Developmental Psychology in the Soviet Union (Second Reading)
By Jaan Valsiner
A couple of months ago, I ran into a reference to this book when reading about the history of activity theory. After checking my bookshelf to verify that I didn't own it, I bought it used on Amazon. It was only later that I realized I had already reviewed it!
But that's fine. We get different things from a book on the second or third reading. This time, I got a few things, which I'll pull out and briefly discuss here.
First, Valsiner situates his discussion in reference to Kuhn, whose work on scientific paradigms has helped us to understand how science is framed and practiced in the West: specifically, scientific arguments appeal to evidence, not to heads of state or the populace (p.10). But "as will be seen in this book, not all social groups of scientists in cultural conditions other than those of Western Europe and North America have followed this rule in a stringent way. ... groups of in-fighting Soviet philosophers and psychologists of the 1930s did indicate their interest in using extra-scientific authorities as arbiters in their relationships" (p.11). Throughout the book, he demonstrates this dynamic in Soviet developmental psychology. This is a major theme of the book, but its import eluded me on first reading. At the same time, I wonder what Valsiner's 1988 analysis would have looked like if he had grounded it in Latour's (1987) Science in Action or his 1988 The Pasteurization of France, both of which suggest that Western scientists often do appeal to extra-scientific authorities, but in ways that cover their tracks.
Second, Valsiner writes at length about Mikhail Basov, whose work was cited by Vygotsky. Like Vygotsky, Basov made substantial contributions to Soviet developmental psychology, and like Vygotsky, he was associated with pedology, which was effectively and suddenly banned at the beginning of the Great Terror in 1936. "Unlike Vygotsky, however, Basov left behind no substantial group of followers to rise to positions allowing them to restate his relevance to developmental psychology once social circumstances after 1956 made this possible" (p.167). Vygotsky's associates had risen to leading administrative positions after 1956; Basov's associates "were located in relatively peripheral positions." Yet "the substantial role that Basov [played] in emerging Soviet psychology is in many ways comparable to that of Vygotsky in the theoretical realm, and may be considered to surpass him in the careful emphasis on empirical detail" (p.167). Contrasting the two is instructive, since it helps us to see science in general and psychology in particular not as the product of Great Men but as a set of collective achievements that are often attributed to Great Men—that is, it points toward a Latourean reading.
This brings us to the third thing that didn't make it into my first review, but that really struck me on rereading. Valsiner argues that when Vygotsky made one of his more famous arguments—that analysis should be conducted by analyzing into units rather than elements—that argument was based on a misreading of Basov. "Vygotsky reiterates that idea in different contexts in his writings, not always taking care to add a reference to Basov. ... [but] he claims to follow Basov in the emphasis on the analysis into units—the 'minimal gestalts' that preserve the systemic functioning nature of the whole from which the unit is derived, while abstracting from many concrete aspects of the original phenomenon" (pp.173-174).
Vygotsky argued by analogy that water is H2O: two hydrogen atoms, one oxygen atom. To analyze water, then, we should examine H2O as our unit of analysis: it's the smallest particle that retains the characteristics of the whole (p.174). If you examine hydrogen or oxygen atoms by themselves, they have radically different properties from water, which is formed through their relationship. H2O is "an objective real element of water" (quoting Vygotsky on p.174). Vygotsky cites Basov as making this argument. (And let's note that this common analogy was also used by Engels in Dialectics of Nature to illustrate the nature of dialectics.)
But Valsiner says that Vygotsky gets this distinction wrong. "Basov, following Wolfgang Köhler, distinguished two kinds of 'structural elements' that can be observed in physical or psychological phenomena": (1) real, objective elements ("self-existent primary phenomena") and differential elements ("caused by purely quantitative modifications of a given phenomenon") (p.174; quotes in parentheses are quotations of Basov). By this differentiation, Basov says, H2 and O are the "objective" and "real" elements, while H2o is the "differential element" (p.175, quoting Basov). Valsiner concludes: "Vygotsky overlooked the structural-qualitative nature of Basov's separation of (and preference for) the 'real, objective elements' (components) of psychological processes" and instead considered the differential elements to be the real elements. Valsiner emphasizes:
it is very evident that Basov emphasized the use of exactly the opposite kinds of unit—those of qualitatively different sub-components like oxygen and hydrogen which make up molecules of water as a qualitatively new structure. These are the 'real' or 'objective' units whose relationship gives rise to new quality. The relevance of 'differential' elements of the structure—the 'minimal qualities' of the substance (as a single molecule would be, relative to quantities of water that contain many similarly structured molecules)—was limited in Basov's view, as the above quote illustrates. (p.175, his emphasis)
Valsiner goes on to trace Basov's argument back to Köhler (p.175). He emphasizes that Basov and Vygotsky agree "in their emphasis on the holistic nature of phenomena" but they "differ greatly in the ways in which they conceptualize the analysis of the holistic phenomena" (p.176). Whereas Basov wanted to reduce the phenomenon into the minimal Gestalt state, then analyze the minimal Gestalt into its components or elements (p.179), Vygotsky wanted to avoid analyzing those elements for fear of losing the characterof the holistic system (p.178).
Is this a significant drawback? On one hand, it would seem to be so if one is actually committed to a developmental analysis. From a developmental perspective, it seems pretty important to understand that H2O is produced by burning hydrogen—or that verbal thought is produced by the dialectic between thought and speech, as Vygotsky argued in Thought and Language. On the other hand, Vygotsky did make that argument—his focus on analysis into units did not keep him from analyzing pre-verbal thought and pre-rational speech.
In sum, I'm glad that I forgot I had read this book—actually buying it and rereading it has helped me immensely as I continue to think through the legacy of Soviet psychology. It's one of the most rewarding books I've read in this vein, and if that subject appeals to you, you should definitely pick up a copy.
(2003).
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