(Reading roundup: Mutizwa Mukute and colleagues)

I haven't reviewed a set of articles for a while, but recently I've been reading some work that applies and extends cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) to explore and facilitate community action in southern Africa. This work has been promoted by Yrjo Engestrom and Annalisa Sannino, and it's noteworthy in part because it applies the Change Labs methodology to community action contexts.

The articles I've read include:

Colvin, J., & Mukute, M. (2018). Governance in Ethiopia: Impact evaluation of the African Climate Change and Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) project. https://doi.org/10.21201/2017.1756

Lotz-Sisitka, H., Ali, M. B., Mphepo, G., Chaves, M., Macintyre, T., Pesanayi, T., … McGarry, D. (2016). Co-designing research on transgressive learning in times of climate change. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 20, 50–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2016.04.004

Lotz-Sisitka, H., Mukute, M., Chikunda, C., Baloi, A., & Pesanayi, T. (2017). Transgressing the norm: Transformative agency in community-based learning for sustainability in southern African contexts. International Review of Education, 63(6), 897–914. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-017-9689-3Mudokwani, K., & Mukute, M. (2019). Exploring group solidarity for insights into qualities of T-learning. Sustainability (Switzerland), 11(23). https://doi.org/10.3390/su11236825

Mukute, M. (2016). Dialectical critical realism and Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT): Exploring and expanding learning processes in sustainable agriculture workplace contexts. In L. Price & H. Lotz-Sisitka (Eds.), Critical realism, environmental learning and social-ecological change. New York: Routledge.

Mukute, M., & Lotz-Sisitka, H. (2012). Working with cultural-historical activity theory and critical realism to investigate and expand farmer learning in Southern Africa. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 19(4), 342–367. https://doi.org/10.1080/10749039.2012.656173

Mukute, M., Mudokwani, K., McAllister, G., & Nyikahadzoi, K. (2018). Exploring the Potential of Developmental Work Research and Change Laboratory to Support Sustainability Transformations: A Case Study of Organic Agriculture in Zimbabwe. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 25(3), 229–246. https://doi.org/10.1080/10749039.2018.1451542

CHAT isn't a stranger to facilitating community action—see for instance the work that Bodker did with unions in the UTOPIA project—but here, Mukute and colleagues apply it across geographically different communities and to issues of decolonization. Because of the wider scope, Engestrom and Sannino cite this work to illustrate a new iteration of CHAT (Yamazumi, n.d.; Engestrom & Sannino 2016). Mukute and colleagues at Rhodes University have examined cases such as “(1) sustainable agriculture in Lesotho; (2) seed saving and rainwater harvesting in Zimbabwe; (3) community-based irrigation scheme management in Mozambique; and (4) biodiversity conservation co-management in South Africa” (Lotz-Sisitka et al. 2017, p.897; cf. Lotz-Sisitka, Pesanayi et al. 2016; Mudokwani & Mukute 2019; Mukute 2016; Mukute & Lotz-Sisitka 2012; Mukute et al. 2018). In these related studies, the authors examine how “expansive learning might also facilitate instances of transgressing norms – viewed here as embedded practices which need to be reframed and changed in order for sustainability to emerge” (Lotz-Sisitka et al. 2017, p.898). 

Mukute et al. (2018) specifically examine organic agriculture in South Africa. They state that activity theory points to “the limitations of current problem-solving approaches that have been developed in and tend to serve a capitalist-based approach, which commodifies knowledge, natural resources, and life forms.” (p.244). In their interventionist research with “eight interacting district organic farmer associations” across Zimbabwe (p.233), they conducted four Change Laboratory sessions. The first session, involving 99 organic farmers and 10 extension workers, was conducted over eight days and focused on identifying challenges and generating mirror data for the later sessions. The second through fourth sessions involved 39 farmers and seven content specialists, and focused on analyzing mirror data and then modeling and refining solutions (p.235). The fourth section in particular involved three groups presenting solutions to each other and critiquing these solutions (p.236). Through these discussions, the interventionist researchers identified how “that the matters were not only interconnected but also stratified”:

For example, climate change causes water shortages through droughts and longer midseason dry spells, and water shortages undermine food production, which results in food insecurity and poverty. Research participants’ analyses of the matters of concern using problem tree analysis suggested that the nexus issues such as food insecurity, water, and climate change had multidirectional causal relationships. For example, poverty and food insecurity make farmers vulnerable to climate change, and climate change weakens farmers’ abilities to produce food and get out of poverty. (p.237)

Through this Change Laboratories approach, Mukute et al. argue, the participants were able to participate in transgressive learning, which challenges “unjust and unsustainable norms and practices that have become normalised” (p.229). In transgressive learning,

transformations to sustainability may involve transgression of unjust and unsustainable norms. Such transgression and associated transgressive learning are interested in protecting and caring for the earth and life in and on it. ... Such learning can be supported through the CHAT-informed expansive learning process using the CL method. However, the current CHAT conceptualisation of goods and services that are produced, exchanged, and distributed seems to exclude common good and ecological services that are important in transformations to sustainability. (p.245)

It's fascinating work. If you're interested in CHAT and its development, and/or how to apply CHAT at broader scope, and/or how CHAT can work with decolonization projects, definitely check it out.

Reading :: Hegel

Hegel

By Frederick Beiser

I’m continuing to avoid reading Hegel by reading Hegel commentaries. Next up is this 12-chapter overview of Hegel’s thought by Frederick Beiser. 

Beiser includes, among other things, a short chronology of Hegel’s life from birth to death (p.xix) and a discussion of relevance. He clarifies that he treats Hegel in historical context rather than as a contemporary philosopher -- that is, Beiser explores Hegel’s thought as it related to his time rather than mobilizing it in current debates (a choice that seems appropriately Hegelian) (p.5). 

The book includes the obligatory biography, then covers 5 parts:

• Early ideals and context

• Metaphysics

• Epistemological foundations

• Social and political philosophy

• Philosophy of culture

Rather than thoroughly reviewing these, I’ll just note some things that caught my attention.

In discussing Hegel’s grounding in Plato and Aristotle, Beiser notes:

Third, Plato and Aristotle understood nature in organic terms, as ‘a single visible living being’. In all these respects Plato and Aristotle presented the sharpest contrast with the modern worldview, whose self is divided into soul and body, whose state is a contract between self-interested parties, and whose concept of nature is mechanical. It was the great achievement of Hegel and the romantic generation to have reaffirmed the classical ideal of unity against the modern worldview. (p.38)

That ideal of unity, of course, is at the root of Hegel’s dialectic. Related (at least in my estimation):

It is indeed noteworthy that Hegel, along with Hölderlin and Schleiermacher, explicitly denied personal immortality and excoriated the entire ethic of salvation based on it. From his early Berne manuscripts to his 1831 lectures on the philosophy of religion Hegel attacked the ethic of salvation for its self-centered concern for the fate of the soul.

True to his immanent ideal of the highest good, Hegel believed that the meaning of life could and should be achieved in the community alone. We find satisfaction and purpose in our lives, he argued, when, like the ancient Roman and Greek, we contribute to the common good and help to create its laws. The ancient Greeks found immortality and meaning in their lives by living for the polis, which was a whole greater than themselves, and which they knew would survive them; they had no concern for their individual salvation, for the fate of their soul after death. In Hegel’s view, the Christian ethic of personal salvation was only a cry of desperation, a feeble Ersatz, after the loss of community. (p.43)

In terms of unity, Hegel (and Schelling) sought grounding in Spinoza:

Schelling and Hegel greatly admired Spinoza for his monism, for showing how to overcome dualism when Kant, Fichte and Jacobi had only reinstated it. True to Spinoza, their principle of subject–object identity essentially means that the subjective and the objective, the intellectual and the empirical, the ideal and the real –however one formulates the opposition – are not distinct substances but simply different aspects, properties or attributes of one and the same substance. (p.64)

But, Beiser points out, unity creates a problem:

In the end, the problem of contingency presents Hegel with a dilemma. The realm of contingency must be inside or outside the system. If it is inside the system, then contingency has only a subjective status, so that there is no explanation of real contingency. If, however, it is outside the system, it has an objective status; but it then limits the absolute and introduces a dualism between form and content. (p.79)

Hegel addressed this question via organicism, in which

The goal of subject–object identity contrasted sharply with the reality of a dualism between subject and object in ordinary experience. These dualisms can be overcome, Hegel maintains, only if we accept an organic concept of nature according to which the subjective and the objective are only different degrees of organization and development of a single living force. (p.105)

Recall that Hegel was a big influence on Vygotsky (which is why I’m reading about Hegel). Beiser describes Hegel’s use of the familiar terms of internalization and externalization:

In some striking passages from The Spirit of Christianity Hegel calls what both produces and results from love, the whole process of self-surrender and self-discovery, of externalization and internalization, spirit (Geist). He first uses the term in a religious context, in writing about how the spirit of Jesus was present at the Last Supper. He wrote that the spirit of Jesus is the spirit of love, which first makes itself objective, externalizing itself in the bread and wine, and then makes itself subjective, internalizing the bread and wine through the act of eating. Hegel likens the process to that of understanding meaning from a written word; the thought is first objectified in the sign, and it is then resubjectified when the sign is read as having a specific meaning. (p.115)

And 

The opposing movements involved in the experience of love – its externalization and internalization, self-surrender and self-discovery – Hegel will later call ‘dialectic’. Hegel will later use the term in this sense to describe the process of spiritual development. It is important, however, to distinguish at least two meanings of this concept: the ontological, whereby it defines something happening in reality; and the methodological or epistemological, whereby it signifies a method of doing philosophy. (p.115)

Dialectic, of course, is one of Hegel’s primary contributions (and the contribution that most interests me). Beiser explains it further:

Hegel’s term for his own anti-methodology is ‘the concept’ (der Begriff), which designates the inherent form of an object, its inner purpose. It is the purpose of enquiry to grasp this inner form, Hegel argues, and it is for this reason that he demands suspending all preconceptions. If the philosopher simply applies his a priori ideas to the subject matter, he has no guarantee that he grasps its inner form or the object as it is in itself; for all he knows, he sees the object only as it is for him. When Hegel uses the term ‘dialectic’ it usually designates the ‘self-organization’ of the subject matter, its ‘inner necessity’ and ‘inherent movement’. The dialectic is what follows from the concept of the thing. It is flatly contrary to Hegel’s intention, therefore, to assume that the dialectic is an a priori methodology, or indeed a kind of logic, that one can apply to any subject matter. The dialectic is the very opposite: it is the inner movement of the subject matter, what evolves from it rather than what the philosopher applies to it. (p.160)

Like everyone else who writes about Hegel, Beiser cautions us that Hegel did not use the schema thesis-antithesis-synthesis (p.161). He also argues that dialectic is not some sort of alternative logic (p.161). Rather, it’s about the unity of the subject matter: “Indeed, the point of the dialectic will be to remove contradictions by showing how contradictory predicates that seem true of the same thing are really only true of different parts or aspects of the same thing” (p.162). Regarding contradictions, Beiser adds:

The dialectic arises from an inevitable contradiction in the procedures of the understanding. The understanding contradicts itself because it both separates things, as if they were completely independent of one another, and connects them, as if neither could exist apart from the other. It separates things when it analyzes them into their parts, each of which is given a self-sufficient status; and it connects them according to the principle of sufficient reason, showing how each event has a cause, or how each part inheres in a still smaller part, and so on ad infinitum. Hence the understanding ascribes both independence and dependence to things. The only way to resolve the contradiction, it turns out, is to reinterpret the independent or self-sufficient term as the whole of which all connected or dependent terms are only parts. (p.164)

Beiser adds:

Hegel states that there are three stages to the dialectic: the moment of abstraction or the understanding; the dialectical or negatively rational moment; and the speculative or positively rational moment. (p.167)

Beiser covers many other aspects of Hegel’s thought as well, but let’s stop there. I found this discussion to be helpful for understanding Vygotsky, but also Marx. If you’re trying to understand Hegel but, like me, are trying to either work up to or avoid reading the original, Beiser has written a clear summary that you should check out.

Reading :: Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory

Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory: A Dialectical Perspective to Vygotsky

By Manolis Dafermos

In this book, Dafermos reviews how Vygotsky’s work has been taken up in different parts of the world. Dafermos emphasizes the dialectical underpinnings of Vygotsky’s theory, which he believes have been lost in some of this work.

This argument begins on page 1, where Dafermos affirms that "diverse ways of interpreting and conceptualizing Vygotsky's legacy in different parts of the globe have been developed" (p.1) and "the expansion and implementation of a scientific idea beyond the boundaries of the field of its initial appearance and formation raises important epistemological and methodological issues. This question preoccupied Vygotsky in his work ‘The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology’" (p.2). Dafermos charges that Vygotsky has been transformed into a cure-all, and "The whole complexity of Vygotsky’s theory has been lost" (p.3). Vygotsky's implicit assumptions are unrevealed. Just as Vygotsky criticized methodological eclecticism, Dafermos critiques postmodernist approaches "connected with the celebration of fragmentation and incoherence" and attempts " to reconstruct Vygotsky’s research program not as a given, static set of ready-made concepts and ideas, but as a developing process" (p.3).

Dafermos argues:

By reformulating the previous insights, the investigation of the development of a theory (in this particular case, cultural-historical theory) includes the study of the following interconnected aspects:

(1) the sociohistorical context within which a theory is formed,

(2) the scientific context, trends in the field of philosophy and science,

(3) the specific characteristics of the subject matter of the investigation,

(4) the particular subjects involved in the production and application of scientific knowledge, the development of their research program,

(5) a study of the personal network of these subjects and their relations to the scientific community (p.5)

He adds that cultural-historical theory is best understood dialectically: "From a dialectical perspective, cultural-historical theory is examined as a developing, unfinished project that emerged and formed historically in the process of solving concrete conceptual and practical tasks" (p.6). Here, he quotes Ilyenkov to claim that "From a dialectical perspective, the internal contradictions of a concrete object constitute the basic source of its own development. Moreover, the emergence and resolution of contradictions can be considered as a course of development of scientific knowledge" (p.6). Thus "A dialectical approach brings to light the logic of the development of Vygotsky’s theory in terms of a drama of ideas and discloses zigzags, returns and loops in the process of its building, rather than a linear accumulation of new knowledge" (p.7). 

Unfortunately, he says, "One of the difficulties in grasping the essence of cultural-historical theory is connected with the devaluation of the dialectic underpinnings of cultural-historical theory" (p.6). That is the problem his book addresses: "The gist of the argument of the book is that Vygotsky’s theory should be examined not as a static and closed system of ideas, but as a developmental process" (p.7) -- thus we examine Vygotsky's mistakes as he works through them to improve the theory (which -- and this is my own commentary -- is still a story of ascent).

With that introduction in mind, Dafermos reviews the context of psychology and philosophy leading up to Vygotsky’s work, specifically the crisis of psychology that Vygotsky addressed in his “Crisis” manuscript (p.47). 

Acknowledging that "there is a need to develop a holistic account of Vygotsky’s research program in the process of its own development. In other words, Vygotsky’s research program can be analyzed as a developmental process" (p.56), Dafermos overviews different authors' perceived periods of Vygotsky's work (pp.60-63). He affirms that 

The idea of the cultural origin and development of higher mental functions constitutes the “hard core” of cultural-historical theory. But this leading idea develops further in different stages of the development of cultural-historical theory. (p.63)

He overviews Vygotsky’s roots in Hegel, praising Jan Derry’s book on the subject (p.67), and notes that "Self-creation of Man was considered by Hegel both as a process and a result [of] his own work” (p.75). Mediation also makes an appearance:

Hegel developed the concept of mediation as opposite to immediacy. It refers to conceptualization through the union of two terms by a third. “it is only through the mediation of an alteration that the true nature of the object comes into consciousness” (Hegel 1991, p. 54). Vygotsky recognized his debt to Hegel in developing his concept of mediating activity. (p.75)

and

The Vygotskian concept of mediating activity cannot be adequately understood without bringing to light its clear connection with the Hegelian concept of mediation and Marx’s concept of labor. (p.75)

He adds, "Taking into account the Hegelian concept of mediation and Marx’s concept of labor, Vygotsky attempted to investigate how Man becomes master of himself by using sign-mediating activity" (p.76). 

Skipping a bit: Dafermos emphasizes that Vygotsky’s “Crisis” manuscript opposed eclecticism (p.119). Vygotsky was working toward a unified theory of psychology. In his “concrete” period, Vygotsky transitioned from signals to signs (signification) (p.129). He distinguished between material (labor) tools, which are oriented to labor, and psychological tools, which are oriented toward controlling one’s own “mental processes” (p.130). In examining psychological tools, 

Vygotsky’s studies of mediating activity opened the path for the investigation of the problem of consciousness. At this point, a theoretical inconsistency in Vygotsky’s theoretical interpretation can be found. Vygotsky discovered the cultural origin of higher mental functions, rather than the overall human psyche. The realm of lower mental functions continued to be considered at the level of naturalistic immediacy. The study of the more developed and mature forms of psychological processes enabled to bring to light their social essence. The less developed sides of the subject matter (the lower mental functions) continued to be assessed in light of the previous naturalistic approaches. (p.152)

Sign mediation was significant for Vygotsky and the cultural-historical program in general, and “Vygotsky’s research focus gradually shifted from the study of the sign mediation to the investigation of sign meaning" (p.163).

Dafermos gets to development, which Vygotsky understood via dialectics: "Development is a contradictory process of continuous and discontinuous, directed and spontaneous, quantitative and qualitative transformations of personality as a bio-social entity and a member of society as a whole" (p.177). Vygotsky identified four laws of child development:

1) "development is a process that takes place in time and flows cyclically" (177)

2) "child development is not uniform and proportional" (177)

3) "there are not only progressive, forward-reaching processes, but also regressive processes of development" (177)

4) "the law of ‘metamorphosis’ in child development. The development is not reduced to simple quantitative changes, but it includes a chain of qualitative changes and transformations. Vygotsky designated the qualitative changes that emerge at each age as ‘novoobrazovanija’ (‘neoformations’)" (178-179)

In the last stage, Dafermos adds, "Vygotsky developed his theory of consciousness in the context of a critical dialogue with the representatives of Gestalt psychology and especially with Kurt Levin" (p.196). And  "In the context of a critical dialogue with Kurt Levin and other representatives of Gestalt psychology, Vygotsky was driven to the conclusion that it is necessary to develop a dialectical, holistic, historical approach to consciousness" (p.197).

That approach involved understanding meaning: "Meaning was treated by Vygotsky as the unit for the investigation both of thinking and speech. Moreover, for Vygotsky meaning constitutes the unit of the analysis of human consciousness" (p.198). Dafermos adds: "For Vygotsky, generalization and communication constitute two interconnected aspects of human consciousness reflected in meaning. Meaning in its interconnection with sense as the unity of generalization and communication serves as the unit of analysis of consciousness" (p.198). This brings us to Vygotsky’s focus on word meaning:

For Vygotsky, consciousness as a whole is reflected in the microcosm of a word. The analysis of the microcosm of a word was developed as the key strategy for the investigation of the macrocosm of consciousness. The top-down strategy of the investigation of consciousness that was developed by Vygotsky (1987a) during the last period of his life was focused on word meaning as a unit of analysis. The bottom-to-top strategy of the investigation of consciousness that was proposed by Leontiev (1983), Galperin (2003a) and others emphasizes object-oriented activity. These two different perspectives were contrasted in the examination of the puzzle of consciousness. (p.199)

In this context, Dafermos addresses the split between Vygotsky and the Kharkovites, who would go on to develop activity theory: "From my perspective, the relations between cultural-historical theory and activity theory were more complex and contradictory than it is usually presented in literature. Activity theory is not a simple continuation of cultural-historical theory, and simultaneously, it is not reduced to its total rejection" (p.202). But "Vygotsky’s approach to consciousness was unacceptable in the social context of the 1930s" (p.202).

A little later on, Dafermos lauds "Vygotsky's commitment to social justice" (p.224). I’ll just note that the road to Stalinism was paved with good intentions, including Vygotsky’s good intentions of elevating the Uzbeks with what was in retrospect ethnocentric research, and that although Vygotsky did take a position studying defectology (essentially what we would call special needs education) as Dafermos notes, his consistent focus was on the other end of the spectrum: creating a New Soviet Man modeled on the Nietzchean Superman.

In any case, Dafermos provides a list of types of dialectics:

• spontaneous (naive) (p.244)

• Sophistic (eristic) (244)

• Platonic (244-5)

• Aristotelian (245)

• Stoic (245)

• (then an account of how dialectics fell out of favor in early modern period) (246)

• Kant (246)

• Fichte (247)

• Hegel (247)

• Marx (247-248)

And he then discusses critiques of dialectics, characterized as misapprehensions (248). Incredibly, he does not mention Engels, whose Dialectics of Nature provided a hugely influential simplification of dialectics, or Stalin, whose compact explanation of dialectics in the Short Course (modeled on Engels) became required dogma in the USSR. 

Vygotsky, Dafermos says, used two conceptualizations of dialectics (p.251) 

• A general outlook on nature, society, thinking (cf. Engels here)

• A method for studying a concrete object in process of development

"Obviously,” he adds, “Vygotsky did not realize the difference between Engels’ concept of dialectic as a general world outlook and K. Marx’s concept of dialectic as the peculiar logic of the peculiar object" (p.252). Dafermos then goes on to discuss (in detail) Ilyenkov and his contemporaries' thoughts about dialectic.

Dafermos concludes by defending dialectics against postmodernism, charging that "The post-modern repudiation of all grand narratives of modernity including dialectics leads to the rejection of the project of human emancipation" (p. 297). I am not sure most postmodernists would agree.

Overall, I found this book to be highly interesting. Dafermos has clearly thought a lot about dialectics’ role in Vygotsky’s system, has provided a good overview of the development of dialectic (for which I am grateful), and has identified differences between cultural-historical theory and activity theory while still making room for reconciliation between the two. On the other hand, the book sometimes (unintentionally) reveals the limits of dialectics as a method of understanding human development. It’s a very useful book. If you’re interested in these issues as I am, definitely pick it up.

Reading :: Mind, Self, and Society

Mind, Self, and Society

By George Herbert Mead

I read this book (Kindle edition, so I refer to locations rather than pages) quite a while ago, but have not gotten around to reviewing it until now. As with most of my other reading over the last few years, this one relates to Vygotsky, who read and was influenced by Mead. I don't think Vygotsky read this specific book—it was put together posthumously by Mead's students after he died in 1934, the same year Vygotsky died—but I can see how their lines of thought paralleled.

"If we abandon the conception of a substantive soul endowed with the self of the individual at birth, then we may regard the development of the individual's self, and of his self-consciousness within the field of his experience, as the social psychologist's special interest," Mead begins (loc. 11). And "Social psychology studies the activity or behavior of the individual as it lies within the social process; the behavior of an individual can be understood only in terms of the behavior of the whole social group of which he is a member, since his individual acts are involved in larger, social acts which go beyond himself and which implicate the other members of that group" (loc.75). Thus "For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts. The social act is not explained by building it up out of stimulus plus response; it must be taken as a dynamic whole-as something going on-no part of which can be considered or understood by itself-a complex organic process implied by each individual stimulus and response involved in it" (loc. 88)

In Chapter 3, in a discussion of gestures, Mead argues that language works within a complex of conditioned reflexes—in fact, language gives us control over the organization of our actions around a referent (loc.176 — compare this characterization to Vygotsky's early formulation of consciousness as a reflex of reflexes). Mead saw language as emerging from social behavior rather than being a prrequisite (loc. 240). Later, in Ch.7, he argues, "Mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or context of experience-not communication through mind" (loc. 691). 

Consequently, as he argues in Ch.11, "objects are in a genuine sense constituted within the social process of experience, by the communication and mutual adjustment of behavior among the individual organisms which are involved in that process and which carry it on. just as in fencing the parry is an interpretation of the thrust, so, in the social act, the adjustive response of one organism to the gesture of another is the interpretation of that gesture by that organism-it is the meaning of that gesture" (loc. 1108). And here he sounds quite externalist:

The basis of meaning is thus objectively there in social conduct, or in nature in its relation to such conduct. Meaning is a content of an object which is dependent upon the relation of an organism or group of organisms to it. It is not essentially or primarily a psychical content (a content of mind or consciousness), for it need not be conscious at all, and is not in fact until significant symbols are evolved in the process of human social experience. Only when it becomes identified with such symbols does meaning become conscious. The meaning of a gesture on the part of one organism is the adjustive response of another organism to it, as indicating the resultant of the social act it initiates, the adjustive response of the second organism being itself directed toward or related to the completion of that act. In other words, meaning involves a reference of the gesture of one organism to the resultant of the social act it indicates or initiates, as adjustively responded to in this reference by another organism; and the adjustive response of the other organism is the meaning of the gesture (loc. 1132). 

In Ch.13, Mead refers to the executive function of voluntary attention, though not by that name: "Man is distinguished by that power of analysis of the field of stimulation which enables him to pick out one stimulus rather than another and so to hold on to the response that belongs to that stimulus, picking it out from others, and recombining it with others" (loc. 1327).

This brings us to this great quote from Ch.16: "The whole process is not a mental product and you cannot put it inside of the brain. Mentality is that relationship of the organism to the situation which is mediated by sets of symbols" (loc.1780). 

He continues this line of thought in Ch.17, in which he sounds a bit like Vygotsky and a bit like Bateson: "The organism, then, is in a sense responsible for its environment. And since organism and environment determine each other and are mutually dependent for their existence, it follows that the life-process, to be adequately understood, must be considered in terms of their interrelations" (loc. 1849). And:

The processes of experience which the human brain makes possible are made possible only for a group of interacting individuals: only for individual organisms which are members of a society; not for the individual organism in isolation from other individual organisms.

Mind arises in the social process only when that process as a whole enters into, or is present in, the experience of any one of the given individuals involved in that process. When this occurs the individual becomes self-conscious and has a mind; he becomes aware of his relations to that process as a whole, and to the other individuals participating in it with him; he becomes aware of that process as modified by the reactions and interactions of the individuals-including himself-who are carrying it on. The evolutionary appearance of mind or intelligence takes place when the whole social process of experience and behavior is brought within the experience of any one of the separate individuals implicated therein, and when the individual's adjustment to the process is modified and refined by the awareness or consciousness which he thus has of it. It is by means of reflexiveness-the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself-that the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other toward himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process, and to modify the resultant of that process in any given social act in terms of his adjustment to it. Reflexiveness, then, is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of mind. (loc. 1906)

And let's stop there. As I mentioned, Mead's thought clearly parallels Vygotsky's in terms of a social, sign-mediated mind. On the other hand, he is not working under (some might say burdened with) a dialectical materialist framework, and consequently he sounds a bit more like Bakhtin in some places and Bateson in others. Overall, fascinating—and I really ought to read more Mead. 

Reading :: Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education

Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education

By Jan Derry

This book was recommended to me by another scholar, who suggested that I needed to better understand Hegel's influence on Vygotsky. True. I have been avoiding reading Hegel. Fortunately Jan Derry has done some of the hard work on this question already.

Derry's first sentence is: "This book is a response to the claim that Vygotsky holds abstract rationality as the pinnacle of thought" (p.1). Throughout the book, Derry explores how Vygotsky understands rationality, contrasting that understanding with how Vygotsky has been taken up by others, comparing Vygotsky's thought to situated cognition (Ch.2), and constructivism (Ch.3), Piaget (Ch.4). She then explores roots of Vygotsky's thought in Spinoza (Ch.5) and Hegel (Ch.6-7).

A few quick notes from the early part of this book:

In Chapter 2,

• Derry sketches the evolution of the Vygotsky school, drawing on Kozulin to discuss the split between Vygotsky's more "complex" view vs. the Kharkovites (p.12)
• She mentions, drawing again on Kozulin, that Vygotsky's "followers ... were inevitably compromised by the difficult conditions of Stalinism," leading to the activity approach, which was "a more 'materialist' approach [that] occurred in a climate of terror that had become life-threatening" (p.13, quoting Zinchenko here).
• Specifically, the Kharkov school moved from the study of consciousness to that of object-orientedness (p.13)
• Derry quotes Zinchenko, who said that in the context of Stalinism, symbols were deemed idealistic, whereas "the thing" was materialist (p.13); one was unsafe to study, the other was safe.
• Critically, Zinchenko says, activity was reduced to the understanding that a human being was a functional organ for carrying out the Soviet state's directives (p.14).

In Chapter 3, Derry criticizes Wertsch for not understanding Vygotsky because he didn't appreciate Vygotsky's grounding in Hegel (a lack that I share, which is why I read Derry's book!). Specifically, "Although Hegel offers a radically different appreciation of 'abstract rationality,' that is lost to much contemporary work, owing in part to the alignment of Hegel with Marxism and Marxism with the failures of Soviet practice" (p.35). She also criticizes the North American approach more broadly as representationalist, understanding meaning as representing something that exists out there (p.39-42), rather than being created through human agency; if we subscribe to a representationalist paradigm, she says, "agency can be and is ascribed to anything that appears to exert effect" (p.42, in a passage that calls out Wertsch's discussion of tools but can be applied to posthumanism as well). 

In Chapter 4, Derry explores the underlying philosophical differences between Vygotsky and Piaget, arguing that Piaget worked within a dualist Kantian framework (p.71) while Vygotsky worked within a monist Hegelian framework (p.75). 

In Chapter 5, Derry argues that "Vygotsky's understanding of free will derives from Spinoza" (p.85). "Freedom and necessity are at the heart of Vygotsky's account of how mindedness is formed and sustained by mediation with artefacts in a social domain" (p.86). And "Vygotsky follows Spinoza in taking the basis of freedom to be the human ability to separate ourselves from our passions, from the contingencies of nature, and to make for ourselves a space within which we can determine our actions" (p.90). 

Later in the chapter, Derry returns to the Vygotsky/Kharkov split, arguing that 

The idea of economic determinism is fostered by a crude reading of Marx, where a determinate relation is taken to exist in what became known as the base and superstructure model. The temptation is then to see human beings simply as a product of their circumstances. This determinism plagued Vygotskians: It was precisely this that provoked the rift with Leontiev and the Kharkov group because they could not accept Vygotsky's insistence on the existence of a plane that was not explicable in terms of tool use in an environment. (p.97)

I'm not all-in on the first part of this interpretation: Lamdan and Yasnitky make a pretty good case that Vygotsky and Luria had themselves subscribed to economic determinism in the Uzbek expedition. But I agree that the Kharkov group collapsed the Vygotskian distinction between physical tools and psychological tools (signs). 

In any case, Derry notes that a rapprochement could occur only when orthodox Stalinist concepts developed that would make it possible: "only when Vygotskian theory was reinstated in the language of the second signal system of Pavlov. The second signal system incorporates the notion that language and concepts mediate human existence as a second signal system rather than as a first signal where stimuli act on the nervous system directly" (p.98; for examples, see my reviews of Simon, Cole & Maltzman, and especially Luria). 

In Chapter 6, Derry finally turns her attention to "the most significant philosopher for Vygotsky—Hegel" (p.105). "Hegel's philosophy is not readily accessible," she adds with some understatement (p.105). To lead us through it, she contrasts Kant and Hegel:

1. Kant believed in an unknowable realm; Hegel believed that everything was knowable.
2. Kant believed that the mind in itself could construct the world in a particular way; Hegel believed that the mind emerges in social activity.
3. Kant emphasized representations corresponding to a world of which we have knowledge; Hegel emphasized "meaning arising inferentially within a system" (p.106).

Based on Hegel, Vygotsky understood forms of knowing as "developed from activity rather than linking the categories of understanding" (p.108). He also argued that words and concepts "do not merely reflect but actually structure thought. Concepts do not follow, but actually precede, thought" (p.112). Indeed, "Under the influence of Hegel, Vygotsky is bound to reject the representationalist view of knowledge, which presupposes a terminus where knowledge is complete" (p.116). 

In Chapter 7, Derry considers Vygotsky, Hegel, and education. Here, she emphasizes that Vygotsky's views were not "the caricature of evolutionism mistakenly attributed to both Hegel and Marx" (p.135). I won't go further into this chapter, but it is illuminating.

Overall, this book really helped me to understand Hegel (and Spinoza, and Kant) in relation to Vygotsky's thinking. If that's something you want to do also, definitely pick this book up.

Reading :: Hegel: A Very Short Introduction

Hegel: A Very Short Introduction

By Peter Singer

I don't enjoy reading philosophy, yet I've been told that to really understand activity theory, I have to understand Hegel—a notoriously unclear writer. So I've been reading summaries and commentaries on Hegel before tackling his original work. And what better place to start than a book that in its very title promises to be Very Short?

Thanks to COVID-19, I chose to buy the Kindle version. The book is indeed Very Short, with just six chapters covering Hegel's life and major aspects of his thought. My review will be Even Shorter, focusing on those aspects that resonate with activity theory.

One of those aspects was, obviously, Hegel's attention to change and development through history, something that he accepted from Schiller and that went on to influence Marx and Engels (p.13). 

A bit later, Singer describes the master-slave dynamic in Hegel, in which, through his [sic] labors, the slave "makes his own ideas into something permanent, an external object" (p.80). In doing so, the slave becomes aware of his own consciousness. This insight, Singer says, inspired Marx 40 years later to develop the concept of alienated labour, in which the worker objectifies or externalizes himself by putting the best of himself into his labour (pp.80-81). When the object is someone else's property, the objectified essence of the worker is lost to him and actually oppresses him. This concept of alienated labour becomes the basis for Marx's concept of surplus value (p.81).

Singer also describes Hegel's understanding of dialectics and the dialectical method, which Hegel uses "to uncover the form of pure thought" (p.99). Singer draws from Hegel's Philosophy of History to provide an example of the dialectical method, in which Greece's customary society (thesis) was revealed as inadequate via Socrates' questioning and independent thought (antithesis), leading to the "acceptance of the supreme right of individual conscience" (synthesis) (p.100). The synthesis then becomes the thesis for the next movement of history. I am not sure how adequate this explanation is, since (according to other sources, including Wikipedia) the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad first appeared in Fichte's summarization of Hegel's work. But perhaps it is enough: Singer goes on to explain that dialectic involves detecting how development involves opposing elements, leading to the disintegration of the current state and the creation of a relatively stable new state, which then develops its own tensions (p.102).

And I think that's enough for now. Singer has indeed produced a Very Short book, one that is highly readable. It did not sell me on the prospect of reading Hegel in the original, but it did give me an idea of the sweep of his thought and how it connects to themes about which I am concerned. If you're interested in taking the first step toward understanding Hegel, check it out. 

Reading :: Steps to an Ecology of Mind

Steps to an Ecology of Mind

By Gregory Bateson

This book is a classic collection of Bateson's work across decades. I've read it before, but haven't attempted to blog it. And rereading it, I remember why. It's a lot.

My review, alas, is short. Even though watching Bateson's development was fascinating—and he offers retrospective comments in each section, pointing out where he was struggling to develop concepts in each period—not all of this work is of direct interest to me and some of it is of interest primarily due to how it's been picked up elsewhere. In addition, I don't think I am adequately equipped to review parts in detail.

With that in mind, let's hit some highlights.

Bateson is well known for the concept of the double bind, in which someone faces two unsatisfactory and mutually reinforcing alternatives. In "Toward a theory of schizophrenia" (1956, authored by Bateson and colleagues), they theorize the double bind ("a situation in which no matter what a person does, he 'can't win,'" p.201) as a way to explain how schizophrenia develops. In "The group dynamics of schizophrenia" (1960, with colleagues), they add that the double blind is "a paradigm for human relations. Indeed, this sort of dilemma is not rare and it is not confined to the contexts of schizophrenia" (p.238). And in "Double bind" (1969, at a symposium on the double bind), he clarifies that "Double bind theory asserts that there is an experiential component in the determination or etiology of schizophrenic symptoms and related behavioral patterns, such as humor, art, poetry, etc. Notably the theory does not distinguish between these subspecialties" (p.272). (Here Bateson emphasizes the role of feedback loops, trial-and-error, and comparison in understanding systemic change (p.274), elements that John Boyd would later pick up for his OODA framework.) Bateson concludes that "if this pathology can be warded off or resisted, the total experience may promote creativity" (p.278).

The themes of feedback loops and trial-and-error also run through other chapters. For instance, in "The logical categories of learning and communication" (1964), Bateson argues that "all learning ... is to some degree stochastic (i.e., contains components of 'trial and error')" and develops "an hierarchic classification of the types of error which are to be corrected in the various learning processes" (p.287):

Zero learning: "the immediate base of all these acts ... not subject to correction by trial and error"

 

Learning I: "the revision of choice within an unchanged set of alternatives"

Learning II: "the revision of the set from which the choice is to be made" (p.287)

"...and so on," Bateson adds, emphasizing that the classifications can become more meta. Learning II is "learning to learn" (p.294) and "a way of punctuating events" (p.300). 

Learning III "is likely to be difficult and rare even in human beings" but, Bateson says, "something of the sort does from time to time occur in psychotherapy, religious conversion, and in other sequences in which there is profound reorganization of character" (p.301). "If Learning II is a learning of the contexts of Learning I, then Learning III should be a learning of the contexts of those contexts" (p.304). 

This insight leads us to Part III of the book, in which Bateson becomes interested in developing a theory of context—one in which a given utterance or action is part of a context, not a product or effect. Here is where Bateson draws on the concept of "ecology" in the book's title, in which relationships come to the fore and the phenomena with which Bateson has been concerned "become part of the ecology of ideas in systems of 'minds' whose boundaries no longer coincide with the skins of the participant individuals" (p.339). It is in this section, in "Form, substance, and difference," that Bateson gives us the illustration of the blind man and the stick (see my review of A Thousand Plateaus for an extended quote, which I won't reproduce here). Bateson also argues here that separating intellect from emotion, and mind from body, is "monstrous" (p.470). 

This book really is a must-read for those of us who are thinking through thought, cognition, and social systems. It's a lot to assimilate, as any book that summarizes an entire life's worth of thought should be. But it's still (generally) accessible and rewarding. Pick it up.

Reading :: The Knowledge Economy and Lifelong Learning

The Knowledge Economy and Lifelong Learning: A Critical Reader

Edited by D.W. Livingstone and David Guile

This book is from the same publisher as Guile's monograph The Learning Challenge of the Knowledge Economy and covers some of the same ground: How do educators deal with changes in the economy?

In their introduction, the editors argue that all human economies are knowledge-based (p.xvi) and ask: what, if anything, is new about the knowledge economy? (p.8). The pieces in the collection wrestle with this question in one way or another. I'll just pull out a couple of those pieces for discussion.

Beth A. Beckhy. "Object Lessons: Workplace Artifacts as Representations of Occupational Jurisdiction" (pp.229-256)

In this chapter, Beckhy notes that occupations are interdependent and examines how they compete for control in task areas, specifically in the case of "the work of engineers, technicians, and assemblers at a manufacturer of semiconductor equipment" (p.229). She focuses on artifacts, which "embed the knowledge of their creators" and which "symbolize social categories and influence and constrain social action" (p.232). Thus "examining artifacts provides a window into the social dynamics of occupational groups, because as artifacts cross occupational boundaries, they highlight the social interaction coalescing around them" (p.232). 

After some discussion of the case, Beckhy presents a table showing the impact of occupational artifacts on workplace jurisdiction (p.237). The columns: 

• Knowledge
• Authority
• Legitimacy

The rows:

• Drawings 
• Machines

And the results: These artifacts functioned as representations of knowledge (pp.237-w38), but also as "boundary objects" that "were used to mediate across occupational boundaries during episodes of problem solving" (p.238). She found that drawings allowed engineers to deflect blame and place blame because "they were open-ended and in a state of flux"—engineers could blame others' poor interpretation of the drawings (p.245). Meanwhile, technicians had physical control of their machines, so they could "challenge the authority of engineers" in that domain (p.246; cf. Dorothy Winsor's work at "AgriCorp"). I saw a lot of resonance with genre theory here.

Peter H. Sawchuk. "Divergent Working and Learning Trajectories in Social Services: Insights from a Use-Value Perspective." (pp.277-300)

Here, Sawchuk argues that to understand a knowledge-based economy, we must understand "the details of everyday economic life and learning" as an "arena of political economic struggle" (p.277). He argues that two things have not changed:

• knowledge, which "continues to be central to production and control"
• use-values, "the direct satisfaction of individual and collective need" (p.277)

However, "in the course of the intensification of learning and change ... the contradictions that emerge may provide an important point of departure for analysis of occupational change" (p.277). This analysis is guided by the use-value thesis (UVT), the result of a "dialogic interaction" between cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) and labour process theory (LPT) (p.278). He contrasts this approach with that of Engestrom, which (he charges) leaves to one side "the broader purpose and political economic dimensions" (p.282), including primary contradictions, which Engestrom and Sannino name-check (pp.282-283) but don't empirically investigate in a consistent way (p.283). He quotes Avis' critique of Engestrom's approach, in which Avis charges that "contradictions" actually secure the interests of capital (p.283). Sawchuk develops UVT as an alternative approach.

David Guile. "Working and Learning in the 'Knowledge-Based' Creative and Cultural Sector: Vocational Practice, Social Capital, and Entrepreneurability." (pp.301-316)

Guile discusses the rise of the creative and cultural (C&C) sector over "the last 20 years" (p.301; n.b., the collection was published in 2012). The knowledge economy has captured the imagination of policy makers, leading to educational policies that encourage developing C&C education and jobs. However, "the link policy makers and transnational agencies assume exist between  qualifications and access to employment does not apply in the ways they imagine in this sector" (p.301). (This argument sums up and extends the one that Guile made in his 2010 book.) Specifically, the C&C sector offers a tangible and intangible contribution to the economy," and policy is not well equipped to deal with the intangible (p.304). In the UK C&C sector, common features include:

• "external labour markets and hence freelance work"
• "individualized rather than unionized work practices"
• "multi-faceted conceptions of expertise" (p.308)

Guile overviews developments, then concludes that they "are likely in the current financial climate to exercise a suppression effect on the aspirations of people who lack financial and emotional forms of support and to position those who do have access to such support to take advantage of the port-of-entry positions that are either advertised in the C&C sector or uncovered from participating in C&C networks" (p.314). 

Overall, I found a lot to like in this collection. If you're interested in the knowledge economy (you can put scare quotes around the phrase if you like), take a look.

Reading :: Collaborative Projects

Collaborative Projects: An Interdisciplinary Study

Edited by Andy Blunden

This book has been on my shelf for maybe six months as I've been clearing out other books to be blogged (I usually do the library books first), or working on research, or sometimes simply procrastinating due to the high number of sticky notes protruding from the book's edges. I took a lot of notes. But I looked through those notes last night and I think this might end up to be a quicker review than I had anticipated. In any case, it's time.

This edited collection follows after Blunden's An Interdisciplinary Theory of Activity, which proposed rethinking the activity system as a collaborative project. In this collection, Blunden presents the works of several researchers who (more or less) take this tack with activity theory. Like most collections, this one is a bit lumpy, with people taking up the core idea in different ways. Rather than reviewing each contribution, I'll just discuss Blunden's introduction.

Andy Blunden. "Introduction: 'Collaborative Project' as a Concept for Interdisciplinary Human Science Research"

Like many collections, this one is most on-point in the introduction. Blunden notes that the human sciences are fragmented in various ways but a "chasm" exists between disciplines that study individuals vs. those that study humans en masse. He asserts that these two types of disciplines lack a mutual concept, and asks, "Could Activity Theory with 'project' as a unit of activity, [sic] provide a way to overcome this gap by using a shared conceptual language across both domains?" (p.1). He adds the adjective "collaborative" to "project," which "is meant to distinguish 'project' as a social formation in contradistinction to an individualistic conception of projects, but projects are always collaborative, and collaboration is always for a project" (p.1). In this chapter, he outlines the concept of the collaborative project.

Blunden tours thought from Marx to Vygotsky to Leontiev and Luria, comparing it with somewhat similar work that traces from Husserl to Schutz and Heidegger as well as Sartre. But he asserts that activity theory (AT) originates in the social world, while in phenomenology and existentialism "the psyche projects itself on to the world" (p.7). He notes how, in being taken up in Europe and the Nordic countries, the activity system developed as an elaboration of Leontiev's "activity" (p.7). 

Blunden argues, borrowing from Hegel, that "projects can be seen as passing through four stages of development," stages that are "ideal-typical, not proscriptive":

1. a group of people are subject to some problem or constraint on their freedom
2. they will attempt and fail projects due to misunderstanding the problem
3. they will formulate an adequate concept of the situation and launch a social movement to change social practices
4. the new form of practice is "mainstreamed" or institutionalized (p.8)

In their development, projects objectify themselves in three aspects: symbolic, instrumental, and practical (p.8). 

• Symbolic: Through being communicated or represented
• Instrumental: Through the construction of instruments or artifacts to facilitate/constrain project actions and integration with the community
• Practical: Once it has been relatively permanently (?) integrated into a community, it becomes an institution (p.9)

Importantly, Blunden argues, the object of the project is immanent within the project itself; it is "not some objective need existing independently of the project, which determines the project from the outside. It might even be quite illusory. But it emerges from the activity of the project itself, as its immanent goal and self-concept" (p.10). Notice that Leontiev would probably disagree, but Leontiev was working within an objectivist (Stalinist) framework. Notice also that conceiving the object as immanent allows the project to be conceived as a dialectical unity.

Blunden further argues that as a unit of analysis, a collaborative project also functions as an ethic (p.11). 

Skipping a bit: Blunden argues that "Every science has for its foundation one concept" — a unit of analysis, system concept, or molar unit (p.13). For many social sciences, he says, the UoA is an individual. For others, it is the social group (usually an aggregate of individuals). But both of these UoAs have been unsatisfactory, leading to proliferating system concepts in the 20th century: "discourse, activity, genre, language game, frame, tradition, figured world, activity system, idioculture, social formation, network, ideology, ideological apparatus, field, habitus and so on" (p.13). And objects of study included "nation, state, market, community, economy, culture, people, social class, and so on" (p.13). Blunden advocates for the collaborative project as a concept that 

• can represent social life at the individual, meso, and cultural-historical level
• can embody movement and change (not structural equilibrium)
• can capture the dynamic between how individual psyches are determined by social situation and how individuals participate in social change
• can express both an "ethical conception of modern life" and "a unit of scientific analysis for the formation of modern life and its conduct" (p.14)

Among other things, "the project is a concept of both psychology and sociology"; it is also humanist because it "gives realistic expression to the agency of individuals in societal affairs and concrete content to social relations" (p.15). 

Blunden thus sees the project as extending and strengthening AT for disciplines dealing with humans en masse (p.16). (Put another way, AT began as a psychology but has extended into a sociology.) 

Unlike psychology, the collaborative project treats emotion and reason under the same heading because we begin with actions (p.16). 

Unlike sociology, the collaborative project does not start with the social group: "Activity Theory sees a social group as but the product of a project, as the appearance of a project at one stage in its development" (pp.17-18). An institution is also a project—one that has become mainstreamed.

Around here, Blunden equates the collaborative project with the activity system (p.20). He adds that "there are three basic modes of collaboration which constitute labor activity as projects":

• command
• exchange
• collaboration (p.21).

(These roughly correspond to hierarchy, market, and network or collaborative community.)

In sum, the project is 

• genuinely interdisciplinary
• a theorization of the connection between human actions and the societal context
• a "further development" of Leontiev's "activity" and Engestrom's "activity system" (p.23)

Blunden adds that Leontiev's concept of activity was "defined by a universal, societal concept of its object"; people might have different perceptions of the object and the activity, and they might have different motives, but due to the social division of labor and societally produced supervision of labor, the social and individual needs are harmonized (p.24). This concept originated in the Soviet planned economy, and thus did not extend well to the capitalist world, nor to "any really existing 'planned economy'" (pp.24-25). Engestrom dealt with this issue via his expanding model. But the question remains: who or what determines the object of the activity/project? The Central Committee? Or does it just emerge from past activity? Blunden argues that it is "immanent within the project itself" (p.25, his emphasis). It's not just a solution (many solutions can be formulated for the same problem). The project continues to develop according to its own logic, so to speak" (p.25). 

This introduction is a lot to digest. And, as with many collections, the other pieces do not entirely share the vision of the introduction: they draw on varying theorists in varying ways, following the concept of the collaborative project in broad strokes but not entirely in specifics. Still, they are well worth reading. 

If you're interested in how AT is developing, and especially how to reconcile the concept of activity with other types of practice theory, definitely pick this collection up.

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