Reading :: Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory

Rethinking Cultural-Historical Theory: A Dialectical Perspective to Vygotsky

By Manolis Dafermos

In this book, Dafermos reviews how Vygotsky’s work has been taken up in different parts of the world. Dafermos emphasizes the dialectical underpinnings of Vygotsky’s theory, which he believes have been lost in some of this work.

This argument begins on page 1, where Dafermos affirms that "diverse ways of interpreting and conceptualizing Vygotsky's legacy in different parts of the globe have been developed" (p.1) and "the expansion and implementation of a scientific idea beyond the boundaries of the field of its initial appearance and formation raises important epistemological and methodological issues. This question preoccupied Vygotsky in his work ‘The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology’" (p.2). Dafermos charges that Vygotsky has been transformed into a cure-all, and "The whole complexity of Vygotsky’s theory has been lost" (p.3). Vygotsky's implicit assumptions are unrevealed. Just as Vygotsky criticized methodological eclecticism, Dafermos critiques postmodernist approaches "connected with the celebration of fragmentation and incoherence" and attempts " to reconstruct Vygotsky’s research program not as a given, static set of ready-made concepts and ideas, but as a developing process" (p.3).

Dafermos argues:

By reformulating the previous insights, the investigation of the development of a theory (in this particular case, cultural-historical theory) includes the study of the following interconnected aspects:

(1) the sociohistorical context within which a theory is formed,

(2) the scientific context, trends in the field of philosophy and science,

(3) the specific characteristics of the subject matter of the investigation,

(4) the particular subjects involved in the production and application of scientific knowledge, the development of their research program,

(5) a study of the personal network of these subjects and their relations to the scientific community (p.5)

He adds that cultural-historical theory is best understood dialectically: "From a dialectical perspective, cultural-historical theory is examined as a developing, unfinished project that emerged and formed historically in the process of solving concrete conceptual and practical tasks" (p.6). Here, he quotes Ilyenkov to claim that "From a dialectical perspective, the internal contradictions of a concrete object constitute the basic source of its own development. Moreover, the emergence and resolution of contradictions can be considered as a course of development of scientific knowledge" (p.6). Thus "A dialectical approach brings to light the logic of the development of Vygotsky’s theory in terms of a drama of ideas and discloses zigzags, returns and loops in the process of its building, rather than a linear accumulation of new knowledge" (p.7). 

Unfortunately, he says, "One of the difficulties in grasping the essence of cultural-historical theory is connected with the devaluation of the dialectic underpinnings of cultural-historical theory" (p.6). That is the problem his book addresses: "The gist of the argument of the book is that Vygotsky’s theory should be examined not as a static and closed system of ideas, but as a developmental process" (p.7) -- thus we examine Vygotsky's mistakes as he works through them to improve the theory (which -- and this is my own commentary -- is still a story of ascent).

With that introduction in mind, Dafermos reviews the context of psychology and philosophy leading up to Vygotsky’s work, specifically the crisis of psychology that Vygotsky addressed in his “Crisis” manuscript (p.47). 

Acknowledging that "there is a need to develop a holistic account of Vygotsky’s research program in the process of its own development. In other words, Vygotsky’s research program can be analyzed as a developmental process" (p.56), Dafermos overviews different authors' perceived periods of Vygotsky's work (pp.60-63). He affirms that 

The idea of the cultural origin and development of higher mental functions constitutes the “hard core” of cultural-historical theory. But this leading idea develops further in different stages of the development of cultural-historical theory. (p.63)

He overviews Vygotsky’s roots in Hegel, praising Jan Derry’s book on the subject (p.67), and notes that "Self-creation of Man was considered by Hegel both as a process and a result [of] his own work” (p.75). Mediation also makes an appearance:

Hegel developed the concept of mediation as opposite to immediacy. It refers to conceptualization through the union of two terms by a third. “it is only through the mediation of an alteration that the true nature of the object comes into consciousness” (Hegel 1991, p. 54). Vygotsky recognized his debt to Hegel in developing his concept of mediating activity. (p.75)

and

The Vygotskian concept of mediating activity cannot be adequately understood without bringing to light its clear connection with the Hegelian concept of mediation and Marx’s concept of labor. (p.75)

He adds, "Taking into account the Hegelian concept of mediation and Marx’s concept of labor, Vygotsky attempted to investigate how Man becomes master of himself by using sign-mediating activity" (p.76). 

Skipping a bit: Dafermos emphasizes that Vygotsky’s “Crisis” manuscript opposed eclecticism (p.119). Vygotsky was working toward a unified theory of psychology. In his “concrete” period, Vygotsky transitioned from signals to signs (signification) (p.129). He distinguished between material (labor) tools, which are oriented to labor, and psychological tools, which are oriented toward controlling one’s own “mental processes” (p.130). In examining psychological tools, 

Vygotsky’s studies of mediating activity opened the path for the investigation of the problem of consciousness. At this point, a theoretical inconsistency in Vygotsky’s theoretical interpretation can be found. Vygotsky discovered the cultural origin of higher mental functions, rather than the overall human psyche. The realm of lower mental functions continued to be considered at the level of naturalistic immediacy. The study of the more developed and mature forms of psychological processes enabled to bring to light their social essence. The less developed sides of the subject matter (the lower mental functions) continued to be assessed in light of the previous naturalistic approaches. (p.152)

Sign mediation was significant for Vygotsky and the cultural-historical program in general, and “Vygotsky’s research focus gradually shifted from the study of the sign mediation to the investigation of sign meaning" (p.163).

Dafermos gets to development, which Vygotsky understood via dialectics: "Development is a contradictory process of continuous and discontinuous, directed and spontaneous, quantitative and qualitative transformations of personality as a bio-social entity and a member of society as a whole" (p.177). Vygotsky identified four laws of child development:

1) "development is a process that takes place in time and flows cyclically" (177)

2) "child development is not uniform and proportional" (177)

3) "there are not only progressive, forward-reaching processes, but also regressive processes of development" (177)

4) "the law of ‘metamorphosis’ in child development. The development is not reduced to simple quantitative changes, but it includes a chain of qualitative changes and transformations. Vygotsky designated the qualitative changes that emerge at each age as ‘novoobrazovanija’ (‘neoformations’)" (178-179)

In the last stage, Dafermos adds, "Vygotsky developed his theory of consciousness in the context of a critical dialogue with the representatives of Gestalt psychology and especially with Kurt Levin" (p.196). And  "In the context of a critical dialogue with Kurt Levin and other representatives of Gestalt psychology, Vygotsky was driven to the conclusion that it is necessary to develop a dialectical, holistic, historical approach to consciousness" (p.197).

That approach involved understanding meaning: "Meaning was treated by Vygotsky as the unit for the investigation both of thinking and speech. Moreover, for Vygotsky meaning constitutes the unit of the analysis of human consciousness" (p.198). Dafermos adds: "For Vygotsky, generalization and communication constitute two interconnected aspects of human consciousness reflected in meaning. Meaning in its interconnection with sense as the unity of generalization and communication serves as the unit of analysis of consciousness" (p.198). This brings us to Vygotsky’s focus on word meaning:

For Vygotsky, consciousness as a whole is reflected in the microcosm of a word. The analysis of the microcosm of a word was developed as the key strategy for the investigation of the macrocosm of consciousness. The top-down strategy of the investigation of consciousness that was developed by Vygotsky (1987a) during the last period of his life was focused on word meaning as a unit of analysis. The bottom-to-top strategy of the investigation of consciousness that was proposed by Leontiev (1983), Galperin (2003a) and others emphasizes object-oriented activity. These two different perspectives were contrasted in the examination of the puzzle of consciousness. (p.199)

In this context, Dafermos addresses the split between Vygotsky and the Kharkovites, who would go on to develop activity theory: "From my perspective, the relations between cultural-historical theory and activity theory were more complex and contradictory than it is usually presented in literature. Activity theory is not a simple continuation of cultural-historical theory, and simultaneously, it is not reduced to its total rejection" (p.202). But "Vygotsky’s approach to consciousness was unacceptable in the social context of the 1930s" (p.202).

A little later on, Dafermos lauds "Vygotsky's commitment to social justice" (p.224). I’ll just note that the road to Stalinism was paved with good intentions, including Vygotsky’s good intentions of elevating the Uzbeks with what was in retrospect ethnocentric research, and that although Vygotsky did take a position studying defectology (essentially what we would call special needs education) as Dafermos notes, his consistent focus was on the other end of the spectrum: creating a New Soviet Man modeled on the Nietzchean Superman.

In any case, Dafermos provides a list of types of dialectics:

• spontaneous (naive) (p.244)

• Sophistic (eristic) (244)

• Platonic (244-5)

• Aristotelian (245)

• Stoic (245)

• (then an account of how dialectics fell out of favor in early modern period) (246)

• Kant (246)

• Fichte (247)

• Hegel (247)

• Marx (247-248)

And he then discusses critiques of dialectics, characterized as misapprehensions (248). Incredibly, he does not mention Engels, whose Dialectics of Nature provided a hugely influential simplification of dialectics, or Stalin, whose compact explanation of dialectics in the Short Course (modeled on Engels) became required dogma in the USSR. 

Vygotsky, Dafermos says, used two conceptualizations of dialectics (p.251) 

• A general outlook on nature, society, thinking (cf. Engels here)

• A method for studying a concrete object in process of development

"Obviously,” he adds, “Vygotsky did not realize the difference between Engels’ concept of dialectic as a general world outlook and K. Marx’s concept of dialectic as the peculiar logic of the peculiar object" (p.252). Dafermos then goes on to discuss (in detail) Ilyenkov and his contemporaries' thoughts about dialectic.

Dafermos concludes by defending dialectics against postmodernism, charging that "The post-modern repudiation of all grand narratives of modernity including dialectics leads to the rejection of the project of human emancipation" (p. 297). I am not sure most postmodernists would agree.

Overall, I found this book to be highly interesting. Dafermos has clearly thought a lot about dialectics’ role in Vygotsky’s system, has provided a good overview of the development of dialectic (for which I am grateful), and has identified differences between cultural-historical theory and activity theory while still making room for reconciliation between the two. On the other hand, the book sometimes (unintentionally) reveals the limits of dialectics as a method of understanding human development. It’s a very useful book. If you’re interested in these issues as I am, definitely pick it up.

Reading :: Mind, Self, and Society

Mind, Self, and Society

By George Herbert Mead

I read this book (Kindle edition, so I refer to locations rather than pages) quite a while ago, but have not gotten around to reviewing it until now. As with most of my other reading over the last few years, this one relates to Vygotsky, who read and was influenced by Mead. I don't think Vygotsky read this specific book—it was put together posthumously by Mead's students after he died in 1934, the same year Vygotsky died—but I can see how their lines of thought paralleled.

"If we abandon the conception of a substantive soul endowed with the self of the individual at birth, then we may regard the development of the individual's self, and of his self-consciousness within the field of his experience, as the social psychologist's special interest," Mead begins (loc. 11). And "Social psychology studies the activity or behavior of the individual as it lies within the social process; the behavior of an individual can be understood only in terms of the behavior of the whole social group of which he is a member, since his individual acts are involved in larger, social acts which go beyond himself and which implicate the other members of that group" (loc.75). Thus "For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts. The social act is not explained by building it up out of stimulus plus response; it must be taken as a dynamic whole-as something going on-no part of which can be considered or understood by itself-a complex organic process implied by each individual stimulus and response involved in it" (loc. 88)

In Chapter 3, in a discussion of gestures, Mead argues that language works within a complex of conditioned reflexes—in fact, language gives us control over the organization of our actions around a referent (loc.176 — compare this characterization to Vygotsky's early formulation of consciousness as a reflex of reflexes). Mead saw language as emerging from social behavior rather than being a prrequisite (loc. 240). Later, in Ch.7, he argues, "Mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or context of experience-not communication through mind" (loc. 691). 

Consequently, as he argues in Ch.11, "objects are in a genuine sense constituted within the social process of experience, by the communication and mutual adjustment of behavior among the individual organisms which are involved in that process and which carry it on. just as in fencing the parry is an interpretation of the thrust, so, in the social act, the adjustive response of one organism to the gesture of another is the interpretation of that gesture by that organism-it is the meaning of that gesture" (loc. 1108). And here he sounds quite externalist:

The basis of meaning is thus objectively there in social conduct, or in nature in its relation to such conduct. Meaning is a content of an object which is dependent upon the relation of an organism or group of organisms to it. It is not essentially or primarily a psychical content (a content of mind or consciousness), for it need not be conscious at all, and is not in fact until significant symbols are evolved in the process of human social experience. Only when it becomes identified with such symbols does meaning become conscious. The meaning of a gesture on the part of one organism is the adjustive response of another organism to it, as indicating the resultant of the social act it initiates, the adjustive response of the second organism being itself directed toward or related to the completion of that act. In other words, meaning involves a reference of the gesture of one organism to the resultant of the social act it indicates or initiates, as adjustively responded to in this reference by another organism; and the adjustive response of the other organism is the meaning of the gesture (loc. 1132). 

In Ch.13, Mead refers to the executive function of voluntary attention, though not by that name: "Man is distinguished by that power of analysis of the field of stimulation which enables him to pick out one stimulus rather than another and so to hold on to the response that belongs to that stimulus, picking it out from others, and recombining it with others" (loc. 1327).

This brings us to this great quote from Ch.16: "The whole process is not a mental product and you cannot put it inside of the brain. Mentality is that relationship of the organism to the situation which is mediated by sets of symbols" (loc.1780). 

He continues this line of thought in Ch.17, in which he sounds a bit like Vygotsky and a bit like Bateson: "The organism, then, is in a sense responsible for its environment. And since organism and environment determine each other and are mutually dependent for their existence, it follows that the life-process, to be adequately understood, must be considered in terms of their interrelations" (loc. 1849). And:

The processes of experience which the human brain makes possible are made possible only for a group of interacting individuals: only for individual organisms which are members of a society; not for the individual organism in isolation from other individual organisms.

Mind arises in the social process only when that process as a whole enters into, or is present in, the experience of any one of the given individuals involved in that process. When this occurs the individual becomes self-conscious and has a mind; he becomes aware of his relations to that process as a whole, and to the other individuals participating in it with him; he becomes aware of that process as modified by the reactions and interactions of the individuals-including himself-who are carrying it on. The evolutionary appearance of mind or intelligence takes place when the whole social process of experience and behavior is brought within the experience of any one of the separate individuals implicated therein, and when the individual's adjustment to the process is modified and refined by the awareness or consciousness which he thus has of it. It is by means of reflexiveness-the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself-that the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other toward himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process, and to modify the resultant of that process in any given social act in terms of his adjustment to it. Reflexiveness, then, is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of mind. (loc. 1906)

And let's stop there. As I mentioned, Mead's thought clearly parallels Vygotsky's in terms of a social, sign-mediated mind. On the other hand, he is not working under (some might say burdened with) a dialectical materialist framework, and consequently he sounds a bit more like Bakhtin in some places and Bateson in others. Overall, fascinating—and I really ought to read more Mead. 

Reading :: Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education

Vygotsky: Philosophy and Education

By Jan Derry

This book was recommended to me by another scholar, who suggested that I needed to better understand Hegel's influence on Vygotsky. True. I have been avoiding reading Hegel. Fortunately Jan Derry has done some of the hard work on this question already.

Derry's first sentence is: "This book is a response to the claim that Vygotsky holds abstract rationality as the pinnacle of thought" (p.1). Throughout the book, Derry explores how Vygotsky understands rationality, contrasting that understanding with how Vygotsky has been taken up by others, comparing Vygotsky's thought to situated cognition (Ch.2), and constructivism (Ch.3), Piaget (Ch.4). She then explores roots of Vygotsky's thought in Spinoza (Ch.5) and Hegel (Ch.6-7).

A few quick notes from the early part of this book:

In Chapter 2,

• Derry sketches the evolution of the Vygotsky school, drawing on Kozulin to discuss the split between Vygotsky's more "complex" view vs. the Kharkovites (p.12)
• She mentions, drawing again on Kozulin, that Vygotsky's "followers ... were inevitably compromised by the difficult conditions of Stalinism," leading to the activity approach, which was "a more 'materialist' approach [that] occurred in a climate of terror that had become life-threatening" (p.13, quoting Zinchenko here).
• Specifically, the Kharkov school moved from the study of consciousness to that of object-orientedness (p.13)
• Derry quotes Zinchenko, who said that in the context of Stalinism, symbols were deemed idealistic, whereas "the thing" was materialist (p.13); one was unsafe to study, the other was safe.
• Critically, Zinchenko says, activity was reduced to the understanding that a human being was a functional organ for carrying out the Soviet state's directives (p.14).

In Chapter 3, Derry criticizes Wertsch for not understanding Vygotsky because he didn't appreciate Vygotsky's grounding in Hegel (a lack that I share, which is why I read Derry's book!). Specifically, "Although Hegel offers a radically different appreciation of 'abstract rationality,' that is lost to much contemporary work, owing in part to the alignment of Hegel with Marxism and Marxism with the failures of Soviet practice" (p.35). She also criticizes the North American approach more broadly as representationalist, understanding meaning as representing something that exists out there (p.39-42), rather than being created through human agency; if we subscribe to a representationalist paradigm, she says, "agency can be and is ascribed to anything that appears to exert effect" (p.42, in a passage that calls out Wertsch's discussion of tools but can be applied to posthumanism as well). 

In Chapter 4, Derry explores the underlying philosophical differences between Vygotsky and Piaget, arguing that Piaget worked within a dualist Kantian framework (p.71) while Vygotsky worked within a monist Hegelian framework (p.75). 

In Chapter 5, Derry argues that "Vygotsky's understanding of free will derives from Spinoza" (p.85). "Freedom and necessity are at the heart of Vygotsky's account of how mindedness is formed and sustained by mediation with artefacts in a social domain" (p.86). And "Vygotsky follows Spinoza in taking the basis of freedom to be the human ability to separate ourselves from our passions, from the contingencies of nature, and to make for ourselves a space within which we can determine our actions" (p.90). 

Later in the chapter, Derry returns to the Vygotsky/Kharkov split, arguing that 

The idea of economic determinism is fostered by a crude reading of Marx, where a determinate relation is taken to exist in what became known as the base and superstructure model. The temptation is then to see human beings simply as a product of their circumstances. This determinism plagued Vygotskians: It was precisely this that provoked the rift with Leontiev and the Kharkov group because they could not accept Vygotsky's insistence on the existence of a plane that was not explicable in terms of tool use in an environment. (p.97)

I'm not all-in on the first part of this interpretation: Lamdan and Yasnitky make a pretty good case that Vygotsky and Luria had themselves subscribed to economic determinism in the Uzbek expedition. But I agree that the Kharkov group collapsed the Vygotskian distinction between physical tools and psychological tools (signs). 

In any case, Derry notes that a rapprochement could occur only when orthodox Stalinist concepts developed that would make it possible: "only when Vygotskian theory was reinstated in the language of the second signal system of Pavlov. The second signal system incorporates the notion that language and concepts mediate human existence as a second signal system rather than as a first signal where stimuli act on the nervous system directly" (p.98; for examples, see my reviews of Simon, Cole & Maltzman, and especially Luria). 

In Chapter 6, Derry finally turns her attention to "the most significant philosopher for Vygotsky—Hegel" (p.105). "Hegel's philosophy is not readily accessible," she adds with some understatement (p.105). To lead us through it, she contrasts Kant and Hegel:

1. Kant believed in an unknowable realm; Hegel believed that everything was knowable.
2. Kant believed that the mind in itself could construct the world in a particular way; Hegel believed that the mind emerges in social activity.
3. Kant emphasized representations corresponding to a world of which we have knowledge; Hegel emphasized "meaning arising inferentially within a system" (p.106).

Based on Hegel, Vygotsky understood forms of knowing as "developed from activity rather than linking the categories of understanding" (p.108). He also argued that words and concepts "do not merely reflect but actually structure thought. Concepts do not follow, but actually precede, thought" (p.112). Indeed, "Under the influence of Hegel, Vygotsky is bound to reject the representationalist view of knowledge, which presupposes a terminus where knowledge is complete" (p.116). 

In Chapter 7, Derry considers Vygotsky, Hegel, and education. Here, she emphasizes that Vygotsky's views were not "the caricature of evolutionism mistakenly attributed to both Hegel and Marx" (p.135). I won't go further into this chapter, but it is illuminating.

Overall, this book really helped me to understand Hegel (and Spinoza, and Kant) in relation to Vygotsky's thinking. If that's something you want to do also, definitely pick this book up.

Reading :: Hegel: A Very Short Introduction

Hegel: A Very Short Introduction

By Peter Singer

I don't enjoy reading philosophy, yet I've been told that to really understand activity theory, I have to understand Hegel—a notoriously unclear writer. So I've been reading summaries and commentaries on Hegel before tackling his original work. And what better place to start than a book that in its very title promises to be Very Short?

Thanks to COVID-19, I chose to buy the Kindle version. The book is indeed Very Short, with just six chapters covering Hegel's life and major aspects of his thought. My review will be Even Shorter, focusing on those aspects that resonate with activity theory.

One of those aspects was, obviously, Hegel's attention to change and development through history, something that he accepted from Schiller and that went on to influence Marx and Engels (p.13). 

A bit later, Singer describes the master-slave dynamic in Hegel, in which, through his [sic] labors, the slave "makes his own ideas into something permanent, an external object" (p.80). In doing so, the slave becomes aware of his own consciousness. This insight, Singer says, inspired Marx 40 years later to develop the concept of alienated labour, in which the worker objectifies or externalizes himself by putting the best of himself into his labour (pp.80-81). When the object is someone else's property, the objectified essence of the worker is lost to him and actually oppresses him. This concept of alienated labour becomes the basis for Marx's concept of surplus value (p.81).

Singer also describes Hegel's understanding of dialectics and the dialectical method, which Hegel uses "to uncover the form of pure thought" (p.99). Singer draws from Hegel's Philosophy of History to provide an example of the dialectical method, in which Greece's customary society (thesis) was revealed as inadequate via Socrates' questioning and independent thought (antithesis), leading to the "acceptance of the supreme right of individual conscience" (synthesis) (p.100). The synthesis then becomes the thesis for the next movement of history. I am not sure how adequate this explanation is, since (according to other sources, including Wikipedia) the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad first appeared in Fichte's summarization of Hegel's work. But perhaps it is enough: Singer goes on to explain that dialectic involves detecting how development involves opposing elements, leading to the disintegration of the current state and the creation of a relatively stable new state, which then develops its own tensions (p.102).

And I think that's enough for now. Singer has indeed produced a Very Short book, one that is highly readable. It did not sell me on the prospect of reading Hegel in the original, but it did give me an idea of the sweep of his thought and how it connects to themes about which I am concerned. If you're interested in taking the first step toward understanding Hegel, check it out. 

Reading :: Steps to an Ecology of Mind

Steps to an Ecology of Mind

By Gregory Bateson

This book is a classic collection of Bateson's work across decades. I've read it before, but haven't attempted to blog it. And rereading it, I remember why. It's a lot.

My review, alas, is short. Even though watching Bateson's development was fascinating—and he offers retrospective comments in each section, pointing out where he was struggling to develop concepts in each period—not all of this work is of direct interest to me and some of it is of interest primarily due to how it's been picked up elsewhere. In addition, I don't think I am adequately equipped to review parts in detail.

With that in mind, let's hit some highlights.

Bateson is well known for the concept of the double bind, in which someone faces two unsatisfactory and mutually reinforcing alternatives. In "Toward a theory of schizophrenia" (1956, authored by Bateson and colleagues), they theorize the double bind ("a situation in which no matter what a person does, he 'can't win,'" p.201) as a way to explain how schizophrenia develops. In "The group dynamics of schizophrenia" (1960, with colleagues), they add that the double blind is "a paradigm for human relations. Indeed, this sort of dilemma is not rare and it is not confined to the contexts of schizophrenia" (p.238). And in "Double bind" (1969, at a symposium on the double bind), he clarifies that "Double bind theory asserts that there is an experiential component in the determination or etiology of schizophrenic symptoms and related behavioral patterns, such as humor, art, poetry, etc. Notably the theory does not distinguish between these subspecialties" (p.272). (Here Bateson emphasizes the role of feedback loops, trial-and-error, and comparison in understanding systemic change (p.274), elements that John Boyd would later pick up for his OODA framework.) Bateson concludes that "if this pathology can be warded off or resisted, the total experience may promote creativity" (p.278).

The themes of feedback loops and trial-and-error also run through other chapters. For instance, in "The logical categories of learning and communication" (1964), Bateson argues that "all learning ... is to some degree stochastic (i.e., contains components of 'trial and error')" and develops "an hierarchic classification of the types of error which are to be corrected in the various learning processes" (p.287):

Zero learning: "the immediate base of all these acts ... not subject to correction by trial and error"

 

Learning I: "the revision of choice within an unchanged set of alternatives"

Learning II: "the revision of the set from which the choice is to be made" (p.287)

"...and so on," Bateson adds, emphasizing that the classifications can become more meta. Learning II is "learning to learn" (p.294) and "a way of punctuating events" (p.300). 

Learning III "is likely to be difficult and rare even in human beings" but, Bateson says, "something of the sort does from time to time occur in psychotherapy, religious conversion, and in other sequences in which there is profound reorganization of character" (p.301). "If Learning II is a learning of the contexts of Learning I, then Learning III should be a learning of the contexts of those contexts" (p.304). 

This insight leads us to Part III of the book, in which Bateson becomes interested in developing a theory of context—one in which a given utterance or action is part of a context, not a product or effect. Here is where Bateson draws on the concept of "ecology" in the book's title, in which relationships come to the fore and the phenomena with which Bateson has been concerned "become part of the ecology of ideas in systems of 'minds' whose boundaries no longer coincide with the skins of the participant individuals" (p.339). It is in this section, in "Form, substance, and difference," that Bateson gives us the illustration of the blind man and the stick (see my review of A Thousand Plateaus for an extended quote, which I won't reproduce here). Bateson also argues here that separating intellect from emotion, and mind from body, is "monstrous" (p.470). 

This book really is a must-read for those of us who are thinking through thought, cognition, and social systems. It's a lot to assimilate, as any book that summarizes an entire life's worth of thought should be. But it's still (generally) accessible and rewarding. Pick it up.

Reading :: The Knowledge Economy and Lifelong Learning

The Knowledge Economy and Lifelong Learning: A Critical Reader

Edited by D.W. Livingstone and David Guile

This book is from the same publisher as Guile's monograph The Learning Challenge of the Knowledge Economy and covers some of the same ground: How do educators deal with changes in the economy?

In their introduction, the editors argue that all human economies are knowledge-based (p.xvi) and ask: what, if anything, is new about the knowledge economy? (p.8). The pieces in the collection wrestle with this question in one way or another. I'll just pull out a couple of those pieces for discussion.

Beth A. Beckhy. "Object Lessons: Workplace Artifacts as Representations of Occupational Jurisdiction" (pp.229-256)

In this chapter, Beckhy notes that occupations are interdependent and examines how they compete for control in task areas, specifically in the case of "the work of engineers, technicians, and assemblers at a manufacturer of semiconductor equipment" (p.229). She focuses on artifacts, which "embed the knowledge of their creators" and which "symbolize social categories and influence and constrain social action" (p.232). Thus "examining artifacts provides a window into the social dynamics of occupational groups, because as artifacts cross occupational boundaries, they highlight the social interaction coalescing around them" (p.232). 

After some discussion of the case, Beckhy presents a table showing the impact of occupational artifacts on workplace jurisdiction (p.237). The columns: 

• Knowledge
• Authority
• Legitimacy

The rows:

• Drawings 
• Machines

And the results: These artifacts functioned as representations of knowledge (pp.237-w38), but also as "boundary objects" that "were used to mediate across occupational boundaries during episodes of problem solving" (p.238). She found that drawings allowed engineers to deflect blame and place blame because "they were open-ended and in a state of flux"—engineers could blame others' poor interpretation of the drawings (p.245). Meanwhile, technicians had physical control of their machines, so they could "challenge the authority of engineers" in that domain (p.246; cf. Dorothy Winsor's work at "AgriCorp"). I saw a lot of resonance with genre theory here.

Peter H. Sawchuk. "Divergent Working and Learning Trajectories in Social Services: Insights from a Use-Value Perspective." (pp.277-300)

Here, Sawchuk argues that to understand a knowledge-based economy, we must understand "the details of everyday economic life and learning" as an "arena of political economic struggle" (p.277). He argues that two things have not changed:

• knowledge, which "continues to be central to production and control"
• use-values, "the direct satisfaction of individual and collective need" (p.277)

However, "in the course of the intensification of learning and change ... the contradictions that emerge may provide an important point of departure for analysis of occupational change" (p.277). This analysis is guided by the use-value thesis (UVT), the result of a "dialogic interaction" between cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) and labour process theory (LPT) (p.278). He contrasts this approach with that of Engestrom, which (he charges) leaves to one side "the broader purpose and political economic dimensions" (p.282), including primary contradictions, which Engestrom and Sannino name-check (pp.282-283) but don't empirically investigate in a consistent way (p.283). He quotes Avis' critique of Engestrom's approach, in which Avis charges that "contradictions" actually secure the interests of capital (p.283). Sawchuk develops UVT as an alternative approach.

David Guile. "Working and Learning in the 'Knowledge-Based' Creative and Cultural Sector: Vocational Practice, Social Capital, and Entrepreneurability." (pp.301-316)

Guile discusses the rise of the creative and cultural (C&C) sector over "the last 20 years" (p.301; n.b., the collection was published in 2012). The knowledge economy has captured the imagination of policy makers, leading to educational policies that encourage developing C&C education and jobs. However, "the link policy makers and transnational agencies assume exist between  qualifications and access to employment does not apply in the ways they imagine in this sector" (p.301). (This argument sums up and extends the one that Guile made in his 2010 book.) Specifically, the C&C sector offers a tangible and intangible contribution to the economy," and policy is not well equipped to deal with the intangible (p.304). In the UK C&C sector, common features include:

• "external labour markets and hence freelance work"
• "individualized rather than unionized work practices"
• "multi-faceted conceptions of expertise" (p.308)

Guile overviews developments, then concludes that they "are likely in the current financial climate to exercise a suppression effect on the aspirations of people who lack financial and emotional forms of support and to position those who do have access to such support to take advantage of the port-of-entry positions that are either advertised in the C&C sector or uncovered from participating in C&C networks" (p.314). 

Overall, I found a lot to like in this collection. If you're interested in the knowledge economy (you can put scare quotes around the phrase if you like), take a look.

Reading :: Collaborative Projects

Collaborative Projects: An Interdisciplinary Study

Edited by Andy Blunden

This book has been on my shelf for maybe six months as I've been clearing out other books to be blogged (I usually do the library books first), or working on research, or sometimes simply procrastinating due to the high number of sticky notes protruding from the book's edges. I took a lot of notes. But I looked through those notes last night and I think this might end up to be a quicker review than I had anticipated. In any case, it's time.

This edited collection follows after Blunden's An Interdisciplinary Theory of Activity, which proposed rethinking the activity system as a collaborative project. In this collection, Blunden presents the works of several researchers who (more or less) take this tack with activity theory. Like most collections, this one is a bit lumpy, with people taking up the core idea in different ways. Rather than reviewing each contribution, I'll just discuss Blunden's introduction.

Andy Blunden. "Introduction: 'Collaborative Project' as a Concept for Interdisciplinary Human Science Research"

Like many collections, this one is most on-point in the introduction. Blunden notes that the human sciences are fragmented in various ways but a "chasm" exists between disciplines that study individuals vs. those that study humans en masse. He asserts that these two types of disciplines lack a mutual concept, and asks, "Could Activity Theory with 'project' as a unit of activity, [sic] provide a way to overcome this gap by using a shared conceptual language across both domains?" (p.1). He adds the adjective "collaborative" to "project," which "is meant to distinguish 'project' as a social formation in contradistinction to an individualistic conception of projects, but projects are always collaborative, and collaboration is always for a project" (p.1). In this chapter, he outlines the concept of the collaborative project.

Blunden tours thought from Marx to Vygotsky to Leontiev and Luria, comparing it with somewhat similar work that traces from Husserl to Schutz and Heidegger as well as Sartre. But he asserts that activity theory (AT) originates in the social world, while in phenomenology and existentialism "the psyche projects itself on to the world" (p.7). He notes how, in being taken up in Europe and the Nordic countries, the activity system developed as an elaboration of Leontiev's "activity" (p.7). 

Blunden argues, borrowing from Hegel, that "projects can be seen as passing through four stages of development," stages that are "ideal-typical, not proscriptive":

1. a group of people are subject to some problem or constraint on their freedom
2. they will attempt and fail projects due to misunderstanding the problem
3. they will formulate an adequate concept of the situation and launch a social movement to change social practices
4. the new form of practice is "mainstreamed" or institutionalized (p.8)

In their development, projects objectify themselves in three aspects: symbolic, instrumental, and practical (p.8). 

• Symbolic: Through being communicated or represented
• Instrumental: Through the construction of instruments or artifacts to facilitate/constrain project actions and integration with the community
• Practical: Once it has been relatively permanently (?) integrated into a community, it becomes an institution (p.9)

Importantly, Blunden argues, the object of the project is immanent within the project itself; it is "not some objective need existing independently of the project, which determines the project from the outside. It might even be quite illusory. But it emerges from the activity of the project itself, as its immanent goal and self-concept" (p.10). Notice that Leontiev would probably disagree, but Leontiev was working within an objectivist (Stalinist) framework. Notice also that conceiving the object as immanent allows the project to be conceived as a dialectical unity.

Blunden further argues that as a unit of analysis, a collaborative project also functions as an ethic (p.11). 

Skipping a bit: Blunden argues that "Every science has for its foundation one concept" — a unit of analysis, system concept, or molar unit (p.13). For many social sciences, he says, the UoA is an individual. For others, it is the social group (usually an aggregate of individuals). But both of these UoAs have been unsatisfactory, leading to proliferating system concepts in the 20th century: "discourse, activity, genre, language game, frame, tradition, figured world, activity system, idioculture, social formation, network, ideology, ideological apparatus, field, habitus and so on" (p.13). And objects of study included "nation, state, market, community, economy, culture, people, social class, and so on" (p.13). Blunden advocates for the collaborative project as a concept that 

• can represent social life at the individual, meso, and cultural-historical level
• can embody movement and change (not structural equilibrium)
• can capture the dynamic between how individual psyches are determined by social situation and how individuals participate in social change
• can express both an "ethical conception of modern life" and "a unit of scientific analysis for the formation of modern life and its conduct" (p.14)

Among other things, "the project is a concept of both psychology and sociology"; it is also humanist because it "gives realistic expression to the agency of individuals in societal affairs and concrete content to social relations" (p.15). 

Blunden thus sees the project as extending and strengthening AT for disciplines dealing with humans en masse (p.16). (Put another way, AT began as a psychology but has extended into a sociology.) 

Unlike psychology, the collaborative project treats emotion and reason under the same heading because we begin with actions (p.16). 

Unlike sociology, the collaborative project does not start with the social group: "Activity Theory sees a social group as but the product of a project, as the appearance of a project at one stage in its development" (pp.17-18). An institution is also a project—one that has become mainstreamed.

Around here, Blunden equates the collaborative project with the activity system (p.20). He adds that "there are three basic modes of collaboration which constitute labor activity as projects":

• command
• exchange
• collaboration (p.21).

(These roughly correspond to hierarchy, market, and network or collaborative community.)

In sum, the project is 

• genuinely interdisciplinary
• a theorization of the connection between human actions and the societal context
• a "further development" of Leontiev's "activity" and Engestrom's "activity system" (p.23)

Blunden adds that Leontiev's concept of activity was "defined by a universal, societal concept of its object"; people might have different perceptions of the object and the activity, and they might have different motives, but due to the social division of labor and societally produced supervision of labor, the social and individual needs are harmonized (p.24). This concept originated in the Soviet planned economy, and thus did not extend well to the capitalist world, nor to "any really existing 'planned economy'" (pp.24-25). Engestrom dealt with this issue via his expanding model. But the question remains: who or what determines the object of the activity/project? The Central Committee? Or does it just emerge from past activity? Blunden argues that it is "immanent within the project itself" (p.25, his emphasis). It's not just a solution (many solutions can be formulated for the same problem). The project continues to develop according to its own logic, so to speak" (p.25). 

This introduction is a lot to digest. And, as with many collections, the other pieces do not entirely share the vision of the introduction: they draw on varying theorists in varying ways, following the concept of the collaborative project in broad strokes but not entirely in specifics. Still, they are well worth reading. 

If you're interested in how AT is developing, and especially how to reconcile the concept of activity with other types of practice theory, definitely pick this collection up.

(What's wrong with my emails?)

If you're frustrated because people can't seem to understand your emails, drop details that you give them, and fail to follow directions—maybe there's something you can do about it. Join us for my HDO webinar "What's wrong with my emails?"

Mon, July 13, 2020
12:00 PM – 1:00 PM CDT
Free!

(Why is working at home so hard?)

I've tackled this question for the HDO blog.

Reading :: Rhet Ops

Rhet Ops: Rhetoric and Information Warfare
Edited by Jim Ridolfo and William Hart-Davidson

A while back, when Bill Hart-Davidson began tweeting about Rhet Ops (or is it RhetOps?), I asked him to clarify the concept further:

@billhd can you bottom-line the difference between #rhetops and propaganda?

He replied:

not clear to me in practice, but we use #rhetops to mark invocation of our disciplinary knowledge about the practice 

Bill is one of the smartest people in our field, and this is a reasonable distinction: "rhet ops" is not a phenomenon or existing type, it's an analytical concept meant to rhetorically examine arguments made by states (and perhaps nonstate actors) for military purposes. Or as they say in the introduction:

by mid-summer 2016 the project began to feel urgent as we collected an increasing number of stories under #RhetOps, a hashtag to mark convergences between digital rhetorical theory and military operations, that pointed to broader militarization of social media and the concomitant questions concerning the vulnerability of democracy (p.vii).

They explain that in this collection, they assemble "a diverse group of authors writing about the contemporary use of digital rhetoric by both state actors and military organizations as well as non-state actors whose motives involve carrying out violence" (p.5). They argue that military agencies are increasingly interested in digital rhetoric, and in addition, actors are increasingly using nonhuman agents in digital networks (p.6).

This concept seems like a good starting point. But after reading this collection, I still don't have a good idea of how RhetOps is operationalized. Each contributor seems to be working with a slightly different concept. For instance, John Gagnon lists 11 Minerva Initiative-funded projects that "clearly intersect in some way with rhetoric studies" (p.84)—these mainly seem to be grounded in psychology or sociology, although the author does not specify, and I strongly doubt that any of them involve rhetoric scholars. Based on this list, Gagnon speculates that "the Pentagon hopes to use such research for the purposes of weaponizing rhetorical knowledge" (pp.84-85). Fair enough: so did Pericles. In the next chapter, Brad Lucas claims that Vietnam War-era antiwar group Students for a Democratic Society "weaponized" the mimeograph machine and referred to the produced texts as "shotgun pamphlets," which Lucas characterizes as "textual weapons" (p.96). But I'm unclear whether Lucas' concept coheres with Gagnon's, or how rhetorical theory provides a deeper understanding than more established frameworks such as PsyOps.

I think that Angie Mallory comes closest to putting her finger on the central challenge in this collection. She explicitly discusses PsyOps (styled here as PSYOP) and attempts to define RhetOps against it (p.201). As she learned more about PSYOP, she realized that "they were oblivious to rhetoric and drew their entire background from psychology, and yet rhetoric was all about persuasive communication, which is what PSYOP experts do" (p.203). Yes: Other disciplines study persuasive communication, especially psychology but also other social sciences such as sociology, anthropology, and economics. Rhetoric doesn't own persuasion and argumentation, and must demonstrate that it actually brings something to the table if it is going to participate meaningfully in this discourse. It's not just a matter of "guarding the borders of our academic fields so tightly," as Mallory adds (p.203)—it's a matter of delineating our unique contributions, and demonstrating that they are useful and  compatible with those of other disciplines.

Does this collection do that? Like many, it's a mixed bag. Some contributions do seem to provide principled analysis that is grounded in or unique to rhetoric. For instance, in their chapter on ISIS, Marcellino and Magnuson tie RhetOps to cultural understanding, and say that "one possible way to frame this rhetorical battle being fought in the Middle East is as a dialogue" (p.125). The authors offer a rhetorical analysis by comparing lexical and lexicogrammatical strategies (p.126). Similarly, Michael Trice uses genre ecologies to map out the discourse in GamerGate. These have potential to interface with other, more established social sciences.

But as a whole, RhetOps seems like an initial orientation rather than an operationalizable concept—and to be fair, I think that's Bill and Jim Ridolfo conceived this collection, as the beginning of a conversation that might eventually develop an operationalized concept. At least that's what I think its central contribution is—and I hope this conversation continues. If you are interested in joining this conversation, this collection is an important starting point.

Reading :: Digital Work and the Platform Economy

Digital Work and the Platform Economy: Understanding Tasks, Skills and Capabilities in the New EraEdited by Seppo Poutanen, Anne Kovalainen, and Petri Rouvinen

Digital platforms include digital labor markets (Upwork, Fiverr, Uber), but also "platforms that can manage [firms'] interface with the external market and society" (as Kenney et al. say in Chapter 1, p.13). Kenney et al. provide us with a taxonomy that includes

• Venture labor
• Contractors
• Platform-mediated marketplaces
• Platform-mediated in-person service provision
• Platform-mediated remote service provision
• Consignment content creators
• Non-platform organization content
• User-generated content (p.17)

This first chapter provided an excellent overview of platform work. And through the rest of the book, contributors discuss topics such as: theorizing platform work; understanding how it interacts with workers' health and safety; understanding changes to vocational education, employment agencies, and migrant labor; understanding how to measure productivity; and understanding cultural changes.

The last topic was especially interesting to me. Laura Seppanen and Seppo Poutanen use activity theory to theorize platform work, arguing that platform workers still tend to follow a price-based market logic (p.183). (They generously use my typology from All Edge.) 

If you are looking for an overview of digital platforms, I recommend this book, which provides a great overview as well as a wealth of sources.

Reading :: Heteromation

Heteromation, and Other Stories of Computing and Capitalism
By Hamid R. Ekbia and Bonnie A. Nardi

This book's central argument is that "digital technologies are responses to the predicaments and opportunities of capitalism" (p.7). "While others debate whether digital technologies are mere tools or drivers of social change, we regard them largely as a response to the dynamics of socioeconomic change" (p.8).

Based on Marx, they argue that labor is "a uniquely human capacity, which accounts for the production of economic value in capitalism" (p.12). In this context, they introduce the concept of heteromation, which is "the extraction of economic value from low-cost or free labor in computer-mediated networks" (p.xv). They ask:

1. What are the social and technological processes through which economic value is extracted from digitally mediated labor?
2. What is the nature of the value created in this process to allow capital to continue its necessary expansion?
3. How are people incited to participate in this process? (p.3).  

 They argue that heteromation is "a capitalist innovation to deal with the tension that derives from [the] paradox" that Marx described, in which the rate of profit tends to fall due to "technologically driven rising productivity" (p.16). Heteromation represents "a new law of capitalist accumulation" (p.17) in which economic value is extracted "from uncompensated or low-wage labor, inciting participation through an intricate set of mechanisms comprised of social and emotional rewards, monetary compensation, and coercion" (pp.24-25). It extracts this labor via inclusion, engagement, and invisibility (p.39).

The authors deploy a variety of examples to make their argument: Mechanical Turk, social media use, kiosks, self-serve checkout at grocery stores. However, I found these examples to be too dispersed to cleanly make the argument the authors want to make.

For instance, take self-serve checkout—which (as the name suggests) disaggregates a component of service from the purchase of goods. The authors say that "a close look reveals that a good part of the labor is, in fact, done by another group of human beings—the consumer, the end user, an intermediary such as a family member, or in some cases, a new kind of casual laborer. This labor costs capital little or nothing" (p.108). Although automated grocery checkout is said to replace humans, the authors argue that "machines are not fully replacing humans, but rather reconfiguring the labor into the heteromated labor of end users who do the cognitive work" (p.110). The authors conclude that this work is "oxymoronically" called "self-service" when it is "no service at all" and instead hides the labor that the consumer ends up taking over (p.111).

But this argument seems to assume that service labor is an intrinsic part of what people are paying for, and thus they are being tricked into performing that labor themselves, while the company keeps the profits of their labor by charging for service that it does not produce. It's possible to view things differently: heteromation, in some cases, allows the provider to partially disaggregate service from the cost of goods. That is, before heteromation, the grocery store had to integrate the service of checkout into the cost of goods because otherwise people would walk out without paying, or pay the wrong price, or otherwise elide the transaction. With heteromation, some grocery shoppers are willing to perform that labor themselves, lowering labor costs in a business with notoriously thin profit margins. The service is no longer part of the goods. Consumers are evidently okay with this tradeoff—how many of us, given the chance, would choose a full-service gas station over a self-serve after comparing the price per gallon? For that matter, how many of us eat every meal at a restaurant (where the cost of labor and service is included in the price of the meal) rather than buying our own groceries and performing the labor of cooking at home?

The authors' argument also doesn't really engage with the relational aspect of value propositions (and I guess I would argue that Marx, who was specifically focused on commodities, doesn't either). For instance, the authors wrote this argument before COVID-19, and I'm writing this review afterwards. COVID-19 is a nice example of how value might change based on circumstances: I'm more likely to use, and see value in, a kiosk vs. a cashier now because the kiosk allows me to actively avoid germy people (I still have to touch the same germy keypad). What was an imposition in January is now, in April, an additional service, and I'm likely to seek out grocery stores that can provide this service. That is, heteromation is preferable for me and I might actually pay more for it because it provides the service of keeping me safer (just as people sometimes pay additional service fees to use ATMs).

The picture is more complicated, of course. Grocery stores still employ checkers, just not as many. They don't (yet) have a differential surcharge for human service. And automated systems do still have tenders, but the ratio of tender to checkout machine is more like 1:4 or 1:8. Finally, the provider may still keep charging for service that it is no longer providing—but to make that case, one would have to carefully disaggregate and examine these costs, and the authors don't do that.

In any case, this case—in which service is steadily disaggregated from cost of goods—seems rather different from the case of social media, in which people create value for the social media company simply by using its product. Or Mechanical Turk, in which people perform casual cognitive tasks.  Ultimately, I wanted the authors to make a stronger and more nuanced argument that these different cases did fit together, that they represented the same overarching trend, and that they all counted as labor.

As you can tell, I have a lot of thoughts about this book. And for that reason, I recommend it—although I was not convinced by the argument, this argument gave me plenty to think about. The authors draw broadly on various literatures to define and describe heteromation, a concept that can underpin other investigations into distributed labor.

(back in the game)

I haven't stopped reading, but I did stop blogging for a while. Not consciously—but I had a lot of other things competing for my attention. The COVID-19 shelter-in-place restrictions have actually made things worse, since I've had to help transition the lower-division curriculum as well as my own, as well as a zillion other things.

As a result, I'm eight books behind on my review schedule. So I'll start digging out today.

(Join us for the 2020 Activity Theory Summer School!)

Interested in activity theory? Want to learn about it and apply it to your own projects and get credit for it in the EU system?

If so, join us for the 2020 Activity Theory Summer School:

9-12th June 2020
University of Leeds
Instructors: Yrjö Engeström, Annalisa Sannino, Stan Karanasios, David Allen, and myself

ATSS 2019 was a blast, and we think 2020 will be even better.  We have more information up about this 7.5 credit course. The linked flyer has contact info for general questions, but don't hesitate to contact me directly (clay dot spinuzzi at utexas dot edu) if you have Spinuzzi-specific questions. Hope to see you there!

Reading :: Together

Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation
By Richard Sennett

I read this book (Kindle edition) because I was interested in the author's contrast between dialectic and dialogic forms of interaction. Sennett, a sociologist, is interested in the question of cooperation, which he says is a craft (loc 52) and defines as "an exchange in which the participants benefit from the encounter" (p.4). Specifically, rather than destructive collusion, he prefers cooperation in which people with conflicting interests can be joined (p.5). He argues that "modern society is 'de-skilling' people in practising cooperation" (p.8).

To explore the issue, he turns to dialogics, which "names attention and responsiveness to other people" (p.13). He contrasts dialogics with dialectics: dialectics' aim is to come to a common understanding (p.18), while dialogics' aim is to better understand each others' position even though common ground is not established (p.19). He links sympathy to dialectics and empathy to dialogics (p.21). Dialectics has an end, but dialogics is open-ended. Dialectics involves "a play of contraries leading to agreement" while dialogics involves "bouncing off views and experiences" (p.23). Unfortunately, our society is much better at the former than the latter (p.23). He specifically discusses the ill-fated Google Wave as a technology built on the dialectical form of cooperation (pp.26-27 and following). He concludes the introduction with this thought: "people's capacities for cooperation are far greater and more complex than institutions allow them to be"(p.29).

Later, he argues that "the one path emphasizes coming to shared conclusions, which is dialectic's goal; the other path emphasizes the dialogic process, in which mutual exchange may lead to no result. Along the one path, cooperation is a tool, a means; along the other, more of an end in itself" (p.45).

Overall, Sennett's book helped me to get a handle on the distinction between these two forms of interaction, although I would have liked to see a more structured and cited argument. As is, although Sennett has done a great job of drawing the contrast, I'll need to review sources myself to confirm whether others see the distinction in these terms.

Reading :: Startup Success

Startup Success: Funding the Early Stages of Your Venture
By Gordon Daugherty

This slim and highly readable book, by the president of Austin-based CapitalFactory, overviews early-stage venture funding. For readers of this blog (mainly academics), this topic may not seem that interesting. But Daugherty makes it interesting with clear and organized discussion, strong illustrations from his deep experience, and clearly drawn lessons. The illustrations, he acknowledges, are mainly from early-stage tech ventures, specifically a software subscription company. But the lessons apply more broadly.

I've been researching early-stage tech pitches for a few years, but this book helped me to put these pitches in greater context. For instance, Daugherty clearly spells out the early stages of startup fundraising (Figure 1.2) and the different types of investors who are pitched in each round (Chapter 3). He also clearly articulates the connection between pivots and fundraising (Figure 1.3). He provides a clear framework for understanding how much you should attempt to raise in each round (Figure 2.1 and following) and how fundraising interacts with valuation (Figure 2.3).

Daugherty also suggests focusing your pitch efforts, saving them for the right investors (ones with reasonable odds of investing) (p.89). And he advises that, at least in the startup phase, the CEO should be the chief fundraiser—which means that an introverted CEO should do some "soul-searching" (p.90) and perhaps find someone else to head the company.

During fundraising, "your most important fundraising tools will be your elevator pitch, pitch deck, and financial projection model" (p.93). Daugherty discusses how to develop each one.

The elevator pitch only has to pique enough interest for the listener to ask a question, any question (p.93). It should answer the questions "What do you do?" and "So what?" (p.95).

The pitch deck serves as a summarized, visual version of the business plan; its most important aspects are (in order) storyline, flow and content (p.102). It should demonstrate that you're building a company, not just a product (p.109). It should cover the following:

• problem
• market
• solution
• business model
• traction
• team
• call to action (pp.105-113)

And it should have a "backup section," which contains details to answer questions that you anticipate coming up in the Q&A (pp.113-114).

He suggests two versions: "one for 5-minute onstage pitch competitions [8-10 slides] and another that is longer and used for in-person investor meetings [12-15 slides]" (p.117). He adds that a pitch deck for a Series A round will be longer than one for a seed round, since it has more to report (p.117).

Daugherty suggests signing up for multiple pitch competitions, since doing so forces you to tell your pitch story in 3-5 minutes (p.119).

The financial model is important for demonstrating that what you're building is not just a product but a business (p.129).

Beyond these three important tools, Daugherty also mentions monthly updates and one-pagers (p.129).

Daugherty then gives us a couple of chapters on fundraising, which I won't summarize. In Chapter 8, however, he discusses interacting with investors, a process that he says involves "a transfer of enthusiasm from founder to investor" (p.208). To find out how an investor makes decisions, he says, talk to other companies that s/he has invested in, like a reference check (p.211).

Overall, this was a great book—highly readable, clearly organized, full of details without being too weighted down by excessive illustration. I learned a lot. If you're interested in the startup investment process, definitely pick it up.

Reading :: Soviet Psychology: History, Theory, Context

Soviet Psychology: History, Theory, Content
By John McLeish

I saw this book in UT's library catalog perhaps 18 months ago, but it never seemed to be on the shelf. Finally I ordered a used copy on Amazon — a copy that had been withdrawn from the Columbus College Library in Columbus, Georgia. (It had been checked out once, due April 14, 1985.)

Their loss was my gain. In this 1975 book, MacLeish develops an account of Soviet psychology as it developed from previous Russian efforts, through the revolution, to the mid-1970s. The book predates the publication of Vygotsky's Mind in Society in the West (1978), so Vygotsky doesn't have the rock star status in this narrative that he would receive later, but Vygotsky and his associates are still discussed, and the overall sweep is clear and generally accords with other accounts I've read.

MacLeish begins with an historical overview. He notes that he considers Soviet psychologists correct in "asserting a monistic view of the organism in its environment as the only possible basis for a science of behavior" (p.2), but argues that Soviet dogmatism held back psychology as a scientific endeavor due to "the subordination of scientific truth to political expediency": "For many years, especially between 1935 and 1955, the discussion of psychological theory was reduced to a subjective elaboration of philosophical nuances of a doctrinaire and irrelevant character" (p.3). Yet the line of inquiry, when divorced from Soviet partisanship, was still valid and McLeish argues that its insights are "acceptable to a large body of non-Communist psychological opinion" (p.3).

He identifies two major themes in the development of Soviet psychology.

1) "the Marxist view that there is no such thing as an unchanging, eternal human essence. ... Informed Communists believe it possible to transform 'human nature' to an unlimited extent" by changing society (p.3). Here he refers to the New Man, a motif "emerging and re-emerging over the whole period of development since 1917" and emphasizing "system and dynamic change. Soviet scientists have been concerned primarily with developing a psychological theory which is compatible with an invincible optimism about the possibility of consciously directing social influences to produce a completely new society and a new type of humanity" (p.3).

2) "the linking of the philosophical controversies of the eighteen forties, fifties, and sixties in Russia with current themes" (p.3). These controversies "were devoted not only to philosophical questions but to the problems of social and political change," and they laid the basis for "the birth of an independent science of human behavior" on the work of Chernishevski and Sechenov (p.3).

With this foundation laid, McLeish dives into Russian history pre-Revolution, noting that under the Tsarist regime, educating the illiterate was seen as destroying society (p.14)! He reviews society and science as it developed from the 1700s to the Revolution, noting consequential themes (which I'll skip over in this review).

In Part II, we get to Soviet psychology proper. McLeish notes that it is different from Western psychology. Western psychology is based on experiment (i.e., it is empiricist), is concerned with the individual, is eclectic (building a general theory inductively from data), and "seeks to avoid any 'contamination' with philosophical a priorism" (p.65). In contrast, Soviet psychology "rejects empiricism as a principle of organization of scientific data," "attempts to explain experimental data within a context of presuppositions about the nature of man and society," understands the individual as part of a society; and "rejects eclecticism as a sign either of intellectual incompetence or of an intellectual compromise based ultimately on ideological self-interest" (p.65). (Note: We can see these principles in action in Levitin's interview with Leontiev.)

McLeish provides a detailed history of objective psychology in Russia, including the works of Lomonosov, Sechenov, and Pavlov, along with interactions with philosophers and the Marx-Engels-Lenin line, summarized in a figure (p.83). One highlight for me was the lucid discussion of Lenin's theory of reflection as interpreted in relation to Pavlov. McLeish summarizes Lenin's position: since the psyche is material and monist, "Reality is fully knowable. Truth is the reflection in the human brain of the actual objects and connections existing outside of us. ... The fact that we know the real world is proved by human practice — that is we can transform reality by working on it to achieve a known and predictable outcome. At the same time there are no absolute, eternal, unchanging truths" (p.84). Reflection theory, of course, became an important tenet for Leontiev's activity theory in the Stalinist years.

In Chapter 4, McLeish reviews the years 1917-1929 in Soviet psychology. He notes that "Four alternative theories were presented in the period 1924-9 for consideration, and possibly official recognition, as Marxist psychology": Kornilov's reactology; Bekhterev's reflexology; Pavlov's conditional reflex (p.99); and Vygotsky's so-called cultural-historical psychology, which was "discredited on the grounds that he borrowed too heavily from Western psychology" as well as his ties to pedology (p.100).

McLeish notes that Lenin's conception of the Party, and the development of academic studies in the Soviet Union, both have roots in the Russian tradition of group consensus. In this tradition,

all are encouraged to participate as equals [in an organized discussion] up to the point where a clear and decisive majority viewpoint emerges. The vote is then taken. The members of the group who are then in the minority are expected to reconsider their standpoint with a view to making the decision unanimous. In any case, everyone must implement the majority decision loyally: neither is further discussion tolerated when a definitive vote has been taken. In Old Russia, according to Kovaleski, in the village commune members of the minority, if they continued contumacious, were beaten with rods until they agreed with the majority view. (p.101)

(Recall that Lenin's opponents once lost a vote, so he insisted on calling the Mensheviks (minority) and his own faction Bolsheviks (majority).)

Immediately after the Revolution, a number of foreign theoretical systems flourished, including Gestalt (p.104). But 1921-1923 marked the end of idealism, and in 1924, Kornilov "swept idealism into oblivion" with the publication of an unoriginal but doctrinaire monograph (p.105). Kornilov had just taken over the directorship of the State Institute of Experimental Psychology in 1923 (p.108). McLeish adds that from this point on, "Theory, and the correct theory, is a prerequisite for intelligent research" (p.109).

With this background, McLeish overviews the four schools, none of which were "considered adequate" (p.109). In his summary of Vygotsky's school, he notes that Vygotsky emphasized the importance of cultural environment in the development of human traits, a line of inquiry that "has since found its way into non-Soviet psychology from anthropology" (p.121). Yet this "devotion to foreign fashions in psychology" and his focus on pedology led to lost favor. McLeish also claims that Vygotsky also made the error of not quoting Marx, Engels, and Lenin enough (p.121). In any case, Vygotsky was accused of thinking that he could dissociate "facts" from the bourgeoise theories that produced them (p.122). Nevertheless, McLeish argues, "In reality, Vygotski and his associates Luria and Leontiev laid the foundation in this period of the Marxist approach to the psyche as a historical, developmental product," one that develops dialectically from cooperative labor, as Engels claimed (p.122).

Moreover, they used both the word and the concept of reflection in accordance with Lenin (p.122). And McLeish adds that "Vygotski was engaged with the 'second signaling system' of Pavlov" (p.123). McLeish ends the chapter in this way: "It is now recognized, belatedly perhaps, that Vygotski emphasized aspects of psychology which have since become part of the pattern of Soviet psychology. ... But it must be said that these current emphases are derived from Marx and only secondarily from Vygotski's associates" (p.124).

(Side note: Rudneva (1936) attacked Vygotsky's work for not using reflection theory, and Leontiev and Luria quickly take up the term and apply it in their subsequent work. So I'm not sure I'm on board this claim, although Leontiev and Luria might well have presented Vygotsky in that light shortly before McLeish wrote this book. Similarly, I think the language of the "second signaling system" was picked up by Leontiev and especially Luria around 1950, when Pavlov was elevated during a joint scientific session of the USSR Academy of Sciences and USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.)

From here, in Ch.5 McLeish examines the influence of the five-year plans, noting the critical role of 1929, the "year of the great divide." Lenin's NEP was destroyed, Trotsky had been expelled, and Stalin was ascendant (p.127). After 1931, six major errors were defined, which "specify the rules which should not be broken" in Soviet psychological and general scientific method (p.132). The errors were:

• Idealism: A sweeping category that includes spirit as opposed to matter, but also abstract categories and even non-dialectical philosophy in general (p.133). For Soviet psychologists, Western empiricism (which "proceeds inductively from what is regarded as the safe ground of experience") is considered idealist in that it does not proceed from correct theory (p.134). 
• Mechanical materialism: An approach to materialism that is too reductive to address historical development. "Mechanical materialism makes an initial assumption that thought, consciousness, and sensation have merely a subjective, or even a fictitious, existence. ... It creates the necessity for a realm of non-material reality," and thus consciousness, which is expelled from mechanical materialism, "returns to plague the theoretician as an experimental ghost" (p.139). Bekhterev, Freud, and the Gestaltists all came under criticism under this error (p.140). 
• Reductionism: This error involves "the attempt to reduce psychological processes on the human level to physiological or biological functioning, failing to realize that new laws, principles, and explanatory concepts must be posited as we move from lower to higher levels" (p.140). Soviet psychologists came to argue that "any specific human characteristic or quality, whether it be an emotion, an attitude, or an intellectual ability, develops through activity. There is a dynamic interaction with the environment which changes not only the individual but the environment as well" (p.141). 
• Abstract human essence: "the attempt to provide a generalized psychology descriptive of man in all times and places" (p.142). 
• Dualism: "any attempt to consider mind as capable of some form of existence separate from matter" (p.144). 
• Eclecticism: "the large-scale borrowing of theoretical systems as well as of factual data from foreign psychologists. Neither system nor data are acceptable" (p.144). He adds, "In 1931 Soviet psychologists turned away from the methods and concepts developed under the capitalist market economy and attempted to strike out on a new path" (p.145). (Recall that Vygotsky and Luria were accused of eclecticism by Rasmyslov in 1934 for their tendency to rely on Durkheim and other Western sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists.) McLeish notes that a 1931 decree on primary and secondary schools was meant to precipitate a sharp break with Western methods and theories, but that break was not completed until the infamous 1936 Pedology Decree (p.147).

Note: In an aside on idealism, McLeish discusses Lenin's reflection theory, in which psychic processes are taken to be reflections of external matter or material processes. Lenin grounds this theory in Marx's Capital, in which Marx asserts that "The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought" (quoted on p.136). Thus reflection "is not a passive, mirror-like image of reality": Marx stresses "the active side of perception and knowledge," McLeish notes, and Lenin characterizes it as "an eternal process of movement, in which contradictions are forever emerging and being resolved" (quoted on p.136). 

Near the end of the chapter, McLeish adds that "it was Vygotski who introduced the principle of historicism into Russian experimental psychology" and notes that Vygotski's principle of double stimulation was invented by his colleague Sakharov (p.152). 

In Chapter 6, McLeish discusses Soviet psychology from 1935-1947 ("in the Stalin era"). The Communist Party cell of the Moscow Institute of Psychology began critically assessing psychological schools in 1929 with the publication of Lenin's philosophical notebooks (p.159). By the time the Pedology Decree was published in 1936, "all the prevailing schools of psychology ... had been discredited. All the technical journals devoted to psychology as an independent brand of knowledge, established in 1928, had been shut down ... Until 1955, psychological studies could appear only if they conformed to the requirements of the physiological or educational journals" (p.159). Psychological research continued, but without a publication outlet (p.159). "Basic research became a backroom activity" (p.160). 

Ascendant during this time was the theme of the New Man, "free to act because he has the necessary will to do so as well as the understanding of the laws of his own nature, of nature and society essential to act in accordance with necessity" (p.161). McLeish argues that in Russia, there was no Reformation, so the underlying conception of society remained spiritual rather than disintegrating as it had in western Europe (p.162). McLeish asks whether the New Soviet Man is Russian or Marxist, concluding that two conceptions had developed in parallel before unifying—indigenous peasant and Orthodox beliefs, borrowings from Western culture, and deliberate Marxist assimilation by Lenin (p.163). (McLeish does not mention the outsized influence of Nietzsche.) The New Soviet Man's virtues included:

• Optimism: "The Russians believe that anything is possible to man, that there are no limits to man's power of transforming nature and society. This is not a mere figure of speech, but is to be taken in its most literal meaning" (p.164). Here, McLeish mentions Lysenkoism, though not by name; we can also think of Leontiev's work with dermal vision.
• Modesty: "It is social man and not individual man for whom all things are — potentially at any rate — possible" (p.164).
• Collectivism: The NSM "has no purposes which conflict with those of the collective. His particular successes are derived from the good fortune of society, from the success of social, collective work" (p.164).
• Social humanism: The NSM "loves and cares for people," unlike the misanthropes in capitalist society, but hates the enemies of the working class (p.165).
• Patriotism: For the NSM, "the motherland and the idea of Communism as the ideal of progressive humanity everywhere are inseparably united" (p.165).
• Ideological approach: The NSM takes an ideological approach to all questions, from the point of view of the working class, leading to true objectivity (p.165). 
• Sense of duty: Developing from the above (p.166).
• Communist attitude to work: "Work is not to be regarded as a punishment for sin, but as the very basis of man's life, the centre of his living interests, and the conditions of a free, human personality" (p.166).
• Readiness to overcome difficulties: The NSM is ready to overcome difficulties and fight for Communism (p.166).

The NSM, McLeish says, can be interpreted in terms of a recurrent figure in Russian folklore: the sleeping giant who suddenly awakens and transforms his environment (p.168). 

You'll notice from the NSM characteristics and the work in previous chapters that McLeish likes to develop exhaustive lists of characteristics. The next list is that of axioms underlying Soviet psychological research:

• psychophysical monism
• the theory of reflection
• the materialist determination of consciousness and activity
• the principle of contradiction in development
• the unity of consciousness and activity
• the class or historical character of psychic processes (p.170). 

In this context, McLeish notes a few things that relate to the Vygotsky Circle:

• Vygotsky was the first to investigate schizophrenia via systematic experimental investigation (pp.175-176). 
• One principle in Soviet therapy is that it stresses work "and the proper attitude to it. Since it is through co-operative labour that man attains his highest level of development, work can be used as a therapeutic agency" (p.176; we see this attitude in Leontiev and Zaporozhets' work at the rehabilitation hospital and arguably in the Gulag as well).
• Abandoning pedology meant abandoning "the conception of normal distribution of traits, such as intelligence, in human beings" (p.177). We see this turn in Leontiev's postwar writings.

Speaking of Leontiev's postwar writings, McLeish overviews the biology discussion of 1948 (p.190) and its effects on psychology (p.195). First, Rubinstein's 1940 textbook, which had won the Stalin Prize (!), was critically reviewed in 1948 (p.195). Rubinstein was accused of proffering a science of unconscious mind copied from Freud and Lewin (p.196). This sort of borrowing was unacceptable: if a single indivisible truth exists, as the Soviets believed, then an eclectic approach meant drawing on two incompatible and mutually contradictory sources (p.199). 

At the end of the chapter, McLeish praises Vygotsky's work, but notes that "his work was totally ignored during the whole period except by his immediate associates — Leontiev, Zaparozhetz, and others" (p.213). 

The next chapter examines 1950-1955, "half a decade of Pavlovian psychology," starting with the 1950 conference centered around Pavlov and the uptake of his underdeveloped "second signaling system" (p.215). McLeish provides an analogy between this second signaling system and Lenin's reflection theory (p.216). 

Around here, McLeish begins to discuss Leontiev's work—in present tense. (Leontiev died in 1979, just four years after the book was published.) McLeish notes that Leontiev is a leader in the study of "mental and educational backwardness" [sic!] (p.221). He reviews Leontiev's work with the rehabilitation hospital and on developing perfect pitch (p.221), on memory, and on teaching the "mentally defective" (p.222-223). 

In the last chapter, McLeish undertakes a survey of Soviet psychology, noting its divergences from Western psychology. The biggest gap, he says, is in the study of emotions (p.232); here, he mentions a paper Vygotsky wrote in 1932 but that remained unpublished until 1958 (p.234). He also notes the work that Leontiev and Luria did in the area using the combined motor method (p.236). 

Under a separate heading, McLeish discusses social psychology, which was "placed in the deep freeze in the late twenties and early thirties" (p.243). From 1936-1963, h states, there were no studies of social psychology (p.243). 

McLeish regards thought and speech as the central problem of Soviet psychology (p.247). "The processes of thought and speech are seen through the prism of dialectical materialism," specifically based on reflection theory (Lenin) and reflex (Sechenov, Pavlov) (p.248). Here, he reviews Vygotsky's work, specifically how "in a series of experimental studies he demonstrated the real nature of the higher mental processes" (p.248). According to McLeish, "Leontiev, Smirnov, Zinchenko, and many others have filled in details of this picture" (p.249). He sees Vygotsky's central contribution to be the understanding of internalization, a concept that he links to reflection (p.249). 

And that's it for this review. As you can tell, I think this book does a solid job of overviewing trends in Soviet psychology as well as roots of some of its concepts, roots that stretch in part to pre-Soviet Russian culture. I quibble with some of the characterizations of the Vygotsky Circle, but to be fair, the evidence for those quibbles really wasn't available in 1975. Overall, I recommend the book highly if you are as interested in the history of Soviet psychology as I am.