Sometime last year, I became interested in what is meant by “concept” — a term that is used broadly, in both colloquial senses and a multitude of academic senses. Like terms such as “solidarity” and “phenomenon,” it can mean very specific things to someone who is steeped in a specific scholarly tradition, yet different things to those in another tradition or in no tradition. After reading several sources, including this one, I have a better understanding of some of these senses (and a diminished enthusiasm for the term itself).
“Concept,” of course, has intrigued Engestrom for a while. As someone who has studied and learned from Vygotsky, Leontiev, Davydov, and others in the tradition of Soviet-era Russian psychology, Engestrom understands concept as sociocultural:
The primary focus of this book is … collective creation of culturally new concepts in the wild. The starting point is the realization that culturally novel concepts are created not only by scientists but also by people struggling with persistent problems and challenges in all walks of life. (p.5)
To study it, he draws on studies he conducted throughout his decades as a scholar, examining not laboratory studies but rather field studies and interventionist studies.
In Chapter 2, Engestrom draws on the work of a variety of (loosely speaking) sociocultural researchers to explore the notion of concept formation. These include familiar names such as Cussins and Hutchins. Re the latter, Engestrom notes that “Hutchins argues that conceptual models are commonly stabilized with the help of ‘material anchors’” — which “are more than just words or signs” (p.12). Indeed, although Engestrom does not point this out, Hutchins does not show any interest in distinguishing between signs and tools — like Engestrom and Leontiev, unlike Vygotsky.
In Chapter 3, Engestrom draws on Vygotsky’s work on concept formation in Thinking and Speech. Discussing the methodological principle of double stimulation as laid out by Vygotsky and explicated by Sannino, Engestrom then moves to discussing the four generations of activity theory. (Longtime readers of this blog will recognize that Engestrom has long described activity theory in terms of these generations, and that they are not universally accepted by other AT scholars. See my upcoming book for the gory details.) When he inevitably presents the activity system triangle (p.19), he locates Concepts under “Instruments: Tools and signs.” And he argues that “From a dialectical perspective, a concept is a stepwise process of moving from the initial germ cell abstraction to its concrete manifestation” (p.21, his emphasis). He adds that “the origin of concepts is to be found in productive labor, in the practical molding of materials into artifacts” (p.22). This is a very Leontievan understanding of concepts, and it contrasts sharply with (for instance) Andy Blunden’s understanding (as we’ll see when I eventually review his book on concepts).
In Chapter 4, Engestrom examines functional concepts in organized productive activities. He begins by discussing “prototype concepts,” which we can examine as material rather than mental representations (p.37). Following Brooks, he provides the example of the Chartres Cathedral, which was built by many contractors in many campaigns over decades, a “mess” that nevertheless defined the concept of the Gothic cathedral (pp.37-38). “It may have been later used by others as a model to emulate, but it was not created to be emulated. It is primarily a prototype of itself and for itself” (p.38). Turning to an example of observing how Indian fishing boats are built, he argues, “A prototype concept answers the question ‘What?’, not by listing attributes or explaining but basically by pointing and inviting the observer to touch and test” (p.41). “Prototype concepts are oriented to the here and now,” and “The formation of the prototype concept in our study took place as extended dwelling and moving in a bounded space around the material object” (p.42).
Other types of functional concepts exist. In fact, Engestrom provides a table (p.77) laying out five types:
- Prototype
- Classification: Category
- Process: Script, story, or plan
- System
- Germ cell
Each is illustrated by a case study, and each has a different purpose. He adds:
Each type of functional concept has its own specific strengths and affordances. In other words, one type is not “better” or “more advanced” than the other. However, many complex activities would benefit from making use of the complementarity of different types of functional concepts. (p.77)
In Chapter 5, Engestrom considers an embodied germ cell at work, drawing on the studies he conducted with Nummijoki and Sannino on physical mobility in elderly home care. He argues that “A theoretical concept may be understood as dialectical movement from the abstract to the concrete. In other words, the concept is a way of moving within a domain, not a static definition” (p.80). Here, he focuses on the germ cell he and Nummijoki identified for elderly home care: “Getting up from the chair, or sit-to-stand, [which] is extensively used as a rehabilitation and intervention technique and central item in tests of physical mobility and functional capacity” (p.83). After all,
It is foundational for any other kind of physical movement. In other words, it can be seen as the smallest and simplest initial unit of a complex totality; as something ubiquitous, so commonplace that it is often taken for granted and goes unnoticed; and as opening up a perspective for multiple applications, extensions, and future development. (p.84)
Intriguingly, through this elaborated illustration Engestrom argues that “Concept formation in the wild is foundationally a societal and collective process that takes shape in a distributed fashion not reducible to individual learning, cognition, and behavior” (p.106) — that is, if we think about concept formation as a socially distributed process, we must think beyond the sign or individual understanding.
In Chapter 6, Engestrom turns to double stimulation and concept formation in everyday work. He focuses on critical encounters, in which participants face a conflict of motives. This conflict could be internal (a participant is oriented toward two different motives) or external (two participants pursue conflicting motives) (p.110). In such a situation, an artifact can be used as a second stimulus, helping to clarify the conflict. Put differently:
A critical encounter is an event in which two or more relevant actors come together to deal with a problem that represents a shared object and at the same time a conflict of motives. In such a critical encounter, there is both complementarity and tension between the actors. To resolve the problem, the actors may use mediating artifacts to take volitional action and to try and conceptualize the situation. In this sense, critical encounters are generic sites of learning, understood as formation of transformative agency and functional concepts. (p.111)
This might lead to “A conceptualization effort [, which] is some type of an articulation of a general idea or characteristic that has integrative potential for establishing a perspective for a solution to the problem or conflict of motives” (p.113).
In Chapter 7, Engestrom considers collective concept formation as creation at work. He argues that “Collective concept formation in the wild may be seen as creation of new worlds, condensed or crystallized in a future-oriented concept” and that it “is typically a long process in which the concept itself undergoes multiple transformations and partial stabilizations. This type of creation transcends the boundary between the mental and the material. The concept typically radiates outward, finds extensions and practical applications that stretch the boundaries of the concept and make it a constantly moving target” (p.139). Let me just note here that I really like Engestrom’s orientation to concept as a social fact, not something that just happens inside the head, but something that happens across people and across their environments. It portrays “concept formation as a process that transcends the divides between mental and material, between mind and body. For these authors, concept formation operates not only with symbols, words, and language, but also it is grounded in embodied action and artifact-mediated enactment in the material world” (p.142).
Based on this line of thought, Engestrom proposes that
concept formation in the wild may be regarded as movement in a space defined by means of two dimensions, namely the dimension of stabilization … and the dimension of representational modality … The end points of the stabilization dimension are “emergent” and “well-defined.” The end points of the modality dimension are “enacted, embodied” and “verbal, textual.” (p.142)
After discussing some case studies of work, Engestrom concludes:
If we abandon the individual as privileged unit of analysis and redirect our analytical gaze to real transformations in work and organizations, we gain a very different angle on work-related creativity. Creativity appears as practitioners’ and their clients’ collective efforts and struggles to redefine the idea of their activities – to construct and implement qualitatively new concepts to guide and organize the work practice. This kind of creativity cannot be neatly located in a standard scale from Big C to small c, simply because the individualist unit of analysis of that very scale is inadequate. Collective concept formation at work is creation in the sense of forging the future, building new worlds of work while dwelling in those worlds. (p.155)
In chapter 8, Engestrom considers concept formation “over the long haul,” anchoring the discussion with Sannino’s recent involvement in the Housing First program. As longtime readers of this blog know, I’ve been following this project for a while, and Engestrom’s discussion here gives us new details about how it has unfolded and what it has produced. In particular, he notes a contradiction between security and freedom in managed housing, and he proposes the concept of escorted transfer as a way to integrate services laterally (p.173).
Chapter 9 wraps up the book, providing advice for interventionist researchers who are interested in helping concepts to form while avoiding imposing their own ideas.
Overall, I really appreciated this book. Like the other books Engestrom has written since retirement, this one draws case studies from across his long career, using them to explore and sum up themes that he has touched on throughout. In particular, I appreciate the more or less distributed cognition treatment of concept. It helped to make concept a more useful category for me and for the sorts of studies I conduct, and along the way, it helped me to think through relationships among different sorts of material conditions that we too often rush to characterize as tools, signs, words, etc.
So I will return to this book as I continue to think through these sorts of relationships. If you are similarly interested in them, or if you’re just interested in activity theory more generally, I highly recommend this book.