Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Reading :: Principles of Topological Psychollogy

Principles of Topological Psychology
By Karl Lewin


I was intrigued by Zavershneva's claim that Vygotsky's holistic period was heavily influenced by Lewin's topological and vector psychology. So when I saw Lewin's book on Kindle, I grabbed it. Since this version is a Kindle book, I won't provide page numbers.

Lewin, like Vygotsky, argues that psychology needs a unifying framework to avoid being split "into a number of unrelated branches," yet one that does not "try to derive all psychological facts neatly from one single concept such as association, reflex, instinct, or totality"—perhaps shading Freud, Pavlov, Bekhterev, and the Gestaltists. He introduced topological psychology, AKA field theory, to provide such an overarching framework, one that would be more Galilean than Aristotelian.

Later, he argues that "A dynamic psychology has to represent the personality and the state of a person as the total of possible and not-possible ways of behaving."

In his topological psychology, Lewin attempts to map out different (overlapping) situations in which a person finds herself. This representation includes both the person and the environment—theories that do not represent the environment are "inadequate."

To be honest, I had a hard time getting into topological psychology. I got the idea of representing psychology topologically, at least in its outlines, but I did not understand how Lewin proposed to concretely carry out such an analysis. (Wikipedia adds that "There is some confusion as to the basics of field theory, causing misconceptions of how it should be used in Gestalt therapy"—so I am relieved that it's not just me.) Yet I can see some connection with what Leontiev later did in activity theory, which similarly offers a holistic approach and similarly identifies activities (similar to fields) in which people participate and goals they attempt to achieve.

To get a better handle on this, I'll have to read more Lewin and more commentaries on Lewin. Suggestions? Email me or leave them in the comments!

Reading :: Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics (second reading)

Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics
By Mikhail Bakhtin


I posted my original review of this book 15 years ago. In my recent reading, I took supplemental notes that focused on Bakhtin's dialogism as opposed to Engelsian and Stalinist dialectics. These notes are in Kindle, so I won't provide page numbers.

Bakhtin tells us early on that "A plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky's novels" and what unfolds in his novels is "a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world" (his emphasis). Dostoevsky sought to destroy the monological European novel. Criticizing previous literary critics' characterization of Dostoevsky, Bakhtin argued that "In their attempt to squeeze the artist's demonstrated plurality of consciousness into the systematically monologic framework of a single worldview, these researchers were forced to resort to either antimony or dialectics," resulting in the gravitation toward a single authorial consciousness. Indeed, the relationships among the characters "are the last thing that can be reduced to thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Nor are these novels to be "understood as the dialectical evolution of the spirit," which, "understood in Hegelian terms, can give rise to nothing but a philosophical monologue."

Indeed, for Dostoevsky, "in every voice he could hear two contending voices"—"But none of these contradictions and bifurcations ever became dialectical." "They were, rather, spread out in one plane, as standing alongside or opposite one another, as consonant but not merging or as hopelessly contradictory, as an eternal harmony of unmerged voices or as their unceasing and irreconcilable quarrel." Thus "it is futile to seek in [Dostoevsky's world] a systematically monologic, even if dialectical, philosophical finalization—and not because the author has failed in his attempts to achieve it, but because it did not enter into his design." Bakhtin goes on: "For Dostoevsky everything in life was dialogue, that is, dialogic opposition."

Turning to the individual in Dostoevsky's works, Bakhtin argues, "a living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process. In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition." He argues: "In the ideal a single consciousness and a single mouth are absolutely sufficient for maximally full cognition; there is no need for a multitude of consciousness, and no basis for it." And "In an environment of philosophical monologism the genuine interaction of consciousness is impossible, and thus genuine dialogue is impossible as well. In essence idealism knows only a single mode of cognitive interaction among consciousness: someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error; that is, it is the interaction of a teacher and a pupil, which, it follows, can be only a pedagogical dialogue."

For Dostoevsky, an idea can't just live in a single consciousness: "Human thought becomes genuine thought, that is, an idea, only under conditions of living contact with another and alien thought, a thought embodied in someone else's voice, that is, in someone else's consciousness expressed in discourse. At that point of contact between voice-consciousness the idea is born and lives." And "even agreement retains its dialogic characteric, that is, it never leads to a merging of voices and truths in a single impersonal truth, as occurs in the monologic world."

Later, in discussing genre, Bakhtin adds: "The dialogic means of seeking truth is counterposed to official monologism, which pretends to possess a ready-made truth, and it is also counterposed to the naive self-confidence of those people who think they know something, that is, who think that they possess certain truths. Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction."

In these quotes, Bakhtin does not directly go after dialectic. Rather, he attempts to demonstrate that dialectic and other monologic approaches do not adequately address what Dostoevsky was trying to do. The application of this analysis to dialectic is only implied (or perhaps inferred?).

In any case, I was glad to reread this book, and I'll have to reread Bakhtin's other books soon as well.

Reading :: Aircraft Stories (second reading)

Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience
By John Law


I originally reviewed this book over 15 years ago, and was not kind. More recently I reread it. And, although I still don't like Law's style, I found that parts of the argument stand up well. So in this second reading, I'll focus on those parts.

n.b., I read the Kindle edition this time around, so I won't include page numbers.

One of the central issues Law tries to address is "fractional coherence," which "is about drawing things together without centering them." Specifically, he examines representations of a fighter jet which was not completed, noting that it "comes in different versions. It has no center. It is multiple. And yet these various versions also interfere with one another and shuffle themselves together to make a single aircraft. They make what I will call singularities, or singular objects out of their multiplicities. In short, they make objects that cohere." Law's focus in this book is how such objects are made to cohere. He adds: "a fractionally coherent subject or object is one that balances between plurality and singularity. It is more than one, but less than many." Fractionality, he adds, is a metaphor for avoiding dualisms.

Furthermore, he argues that fractionality is distinct from perspectives: "inconsistency between different performances reflects failing coordination between different object positions rather than differences between external perspectives on the same object." In Chapter 2, he examines strategies of coordination: in his case study, a brochure for the TSR2 fighter, he identifies "a series of mechanisms that work to connect and coordinate disparate elements." These include syntax, physical structure, tabular hierarchy, perspective, cartography, system, and speed/heroism. He adds that "once we look at things in this plural way, any singular object immediately becomes an effect -- and a more or less precarious effect."

Later, he identifies singularity with modernism and multiplicity with postmodernism, arguing that the oscillation (and tension) between the two bears investigation: "It is much more interesting and productive to explore oscillation between certainties than to take a position in the debate." "Heterogeneity is an oscillation between absence and presence," he declares.

Law later refers to this project as an "academic pinboard" that consciously avoids a grand narrative.

Do I recommend reading Aircraft Stories—again? Yes, I suppose. I am not a fan of the "pinboard" approach, but I understand the project and why Law felt that this would be a good approach for exploring it. Still, I found the (more conventional) first chapter to be more rewarding than the exploration of the brochure in subsequent chapters.

Wednesday, March 27, 2019

Reading :: Cognitive Capitalism

Cognitive Capitalism
By Yann Moulier Boutang


David Guile suggested I read this book, and I owe him a debt for discussing its salient points with me. Moulier Boutang originally published it in 2007; this translation was published in 2011. In it, the author argues that we are undergoing a transition, not to socialism (as Marx and his successors have hoped) but to a new type of capitalism, corresponding with globalism.

In the Introduction, the author characterizes capitalism in three stages: "Marx in Manchester," "Marx in Detroit," and "Marx in California" (p.8). The third stage, AKA "cognitive capitalism," began around 1975 and has "little similarity to industrial capitalism, which at its birth between 1750 and 1820, broke with mercantilist capitalism and slavery" (p.9). He emphasizes: "We are not living in a period of socialist transition" but rather a transition into this new form of capitalism (p.9).

He continues this argument in Chapter 1, where he argues that "From 1975 onwards the pace of economic growth in the developed countries slowed considerably. ... Unemployment became omnipresent and structural." The previous model, which relied on "rapid salarisation of an originally agricultural population, an abundant supply of family dependants and a demand that was driven first by postwar reconstruction, and then by wars taking place in the Third World ... finally ran out of steam" (p.11). Yet there was no collapse. World trade rose and new trans-state organizations were created (p.12). Bases of capital changed repeatedly (see table 1.1, p.18). In the process, "Capitalism has set negative externalities at the centre of its functioning as positives, and they make one of the characteristics of complex systems within which organised human intervention must evolve" (p.20). These negative externalities include our air, water, and other aspects of our ecological system. And they are now interfering with transaction costs (p.30). This fact has an impact on immaterial labor, which characterizes the new production model.

By immaterial labour, the author means that "the essential point" for understanding the economy is "no longer the expenditure of human labour power" as Marx would have it, but rather "invention-power," or "the living know-how that cannot be reduced to machines and the opinions shared in common by the greatest number of human beings" (p.32). For example, the price of a pair of trainers (that's athletic shoes for those of us in the US) relies not just on the manufacturing and transport costs but also on "the value of the brand," which itself results from labor from designers, stylists, and lawyers (p.32). The capacity for innovation becomes a key part of the stock price (p.32). "If the economy is becoming increasingly flexible (a transition that many industries are finding it very hard to make), it is because the central core of value rests now on immaterialities" (p.33). Here, "immaterial labour" is not idealist, but rather an update of Marx's "abstract labour" (p.33). Capitalism now seeks to prioritize "collective intelligence, creativity distributed through the entirety of the population" (p.34).

Capitalism must mutate to survive, partly due to human change: the social accumulation of knowledge, expanded memory, and collective intelligence, due to information technologies (p.36). Thus he calls the new capitalism "'cognitive capitalism', because it has to deal with collective cognitive labour power, living labour, and not simply with muscle-power consumed by machines driven by 'fossil-fuel' energy" (p.37).

In Chapter 2, the author contrasts cognitive capitalism (hereafter CC) with other characterizations, such as the knowledge-based society, the information society, technological capitalism, and the new economy. Chapter 3 defines CC in detail as a coherent system and a dynamic process. The author argues that cognitive capitalism involves "a remarkable return ... to use-value and to the world of human relations" (p.49). CC has 15 markers:

  1. The virtualization of the economy, i.e., the "growing role of the immaterial" (p.50)
  2. "The weight of the immaterial is an outcome of the new computer technologies" (p.50)
  3. The capture of innovation "present in the interactive cognitive processes of social cooperation and of tacit knowledge" (p.51)
  4. Thus technological process "takes the form of a socio-technical system" and the critical variables are "the appropriation of knowledge" and "the use of technology" (p.51)
  5. The division of labor model has been brought into question; "As for innovation that requires not only the coordination of complex processes but also the active cooperation of agents, it is hampered, indeed blocked, by the division of labour" and thus "productivity gains ... derive from economies in learning"  (pp.51-52)
  6. "The growing complexity of markets" is increasingly managed via "learning economies" (p.52)
  7. Sequences of production are reversed: "Now deep innovation involves 'flexible production' and 'just-in-time' production" and relies on "the productive nature of consumption"—users become co-producers of innovation (pp.52-53).
  8. Traditional dividing lines "between capital and labour and between skilled and unskilled labour" are dissolving (p.53)
  9. The digital network yields the network society (p.53)
  10. The "hegemony of the paradigm of industrial labour and manual labour power" is coming to an end (p.53)
  11. Whereas "dead labour" is crystallized in machines, in CC, living labour "is not consumed and not reduced to dead labour in machinism" (p.54)
  12. "Concepts of individual performance within the workplace"are declining, while innovation is no longer solely located within the company (p.54)
  13. CC produces immaterial goods (information-goods, knowledge-goods), yielding tensions over intellectual property rights (pp.54-55)
  14. Externalities are no longer marginal: "capturing positive externalities becomes the number one problem of value," i.e., "work done outside working hours, and implicit knowledge, and capacities for contextualisation" (p.55)
  15. "Whereas industrial capitalism could be characterised as the production of commodities by means of commodities, cognitive capitalism produces knowledge by means of knowledge and produces the living by means of the living. It is immediately production of life, and thus it is bio-production" that can only "take place on the basis of collective brain activity mobilised in interconnected digital networks." This is "bio-production" and its control is "biopower" (pp.55-56). 
CC, he concludes, is "a mode of accumulation in which the object of accumulation consists mainly of knowledge, which becomes the basic source of value, as well as the principal location of the process of valorisation" (p.57). Its strategies "are determined by the quest for a spatial, institutional and organisational positioning likely to increase its capacity for engaging in creative processes and for capturing their benefits" (p.57). Its mode of production "is based on the cooperative labour of human brains joined together in networks by means of computers" (p.57). Therefore the new wealth of nations is "the important place of research, of technological advancement, of education (the quality of the population), of information flow, of communication systems, of innovation, of organisational learning and of management organisational strategies" (p.57). "A capitalist society of this kind aims to place at the centre of the sphere of production and to integrate fully into the economic sphere (both market and non-market) resources that had previously been external to them" (p.58). 

CC requires a new division of labor as well. The author provides a table (p.62) demonstrating a shift from industrial to cognitivist DOL in terms of various aspects: function, evolution variables, organizational model, etc. In a nutshell, CC characteristics seem similar to those of Adler and Hecksher's collaborative communities, focusing on cooperation in networks (not markets or hierarchies). Importantly, CC relies on educated, intellectual members, in contrast to the deliberately limited worker requirements of Tayloris, (pp.66-67). 

Yet, as the author argues in Chapter 4, cognitive capitalism is also unstable: it involves omnipresent exploitation and antagonistic social relations and relations of production (p.92). First CC splits living labor into consumed (crystallized) and continuing (skill, know-how). It produces living labor by means of living labor (i.e., knowledge by means of knowledge). Thus re get living capital, a seeming paradox (p.93). CC draws its legitimacy from the nature of its accumulation, mainly exploiting invention-power and ideally maximizing that exploitation (p.94). The author provides a helpful typology, showing different cases in terms of exploitation of labour-power, invention-power, and freedom: on one end is the slave or serf, who is solely exploited in terms of labour-power and has no freedom; at the other end, the creative, who is exploited solely in terms of invention-power and does have freedom (p.96). 

The production of knowledge goods has two problems: First, they are not scarce, and second, they are too public to be produced through a market system—hierarchy and market are inadequate (pp.103-104). The dot-com entrepreneur, he says, can only find a business model by staying on top of the wave of social innovation; we're no longer in the era of Schumpeter and Knight, when entrepreneurs identify the needs of a passive society (p.109). 

In Chapter 5, the author examines the question of social class. CC involves worsening inequalities and precarity (p.122). The latter does not mean poverty but rather vulnerability to poverty: the safety net has holes (p.129). Precarity involves intermittent workers; to exploit invention-power, trades must "develop multi-level capabilities, so that their pollination and nomadic activity may be recaptured" (p.132). "The regime of widespread intermittency is becoming the real form of work," he says, adding that a guaranteed universal income will be needed to underpin CC—people need to eat in order to do cognitive work (p.134). 

In Chapter 6, the author argues that finance is the only way to govern the inherent instability of CC (p.136). Accounting rules are currently inadequate for companies that accumulate and retain immaterial (intangible) capital (p.141). 

In Chapter 7, he presents a manifesto, gathering up the policy recommendations made throughout the book (universal basic income, financial governance, etc.).

And let's stop there. This was a rewarding book, allowing me to draw together some of my previous readings and writings to rethink what is going on with work. I highly recommend it.



Reading :: Expertise in Transition

Expertise in Transition: Expansive Learning in Medical Work
By Yrjo Engestrom


This 2018 book, like 2016's Studies in Expansive Learning, serves as a capstone for aspects of Engestrom's prodigious work. Whereas Studies in Expansive Learning summarized his career findings related to the theory of expansive learning, Expertise in Transition summarizes his career findings about the nature, development, and improvement of expertise, a theme stretching back to his 1992 research bulletin Interactive Expertise. Specifically, it focuses on medical expertise.

As Engestrom says in the preface, "our predominant notions of expertise are foundationally insufficient in the face of the present challenges of an interconnected and unpredictable world," and in response, "this book builds a perspective of transition toward collaborative and transformative expertise" (p.vii). This argument is based on the one from Interactive Expertise, in which Engestrom argued that traditional cognitive foundations of expertise are dualistic, with algorithmic and enculturational poles (Ch. 1 in Interactive Expertise, covered also on p.4 in this book). He goes on to note two dimensions of expertise (learning for stability vs change, and collective vs individual locus of expertise), which he maps into a four-field diagram (p.10) to demonstrate a lacuna in the quadrant of learning for stability && collective locus of expertise. That's the quadrant that Engestrom fills with this book, using activity theory (p.13). He argues that

  • Expertise is located in mediated activity systems and "cannot be meaningfully reduced to individual competency";
  • "Expertise is inherently heterogeneous"; "there is no universally valid, homogeneous, self-sufficient expertise"; and 
  • "Expertise is increasingly faced with the challenge of radical transformations that require culturally novel solutions and learning about what is not yet there" (p.14).
Related to the third point, he argues that in situations that require emergent learning, "There is no competent teacher, or there are many competing ones" (p.18). As he did back in Interactive Expertise, Engestrom points to Gregory Bateson's "Learning III," characterized as dialectical and understood within Engestrom's expansive learning cycle (pp.18-19). To address emergent learning, we need an interventionist developmental methodology (pp.20-21) in which "research aims at developmental re-mediation of activities" (p.22). He proposes a "methodology of formative interventions" (p.23), such as his own Change Laboratory (p.24). 

In this book, Engestrom specifically focuses on medical expertise. Like Annemarie Mol in her study of medical expertise, Engestrom notes that "a chronically ill patient typically becomes an object for a number of physicians, each viewing the patient from the perspective of his or her own specialty" (p.25), and "the multiplying nature of chronic illness further complicates the issue" by yielding different diagnoses and prescriptions (p.25). (Unlike Mol, however, Engestrom sees these as perspectives on a unitary object.) This question of the object is discussed further in Ch.2, where Engestrom illustrates the question in an empirical study, demonstrating that physicians hold different dominant models of the object associated with different theories of the illness (p.41). The object, he concludes, "is not only constructed by the subjects, it also constructs itself" (p.54). I note that here, he characterizes Latour in Science in Action as being purely constructivist, and relates this view to "critical sociological studies of medicine" in which "the professional dominance of doctors is commonly pictured as constructing patients and illnesses as if they were passive material" (p.54)—a characterization that seems at odds with Latour in that book and subsequent ones. 

In Chapter 3, Engestrom discusses levels of activity and contradictions. 

Chapter 4 goes into the spatial and temporal expansion of the object, focusing on the case of a Change Lab intervention. In addition to activity system triangles, Engestrom develops other representations (care maps, calendars; see p.78). These three types of representations are mediational means that provide dual stimulation for the participants in the Change Lab. I want to note this point because critics of CHAT have often focused on the activity system triangle as an oversimplified and limited representation of activity. Yes, it's simplified, just as a paper prototype is a simplified version of a tool to be fully developed later. These representations are not meant to be purely descriptive, analytical devices; they are starting points for codesign and co-intervention. 

In Chapter 5, Engestrom brings in the notion of knotworking, which happens in "work that requires active construction of constantly changing combinations of people and artifacts over lengthy trajectories of time and widely distributed in space" (p.85). Knotworking involves fluid combinations of individuals that have roles but do not work together continually, such as judges and attorneys (the combinations change for each trial). "These combinations of people, tasks, and tools are unique and of relatively short duration. Yet, in their basic pattern, they are continuously repeated" (p.86). Such combinations, he says, are not well described by terms such as team or network, both of which (he argues) assume stable configurations (p.86). In contrast, knotworking is unstable, pulsating, with no center of coordination or control (p.87). In his example of knotworking, the case of a mental patient, "the knot functioned as a self-conscious agent" whose duration was too short to develop infrastructure (p.91). He concludes the chapter by discussing another case, the development of a care agreement. 

In Chapter 6, Engestrom examines knotworking as expansive decision-making. Drawing on Klein's work in naturalistic decision-making, Engestrom argues that activity theory can contribute to NDM by providing a framework that addresses socio-spatial, temporal, moral-ideological, and systemic-developmental dimensions of decision-making.

The book has more chapters, but I'll stop there. In sum, Engestrom has drawn across his theorization and case studies of the last three decades to provide a coherent accounting of expertise from an activity-theoretical perspective. In doing so, he has demonstrated and illustrated the extraordinary potential for activity theory to understand and intervene in domains of complex expertise. If you're interested in expertise, activity theory, or both, you really ought to read this book.

Reading :: Practice Theory

Practice Theory, Work, and Organization: An Introduction
By Davide Nicolini


I've seen this book referenced in various places, but a conversation with Julian Waters-Lynch convinced me that I needed to pick it up. Although the book as a whole is solid, I'll focus below on aspects that are salient to activity theory.

As the title indicates, Nicolini provides an introduction to practice theory, an umbrella term for "contemporary theories of practice" contributing to "the practice turn in social and organizational studies" (p.1). These theories include praxeology (Giddings, Bordieu), practice as tradition and community (Lave, Wenger), activity theory (Engestrom), ethnomethodology, social practice (Heidegger, Wittgenstein), and conversation analysis. These are all different, but they generally agree on certain points:

  1. "Practice approaches are fundamentally processual and tend to see the world as an ongoing routinized and recurrent accomplishment" (p.3).
  2. Practice approaches are material, bodily, with active objects (p.4).
  3. "Practice theories carve a specific space for individual agency and agents" (p.4).
  4. "Adopting a practice approach radically transforms our view of knowledge, meaning, and discourse. From a practice perspective, knowledge is conceived largely as a form of mastery that is expressed in the capacity to carry out a social and material activity" (p.5) 
  5. "All practice-based approaches foreground the centrality of interest in human matters and therefore put emphasis on the importance of power, conflict, and politics as constitutive elements of the social reality we experience" (p.6). 
In practice theories, practice comes first—not rational agents (practitioners) (p.7). They "use a performative perspective to offer a new vista on the social world" and they provide an "alternative to  cognitive perspectives that try to explain organizational conduct and phenomena as something stemming from the mind or brain of an individual" (p.7). They are material (p.7). They are dynamic and discursive, but not solely discursive (p.8). Finally, they "depict the world in relational terms" (p.8).

Practice theory impacted organizational studies in the 1990s, shifting the focus of org studies from orgs-as-things to orgs-as-social-processes (p.11). The current practice-based organizational studies derive from three research streams: "the study of learning and knowing phenomena as situated practices," "the study of technology as practice," and "the study of strategy as practice" (p.11). 

In Chapter 2, Nicolini traces the roots of practice theory to Aristotle's focus on praxis and poeisis, discusses its demotion in the Western tradition, and examines its rediscovery in Marx, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. In particular, Marx embraced praxis as critical to materialism, arguing that thought and world are always connected via human activity and cannot be separated (p.30). Nicolini argues that when Marx articulated his famous thesis—"the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it"—his epistemological proposition was "the need to engage practically as well as cognitively with phenomena in order to understand them" (p.32). 

After Chapter 2, Nicolini begins covering various strands of practice theory, including interstitial chapters that illustrate each strand with a case study. Let's skip to Chapter 5, on activity theory.

Activity theory, Nicolini notes, is not unified. Here, he focuses on CHAT, Engestrom's variation and "the strand of activity theory that tackles more explicitly the issue of theorizing practice, and which has been translated into organization and management studies" (p.104). And "the fact that the result of one type of activity may become the raw material for another makes work the fundamental grounding of sociality as well as one of its outputs. Work is thus not only material, but also inherently social" (p.105)—to which I would add that this stance was articulated in Engels' origin story in Dialectics of Nature and retold by Vygotsky & Luria and Leontiev

Nicolini articulates five major tenets of CHAT: "the mediated nature of practice; the notion of an activity system; the object-oriented nature of human activity; its historical and contradictory nature; and the necessarily interventionist and developmental nature of the study of practice" (p.106). 

In discussing the object of the activity, Nicolini notes that the object is "partly given and partly emergent, both socially constructed and objective" (p.112). Since "the object is actively constructed through the negotiation, alignment, or ignoring, of the different motives, interests, and aspirations represented in the community," "it follows that the object is inherently fragmented" because it "is not visible in its entirety to any one of the participants", and it is also "composed of heterogeneous entities" and therefore "inherently multiple" (p.112). 

In discussing CHAT's interventionist orientation, Nicolini notes the "Marxian reading of Kurt Lewin's principle that you cannot understand a human organization until you attempt to change it." For CHAT, "Expansive learning always originates from small fractures, deviations, and individual exceptions, and proceeds in cycles or spirals, through multiple phases and over lengthy periods of time" (p.116). 

Overall, I found Nicolini's overview of practice theory, and his view of CHAT, to be valuable. In places, I thought he worked a little hard to fit CHAT into the practice theory mold (for example, I'm not sure that Engestrom sees the object the way Nicolini does). But viewing CHAT from this direction helps me to think through its structure and limitations. For that, and for the general insights into practice theory, I recommend the book highly.