequently, of manufacture; the transition from handicraft tools to machines and the transformation of handicraft and manufacture into machine industry; the transition to the machine system and the rise of modern large-scale machine industry – such is a general and far from complete picture of the development of the productive forces of society in the course of man's history. It will be clear that the development and improvement of the instruments of production was effected by men who were related to production, and not independently of men; and, consequently, the change and development of the instruments of production was accompanied by a change and development of men, as the most important element of the productive forces, by a change and development of their production experience, their labor skill, their ability to handle the instruments of production.

Stalin declares that "Five main types of relations of production are known to history: primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist." He discusses the basis of each system, ending with the socialist: 

The basis of the relations of production under the socialist system, which so far has been established only in the U.S.S.R., is the social ownership of the means of production. Here there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labor performed, on the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." Here the mutual relations of people in the process of production are marked by comradely cooperation and the socialist mutual assistance of workers who are free from exploitation. Here the relations of production fully correspond to the state of productive forces; for the social character of the process of production is reinforced by the social ownership of the means of production. 

For this reason socialist production in the U.S.S.R. knows no periodical crises of over-production and their accompanying absurdities. 

For this reason, the productive forces here develop at an accelerated pace; for the relations of production that correspond to them offer full scope for such development.

(Indeed, the USSR did not generally suffer from overproduction.)

"The third feature of production is that the rise of new productive forces and of the relations of production corresponding to them does not take place separately from the old system, after the disappearance of the old system, but within the old system; it takes place not as a result of the deliberate and conscious activity of man, but spontaneously, unconsciously, independently of the will of man." This is because "Their conscious activity did not extend beyond their commonplace, strictly practical interests"; they did not have a scientific understanding of history to help them foresee changes in production.

Stalin ends with a long quote from Marx, describing the essence of historical materialism. Then he ends the book:

Such is Marxist materialism as applied to social life, to the history of society. 

Such are the principal features of dialectical and historical materialism.

And there it is, the end of this short book. 

I found this book tremendously useful for understanding dialectical materialism, specifically the version that was described and sanctioned during the long Stalin years. Certainly this is a simpler formation than the ones Leont'ev and Luria may have been using, but it supplies the baseline orthodoxy against which applications of dialectical materialism would be judged. If you're interested in a well formulated, critical theoretical argument, this book may not be for you. But if you're trying to understand the atmosphere and assumptions of the Soviet Union, pick it up. 

Reading :: Understanding Entrepreneurship

Understanding Entrepreneurship
By Bjorn Bjerke

I picked up this 2007 textbook on entrepreneurship at the UT Library to see what it had to say. It's written by a professor of entrepreneurship, and its central premise is in the title of Chapter 1: "Our New Entrepreneurial Society."

In this chapter, the author argues, based on Toffler's The Third Wave, that a new societal paradigm is developing (p.5). He associates the third wave with "our new entrepreneurial society" (p.6, his emphasis). This entrepreneurial society's characteristics include a list that I'll directly reproduce from p.7, but with later commentary appended:

• "A new kind of change"—New changes contain genuine uncertainty (p.7)
• "IT and other technologies play a decisive role"—He cites Castells here (p.8) and argues that IT is more pervasive, efficient, and global, and thus speeds up innovation (pp.8-9)
• "Knowledge is central"—here, he agrees with Drucker that our society is now a knowledge society, then agrees with Castells that we should not be paying attention to post-industrialism but to informationalism (p.9). 
• "Business has a new content"—services and information (p.10).
• "New kinds of organization at work"—contrasting with hierarchical, centralized ones (p.10).
• "Relationships and networks are more important to us"—Again, he cites Castells and argues that "Our new entrepreneurial society is based on networking" (p.10).
• "Globalization"—Citing Castells again, he argues that "Our new entrepreneurial society is global because its central activities and its components are organized globally" (p.11).
• "A new view of distance and time"—He argues that "the limitations of physical distance on decisions and actions in our companies and organizations as well as limitations of time have, by and large, disappeared" (p.11)
• "New types of capital"—Not just financial capital but "capital invested in, say, business knowledge, local data bases, willingness to learn, networks, contacts and so on" (p.12)
• "Industrial boundaries are more blurred"
• "Members of the economy are, on average, older"
• "Words are more important"—since new actions must increasingly be based on new ideas, concepts, and understandings, we must communicate them more (p.13)

So, he argues, "We need more entrepreneurship": success comes from innnovation, not optimization (p.13). And 

What is needed today is innovation at all levels and in all camps, not only in the traditional sense of new goods and services, but in the very way in which our societies operate, in the way in which we look at ourselves, and in those mechanisms, groupings and organizations which can develop and commit our resources in the most meaningful way to changing our setup in order to start a normal, steady, and continuous innovation process (Kanter, 1983). And it is precisely those everyday innovations—which are not necessarily planned but aimed at possibilities and needs—which will keep any society, economy, industry or company flexible and in a continuous flux. (p.14)

He goes on to list three definitions of entrepreneurship (p.16), then offers what he terms a conceptualization of entrepreneurship:

Entrepreneurship = to create new user value (p.17)

And he immediately expands it in relationship with creativity and innovation:

Entrepreneurship = to come up with new applications which others can use (as well) to fill a need and/or satisfy some demand, existing or created. (p.17)

This conceptualization rules out small businesses, since these often do not create new value (p.20). (See also Schumpeter.)

Furthermore, he warns that the modern corporation has a hard time being entrepreneurial because it is built on five points, all of which are being questioned (paraphrased here):

• The corporation is the master; employees are the servants
• Most employees work full-time
• Efficiency comes from bringing all activities under one roof
• Suppliers and manufacturers have information that customers don't, so they have more market power
• Each technology pertains to one industry and vice versa (p.27). 

Let's skip to Ch.3, where the author discusses entrepreneurship theorists. The author provides a broad characterization of economists and non-economists who have studied entrepreneurship, including the current multidisciplinary study of entrepreneurship and schools of entrepreneurship. As I said, this characterization is broad, and thus difficult to characterize in a review. 

The rest of the book was less interesting to me, so I'll call it a day here.

My review? For my purposes, the first chapter was the most interesting, although I am cautious about taking it at face value. The author's understanding of entrepreneurship is rooted in the knowledge economy literature, which I know reasonably well, but I wanted a stronger articulation between this literature and entrepreneurship as a field of study. The overview of different entrepreneurial schools was valuable and gave me a better lay of the land. And the book is engagingly written (although the author doesn't care much for parallelism). If you, like me, are trying to figure out how a rhetorical angle on entrepreneurship might fit into its general multidisciplinary study, yes, take a look. 

(Two origin stories)

Origin stories are interesting to me. When people tell origin stories, it's typically because they want to draw a moral.

For instance, Greek myth explained echoes through the myth of Echo, who tried to protect Zeus from Hera; from then on, she could only speak the last few words spoken to her. Moral: Don't cross Hera. In more recent mythology, Spider-Man's moral origin comes when the newly powered Peter Parker ignores a petty crime, then later discovers that the criminal has killed his beloved uncle. Moral: With great power comes great responsibility.

So let's examine two different origin stories, both about where human beings come from. You will probably be familiar with both. Both have fantastical elements, but the point is not to evaluate those elements but to see what morals arise from them.

Origin story 1: "In the beginning"
"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Genesis 1:1). In this origin story, God labors for six days to create the different components of the Earth, ending on the sixth day with land animals and a pair of human beings. (Genesis 1:1-2:2). On the seventh day, God rested (Genesis 2:2). (Notice that Genesis 2:4-25 gives a distinct account that doesn't easily mesh with this one.)

According to later Christian doctrine, that rest has continued—God didn't get up the next morning and start working again (Hebrews 4:3-4). At first, the pair of humans also enjoyed this rest from labor. But when they sinned, they were cursed with labor: woman with childbirth (Genesis 3:16), man with toiling:

“Cursed is the ground because of you; through painful toil you will eat food from it all the days of your life. 

It will produce thorns and thistles for you, and you will eat the plants of the field. 

By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food until you return to the ground, since from it you were taken; for dust you are and to dust you will return.” (Genesis 3:17-19)

God's labor was a blessing; humanity's labor was a curse.

But, as Max Weber argues, labor was reinterpreted under Protestantism, specifically Calvinism. Calvinism argues that human beings cannot do anything to earn their salvation; they must be called (and predestined as part of the elect) by God. This belief, carried to its conclusion, is nerve-wracking: how does one know one is part of the elect?

To borrow from my previous review of Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: people wanted to be assured of whether they were the elect. They did not believe that their works would save them, but they did believe that works were the result and evidence of a saving faith. "Thus the Calvinist, as it is sometimes put, himself creates his own salvation, or, as would be more correct, the conviction of it. But this creation cannot, as in Catholicism, consist in a gradual accumulation of individual good works to one's credit, but rather in a systematic self-control which at every moment stands before the inexorable alternative, chosen or damned" (p.115). So Calvinism demanded, "not single good works, but a life of good works combined into a unified system" (p.117). Labor was a sign of eventual salvation in the afterlife—and in the Kingdom of Heaven that God would eventually set up at the end of history.

In the Protestant ethic, one saw one's occupation as a calling. One strove to pursue one's calling as to the glory of God (I Corinthians 10:31). That meant maximizing profits—not for one's own enjoyment but for God's glory. And that in turn meant asceticism. The individual was torn away from his closed ties; everything, even social activity, was pursued solely for God's glory—and that included labor, conceived as "a calling which serves the mundane life of the community" (p.108).

Weber concludes that this ethic, once established, became independent of Protestantism. The Calvinists may have chosen it, but now it constitutes our "iron cage" (p.181).

In short, in this origin story:

• God created humankind through labor
• Labor proves our closeness to God

Origin story 2: "the decisive step in the transition from ape to man"

In Dialectics of Nature, published posthumously, Engels provides a different origin of humanity. It is also intricately tied to labor.

The first operations for which our ancestors gradually learned to adapt their hands during the many thousands of years of transition from ape to man could have been only very simple ones. The lowest savages, even those in whom regression to a more animal-like condition with a simultaneous physical degeneration can be assumed, are nevertheless far superior to these transitional beings. Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation.  

Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to ever new operations, through the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paganini. (p.281)

According to Engels, the evolution of the hand set off other developments as well, both physical and social: "the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual" (p.283). Entities had something to say to each other, so they developed the larynx and other organs of speech (p.283). The combination of labor and speech eventually yielded society (p.285) and then tools, beginning with hunting and fishing implements (p.286). Hands plus organs of speech plus the organ of the brain, Engels says, yielded the division of labor: "men became capable of executing more and more complicated operations, and were able to set themselves, and achieve, higher and higher aims. The work of each generation itself became different, more perfect and more diversified" (pp.288-289).

Labor was a good in one's own service. But eventually, under capitalism, human beings had to sell their labor to others and thus became alienated from their labor. Marxists looked forward to a time, after the worldwide socialist revolution, when everyone would share the same ideology, the division of labor would disappear, and the State would eventually wither away.

Solzhenitsyn notes the practical effects of this story:

Engels discovered that the human being had arisen not through the perception of a moral idea and not through the process of thought, but out of happenstance and meaningless work (an ape picked up a stone—and with this everything began. Marx, concerning himself with a less remote time ('Critique of the Gotha Program'), declared with equal conviction that the one and only means of correcting offenders ... was not solitary contemplation, not moral soul-searching, nor repentance, and not languishing (for all that was superstructure!)—but productive labor. (p.215) 

Solzhenitsyn cites this claim as the rationale for the Gulag's work camps—and he also says that Marx never had to work!

In short, in this origin story:

• Humankind created itself through labor
• Labor improves us, individually and collectively

Commonalities—and convergence

Both origin stories are creation stories, but the agent is different: we are created either by God or by ourselves. Both stories imply that we should labor, both to improve ourselves and to draw closer to an ideal that is larger than ourselves. For the Calvinist, labor is the sign of individual salvation and points to the eventual end of history: the Kingdom of God. For the Soviet, labor is the sign of individual and collective improvement and points to the eventual end of history: the withering away of the state.

One origin story gave us the Protestant ethic, which rooted and spread beyond the Protestant world. The other gave us a Soviet ethic—one that was arguably less successful as a global ethic, but still shifted the course of Soviet thinking on a range of issues. One was activity theory: Leont'ev chose to make labor, not signs, the root of its investigation. 

The stories converge in one other way related to labor. Echoing II Thessalonians 10:3, Lenin lays down a "socialist principle": "He who does not work shall not eat."